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Notations
The following notations and abbreviations are found throughout this thesis:
Z The set of integers.
Z+ The set of strictly positive integers.
£ The set of participating agents (£ = {l,...,n}).
n The number of participating agents (n = |£|).
T The collection of feasible sets.
S The lowest cost feasible set.
SM The feasible set chosen by mechanism M..
m The number of agents in the feasible set (e.g. m — |(S'[).
b A bid vector (b = (&i,..., bm)).
be The bid of agent e.
b“ A specific bid vector (b“ = (f>“,..., b^)).
6“ The bid of agent e in bid vector ba.
by The sum of bids of agents in set V(Y^e€y be).
cy The sum of costs of agents in set V(Y]eeV ce)-
by The sum of bids, in vector ba, of agents in set V&“)•
Py1 The sum of payments by M. to agents in set V(^2e^.y ■
pM The sum of payments by M to agents in the set SM(Y2eeSM Pe4)-
c A cost vector (c = (ci,..., cn)).
ce The cost of agent e.
pM The payment vector of mechanism Af, (p = (pi,... ,Pm))'
p-M The payment to agent e by the mechanism AT
NTUmin Non-Transfer able Utility minimum.
fomm An NTUmin bid vector
NTUmax Non-Transfer able Utility maximum.
TUmin Transferable Utility minimum.
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q
Transferable Utility maximum.
Ordered Maximal Bidding minimum.
Ordered Maximal Bidding maximum.
An ordering of the set S.
An ordering of the lexicographically first, lowest cost feasible set, S.
A maximal ordered bid vector for ordering a.
A specific ordering of the lexicographically first, lowest cost feasible set, S. 
A maximal ordered bid vector for ordering 7.
An iteratively rising bid vector for selection function /.
An iteratively rising bid vector for selection function /.
A uniformly rising bid vector.
A uniformly falling bid vector.
A quantity to purchase in a single-commodity auction.
A quantity vector (q = (?i, • • •, 9n)).
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Preface
This thesis is primarily my own work. The sources of other materials are identifed. 
Chapter 1 contains introductory materials describing the setting, and is drawn from 
various authors. From Chapter 2 onwards, of particular importance are the definitions 
and notation that have been used in previous literature describing set-system auctions 
and frugality. These come from the paper by Elkind, Goldberg and Goldberg in 2007 
[11], which derives much of the notation and definitions from Karlin, Kempe and Tamir 
in 2005 [24]. The structure for various examples are derived from examples given in [11]; 
in particular extensions of the ‘diamond’ graph appearing in both papers.
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Abstract
We study the topic Frugality in Set System auctions; examining the payments that are 
given by truthful mechanisms when buying selections of items at auction.
Firstly, we examine a simple single-commodity auction, where the auctioneer wishes 
to buy some given quantity of identical items. We show methods of quickly computing 
a winning set, as well as the benchmark NTUmin. We then show, for certain special 
cases, a mechanism that improves on the frugality of VCG, and is within a constant 
factor of optimal for mechanisms in its class. We then consider the general case, and see 
a relatively large lower-bound for a class of similar mechanisms.
We propose a new type of auction, based on finding the shortest-path in a graph with 
‘bundles’ of edges. We show that finding an optimal solution to this problem is NP-hard, 
for any bundle-size (k) of 2 or more, showing that there is no polynomial time algorithm 
that can compute an exact solution, subject to the commonly-held assumption that 
P! =NP. However, we give a simple k approximation and use this to design a truthful 
mechanism and give its frugality ratio.
We consider the benchmarks that have been used in the literature as first-price 
auctions, and examine a range of other possibilities that should aim to meet the same 
‘fairness’ criteria. We show that not all of the proposals will meet these criteria, and give 
the ranges of values possible for these other benchmarks. We also give information on 
their computational complexity, including a new result showing approximation hardness 
for a new benchmark as well as an existing one used in the literature.
We then briefly examine the meaning of the benchmarks we used for frugality if they 
are rewritten for use in the more traditional ‘forward’ auctions (that is, selling items by 
auction).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 History
An auction is a traditional method of selling items, or services, amongst a pool of 
interested parties. In the classic setting, an item is offered up for sale and ‘bids’ are 
invited by varying means, with the intention that the seller can agree to sell to one of 
the interested parties at some price acceptable to the chosen buyer. Reports of sales by 
auction go back at least as far as Herodotus [21], around 2,500 years ago.
One of the most common types of auction is an ‘English’ auction, which is an inter­
active process, traditionally held with all of the potential buyers in the same room. In 
this auction, the auctioneer starts by offering the item at some low price. When at least 
one person indicates their willingness to buy at the current price, they are deemed to 
have bid that price on the item, and are accepted, provisionally, as a winner at the price 
of the bid. The auctioneer then increases the price, and asks if anyone else in the room 
would like to buy at the slightly higher price. If there is somebody else who is prepared 
to pay the new price, they then become the provisional winner at the new price. This 
process is then repeated until there are no bidders left that are prepared to pay the new 
price, and the provisional winner becomes the winner and must pay the price of his final 
bid. Although it is not relevant in this work, for completeness, it is worth describing a 
reasonably common complication — a seller may specify a reserve price, which is not 
communicated to the buyers, and if the result of the auction would be to sell below this 
price then the sale is cancelled.
Another type of auction that has been commonly used is the sealed bid auction. 
In such an auction, the seller invites the buyers to submit a bid amount, in a sealed 
envelope, to be given by a certain date and time. At the given time no more bids are 
accepted, and the sealed bids can now be revealed. The seller then chooses the amount 
of the largest bid and sells to that bidder at the price of his bid (this property is often 
called a first-price auction, as the price paid is equal to the highest bid).
William Vickrey in 1961 [37] made some interesting observations about the different 
strategies that are present in these two types of auction. Assuming that all the buyers 
have in mind a specific valuation for the item (the maximum price that they are prepared
1
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t° pay) which only they know, their optimal strategy in an English auction is to keep 
bidding until the price reaches their private valuation.
The optimal strategy for a sealed bid is rather more complex, as it will depend on 
the buyers’ knowledge of the likely bids by the other buyers. As an example, if each 
buyer were to believe that his is the only bid, he could place an arbitrarily low bid with 
the expectation that he could secure the purchase at a very low price. There is also 
certainly no incentive to place a bid that is in excess of their valuations, so this auction 
tends to incentivize bidding below their valuation, but not in an easily predicted way. 
If we wish to make any sort of mathematical analysis of an auction then being unable 
to determine the correct strategy for any of the buyers is obviously undesirable.
Vickrey proposed a sealed-bid auction that avoids this problem. His auction takes 
sealed bids, chooses the winner with the highest bid, but only sells at the price of the 
next highest bid. He shows, through case analysis, that the optimal strategy in this type 
of auction is for each of the sellers to submit a bid which is equal to their full valuation 
for the item. This type of auction is now generally known as a Vickrey Auction, and the 
term second-price is often used as a description. We will see an example of this shortly, 
in Section 1.1.2, which will also describe the case analysis which shows that each bidder 
should only ever bid their full, truthful, valuation.
A dominant strategy in an auction is some strategy that a buyer can adopt in order 
to guarantee their best possible outcome, no matter what the bids of the other buyers 
may be. When the dominant strategy for a type of auction is truth-telling, we often 
describe it as truthful Obviously, not all types of auction admit a dominant strategy, 
such as the ‘first-price’ sealed-bid auction discussed earlier — in order to get the best 
possible result, the bidder would need to know all of the other bids first.
While, of course, humans are quite capable of employing many convoluted, devious 
and even unfathomable strategies, the notion of the ‘rational, selfish agent’ is perhaps 
not so far from reality. As Vickrey pointed out, truthfulness removes the (possibly 
substantial) burden for each bidder of trying to predict the behaviour of the other 
bidders. If this difficult prediction is not done correctly then it seems likely that this 
will lead to less than optimal outcomes.
The notion of truthfulness is not restricted to auctions, and can be applied to many 
other settings which involve making some allocation of resources within some community, 
such as in auctions, markets, voting and routing games. Perhaps, unsurprisingly, there 
is a great deal of literature studying truthful mechanisms and there are many references 
as well as descriptions of several domains in the book by Nisan et al. [35].
So far, we have been discussing sales by auction as they have been historically the 
most commonly seen type of auction. However, this thesis is primarily about procure­
ment auctions where the auction is run on behalf of a single buyer, rather than a seller. 
Sales by auction can sometimes be called forward auctions with procurement auctions 
being called reverse auctions. We primarily concern ourselves with sealed bid auctions
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(although we do not restrict ourselves to a single item), and the notion of truthfulness 
in these auctions is an important theme in this thesis.
As is common with the literature in the field, throughout this work we refer to the 
auction participants as agents, with the body deemed to be running the auction called 
the auctioneer.
One assumption we make, which is extremely natural in an auction setting, is that 
we imagine the use of some form of currency or money. The way that we imagine the 
use of money throughout this work is to assign values to certain properties that the 
participants hold. We measure how ‘happy’ an agent is with some utility value, so our 
assumption that each participant acts purely selfishly (or rationally) can be modelled 
by requiring that every agent maximizes its utility value.
1.1.1 Auction Mechanisms
We generally call these rules concerning the running of an auction a mechanism (see, 
e.g., [3, 4, 24, 35, 11]).
In the case of a sealed-bid procurement auction a mechanism may be uniquely char­
acterized by just two rules — a selection rule and a payment rule. The selection rule 
examines all of the bids supplied by the agents and then chooses which of the agents it 
will buy from. The payment rule will then decide a value for a payment to each of the 
agents that was selected. We will also make the standard, reasonable, assumptions on 
individual rationality — that an agent which is not selected will always have a payment 
value of zero, and that each agent that is selling an item will be paid no less than the 
amount that they bid, otherwise they would not be willing to participate in the auction.
The same concept of a mechanism can be applied to a forward auction. The mecha­
nism will select a ‘winning set’ to sell items to, and will decide on the payment amount 
that each of the winning agents must make. It is also standard to assume that agents 
who do not win pay zero, and that no agent is asked to pay more than the amount of 
their bid.
1.1.2 Example of a Vickrey Auction
We now give a more detailed description of a procurement auction. In this example, we 
have a person, Mary who wishes to purchase a pet lamb. Mary has identified a number 
of possible suppliers. The first on her list is a nearby farm owned by Fred. Fred would 
be able to get £20 each for his lambs at the local market, but making a special delivery 
to Mary would cost him an additional £5 in time and fuel, so Fred values his lamb at 
£25. The second supplier on Mary’s list is George’s Farm, which is somewhat further 
away. Including the delivery, George values his lamb at £40. The final possible supplier 
is a neighbour and small-holder, Bob. He also keeps sheep as pets and has had more 
lambs this year than he expected; he would be happy to let one go to a good home (and 
not to slaughter) for free to reduce his maintenance costs, and hence he values his lamb 
at zero, although he would still like to be paid a fair price.
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Mary has chosen to purchase her lamb by way of a sealed-bid auction, and has chosen 
to use the Vickrey, 2nd-price, auction. In this auction, Mary will ask for sealed-bids and 
will select the lowest-cost supplier. She will then pay the second-lowest cost. As Fred, 
George and Bob are all aware of this, they can each see that their best strategy is simply 
to bid their actual valuations, of £25, £40 and 0 respectively. As Vickrey noted, there 
is never any advantage to bidding other than their valuations in this setting, but we will 
briefly demonstrate it here.
Truthfulness of Vickrey Auction
We will examine Fred’s possible choice of bids, assuming that the other bids are unknown 
to him. We take the first case, that Fred bids £25 and wins the auction. This means 
that Fred is paid the second-lowest price, £x and that x > 25. If Fred bids below £25 
he will still win the auction, and still be paid £x so does not benefit by changing it. If 
Fred bids above £25, and still wins the auction, then he must have bid no more than 
x, so is still paid £x. If Fred bids above £25, but loses the auction, then he makes no 
profit at all, so cannot benefit by this.
In the second case, Fred bids £25 but loses in the auction, so somebody must have 
bid £x, where x < 25. If he bids more than £25, he will still lose. If he were to bid 
£y with y < 25 and he manages to win the auction, then he must have bid y < x, but 
x < 25, so he cannot make any profit with this bid either (and will make a loss unless 
x = 25 exactly). This analysis may be duplicated for each of the other suppliers with 
the obvious changes.
Notation
Now we have seen why the Vickrey auction ensures that the suppliers bid truthfully, 
we will consider a more formal notation for this auction. We denote Fred by Agent 1, 
George by 2 and Bob by 3, and write this auction in the form given in Example 1.1; in 
order to avoid ambiguity we will use the labels Ai, A2, A3 to refer to agents 1,2, and 3 
(this notation is used throughout this thesis).
The example shows the set of solutions that are acceptable to Mary as feasible sets, 
denoted by ^ = {{Ai}, {A2}, {A3}}, which shows simply that Mary may have chosen to 
buy from any of Fred, George, or Bob. We can see from Table 1.1 in column ce that the 
entry for agent A\ gives ci = 251 which is the cost value for Fred, and hence the amount 
of the bid he submitted, as he will bid truthfully. The other costs given are C2 — 40 and
C3 = 0.
We can see that Mary chooses to buy her lamb from Bob, where the winning set is 
given as S — {A3}. The payment made to Bob of £25, as the second-highest, is given 
by P3 =25. We follow the convention that ‘losing’ agents do not receive any payment.
1The notation describing the cost of agent Ai is abbreviated from ca, to ci throughout. Similar 
abbreviations for the bid, price and valuation of an agent Ae are given as be,pe, and ve respectively.
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Example 1.1. Suppose that we have three agents Ai, A2 and A$, and that the feasible 
sets are T — {{Ai}} {^2}, {A3}}. Observe that the winning set S — {A3}.
Agent vCe Pe
A! 25
A2 40
A3 0 25
Table 1.1: Mary’s Vickrey Auction
1.2 Procurement Auctions
In recent years, competitive tendering has been of great importance to many organi­
sations, in particular public bodies, not least due to the accountability it lends to the 
procurement process. For example, in the United Kingdom, The 1980 Local Govern­
ment, Planning and Land Act (c.65) made competitive tendering compulsory in certain 
circumstances. Competitive tendering typically requires that a number of different com­
petitors are given the opportunity to bid for a contract, with the contract awarded to 
the most competitive bid (typically the lowest cost, but there may be other factors taken 
into consideration).
The traditional auction sales that have been discussed here have often been about 
selling lots of single items and, similarly, ‘competitive tendering’ can be seen as an 
auction for a single contract. These may easily and naturally be extended to include 
auctions for multiple items, which were also studied by Vickrey [37]. From the assump­
tion that a buyer may wish to procure some number of items it is only a small step to 
assume that a buyer may wish to procure only certain specific combinations of items. 
To give a possible example; perhaps an organisation may need promotional materials to 
be printed and there are a number of different technologies available. If they buy inkjet 
printers then they may also need plain paper and ink. Laser printing may use the same 
paper but require toner rather than ink. Thermal printing may require special paper 
but no further consumables. This choice may easily extend to many other items, such 
as the options for covers or bindings. It is certainly conceivable that there are many 
different manufacturers who may be able to competitively supply specific parts of the 
requirements without being able to fulfil the entire need unilaterally.
Another way of considering this type of auction is assume it that of ‘hiring a team 
of agents’ (see, e.g., [4, 24, 11]) to perform some complex task. In this model we assume 
that each agent can perform some task, for a price, which is a sub-task of the more 
complex task that is required. It is the goal of the auctioneer to buy any set of agents 
such that, between them, they can perform the entire complex task required.
This notion, of buying only certain combinations of items, can be captured with a set- 
system auction, and we will now see a more precise definition of the type of procurement
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auction that we will study. In the general case, we allow the acceptable solutions to be 
defined as a specified collection of sets, each of which is some acceptable subset of the 
selling agents that are taking part in the auction (which we call a feasible set). We call 
this auction a Set-System Auction.
Set-System auctions are integral to much of the work that is presented in this thesis. 
We will now formally define the Set-System Auction as a method of using an auction to 
purchase a solution to some problem that can be represented by a set-system, following 
the definitions of Karlin et al. [24].
1.2.1 Set-System Auctions
Let a set-system (£, J-) be specified by a set £ of n elements, each representing an agent, 
and a collection J7 C 2s of feasible sets; these are the subsets of agents that make an 
acceptable solution for the buyer. We will, in general, assume that any superset of a 
feasible set is also a feasible set, which is a reasonable assumption for many problems of 
‘hiring a team’.
The final outcome of the auction will be achieved by a process as follows. Each agent 
e G £ will submit a sealed bid be to the auction, giving a bid vector b. Let n = |£|, 
and b = (&i,,.., 6n). We also assume that there is a cost vector c = (ci,..., cn) that 
represents the cost ce that each agent e will incur in providing its goods or services, but 
that this information is private and known only to the agent. Recall that a truthful 
mechanism is designed to elicit truth-telling, so that an agent may maximize its utility 
by truthful bidding, i.e., that Ve E £,6e = ce. Typically, in a procurement auction, the 
utility value is simply defined as payment received minus cost outlaid.
In order to simplify some of the later notation, we will define aggregates over any 
set of agents, denoted by T, to refer to the sum of values of those agents. Recall that 
we have defined a cost vector c = (ci,..., Cn), and a bid vector b = (&i,..., 6n), and let 
p be a payment vector p — (pi,... ,pn) representing the payments made to each agent. 
Let these aggregates be
ct =
eeT
bT = J2b*’
eeT
PT - ^Pe- 
eeT
Recall that a mechanism, which we will denote by A4, is a method (or set of rules) 
for running the auction. Every mechanism M. consists of a selection rule, and a payment 
rule, which are implemented as follows. The auctioneer will, by means of this mechanism 
M, select a set of agents (which must be a feasible set defined by the set-system) which 
we will call E J7 to be the ‘winners’. The mechanism will then pay each agent 
e E SM some value p^1. Note that the set S^ will depend on the mechanism AA, and 
may not always be the same as the lowest-cost solution.
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1.3 Truthful Strategies
Recall the idea of dominant strategies — which are when an auction participant (a seller 
or buyer, for procurement auctions or forward auctions respectively) has some specific 
strategy that will always give them the best possible result, regardless of the bids of 
other participants. We are interested in designing mechanisms that have truth-telling 
as a dominant strategy; that is designing auction mechanisms so that all participants 
are incentivized to bid only their true valuations — often referred to as a truthful mech­
anism [35].
The notion of a truthful mechanism is an interesting one, not least because it allows 
some method of predicting the strategies that may be employed by bidders. While this 
idea of truthfulness may perhaps seems a little difficult to pinpoint at first, given some 
reasonable assumptions, and appropriate definitions, it can be very well defined.
In a procurement auction we will generally assume that an agent is supplying some 
sort of goods or services and that it will incur some cost if it is selected but zero cost if it 
is not selected. Many of the more esoteric preferences that exist in real-world situations 
can be thought of as being included in this ‘cost’ valuation and we can think of it as the 
price at which the participant is ambivalent to being selected or not.
It is well-known, in our auction setting, that there are certain properties that mech­
anism must hold which are both necessary and sufficient for the mechanism to be truth­
ful [35], The first is that the selection rule must be monotonic. In a procurement 
auction this means that, given all other bids being equal, if agent e may be selected in 
the ‘winning’ set with some bid value be then agent e must always be selected with any 
bid b'e when b'e < be. More intuitively, an agent can never get into the winning set by 
increasing its bid. The second property that must be met is that the payment rule must 
pay threshold payments. A threshold payment is the supremum of the amounts that the 
agent can bid and still be selected in the winning set, given the fixed bids of the other 
agents. In the case of the Vickrey ‘second-price’ auctions that we have seen it is easy 
to observe that the threshold payment is exactly the price of the second-highest bid, as 
any lower bid would not win and any higher bid would be unnecessarily high.
1.3.1 The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism
Vickrey described a truthful way to purchase single, or multiple, items at auction. Fur­
ther work, by Clarke [6] and Groves [18] then extended this mechanism to more general 
settings. The mechanism that they devised has become known as the Vickrey-Clarke- 
Groves (VCG) mechanism and is perfectly applicable to the types of set-system auctions 
that we are interested in. As VCG is historically important, and has a quite gen­
eral definition, it is quite common for any new mechanism to be compared with VCG 
(see,e.g., [4, 24, 11]), and we will see a number of comparisons to the VCG mechanism 
throughout this work.
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While the VCG mechanism is applicable to a large range of scenarios it does have 
a simple definition when applied to set-system auctions. We give a definition here that 
was described by Karlin et ah [24].
Definition 1.1. Given a set-system auction having cost vector c, let S be the lowest- 
cost feasible set. Let the VCG payment denoted by pXCG given to each agent e £ /S', be 
pXCG — Cc + ct ~ c-s when T is the lowest cost feasible set T £ ^ such that e £T.
□
VCG is well known to be a truthful mechanism (see, e.g., [35]), and we can easily 
verify this. The selection rule chooses the lowest-cost feasible set, which is clearly mono­
tonic. The payment rule given is a threshold payment — assuming that all agents bid 
their cost value, then if e were to submit a bid be = ce + c? — eg then we would have 
bs = cs\{e} + c& + ct — cs — eg + ct — cs ^ ct- Hence be = ce + ct — cs is a threshold 
bid, as T is an alternative feasible set, and the cost of T compared to the cost of S 
represents the threshold between e ‘winning’ the auction and ‘losing’. We already know 
that having a monotonic selection rule and threshold payments are sufficient conditions 
for a truthful mechanism.
Although the definition is given in terms of costs, we know that VCG is truthful, so 
we can assume that the bids made to the mechanism are identical to the costs, and the 
VCG payment can equally be given by p^CG — 6e + br — 6,5.
Observe that using VCG requires finding the lowest-cost feasible set. However, find­
ing a lowest-cost feasible set may be an NP-hard problem, making VCG not universally 
useful. For example, Elkind et al. [11] describe a polynomial-time truthful mechanism 
for (NP-hard) vertex cover auctions by using an approximation algorithm.
1.3.2 VCG Example
To demonstrate VCG in action, we return to the example of Mary and her attempt to 
buy a pet lamb.
Mary has discovered that sheep are social animals, so she has decided that she would 
need to purchase at least 3 lambs. Bob still has a lamb available, and has found 2 other 
local small-holders that each have one lamb available that they would be prepared to 
accept no payment for (although Mary does not know this prior to the auction). Mary 
has also found a farmer who will give her two lambs for just the cost of delivery, at £40 
for both.
Mary, again, decides to run an auction, and invites sealed bids. The VCG payment 
is slightly more complex than in Example 1.1, but the VCG payment to an agent can 
be thought of as the amount extra that would need to be paid if that agent were not 
involved in the auction. In this example, Mary will choose the 3 lambs from the small­
holders, and each will be paid £40 — the cost that Mary would have incurred if each 
one, individually, did not participate (defined by p£GG = ce + c? — cs) — giving a total 
of £120.
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This example is shown as Example 1.2, where agents Ai, A2, A3 represent the small­
holders, and agent A4 the farmer.
Example 1.2. Suppose that we have four agents Ai, A2, A3, and A4. The feasible sets 
are IF = {{Ai, A2, A3}, {Ai, A4}, {A2, A4}, {A3, A4}}. The costs are given in Table 1.2, 
and observe that the winning set S = {Ai, A2,A3}.
Agent ce pYCG
Ai 0 40
^2 0 40
A3 0 40
a4 40
Total 120
Table 1.2: Mary’s VCG Auction
1.4 Frugality
Recall that, in the Vickrey procurement auction, a single item is bought for a price 
equal to the second-lowest bid. Obviously, this may not be the optimal outcome for the 
auctioneer as there may have been a seller willing to sell at a much lower price (such as 
in Example 1.1). If we wish to make our mechanisms truthful, then we may have to pay 
more than perhaps we might had we somehow known all of the bidder’s true valuations. 
Truthful mechanisms are certainly very desirable mechanisms for study, so we would 
naturally like to understand more about this potential downside of overpayment. Not 
surprisingly, the question of studying overpayment has been looked at earlier — initially 
by Archer and Tardos [4] in 2002. They called this concept, of measuring overpayment, 
frugality. The measuring of frugality is a common theme throughout this thesis, where 
we aim to extend the known results in this field. Firstly, though, we need to give a 
description of what exactly we mean by frugality, which is followed by a formal definition 
of a metric which allows the idea of frugality to be measured.
Perhaps the first question that springs to mind in measuring ‘overpayment’ would be 
‘what do we compare the payment with?’. It turns out that this is not a trivial question. 
A first attempt may be to consider taking the cost of the winning set as a possible 
benchmark, but even for the Vickrey mechanism, Archer and Tardos in [4] observed 
that no truthful mechanism can hope to get near this lowest price (within an arbitrary 
factor). To help illustrate this, if we refer to Mary’s Vickrey auction in Example 1.1, 
we see that the lowest-cost feasible set has a cost of 0, and the Vickrey payment has no 
finite approximation ratio to this. If we were to assume that 0 was a reasonable payment 
for this auction, then there would be no incentive for Bob to bid truthfully, as a larger 
bid may well gain him some payment, causing him not to bid truthfully.
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Next, we could possibly consider using the second lowest cost feasible set as a bench­
mark. In the case of an auction for a single item, this would give the same value as the 
Vickrey payment. This idea was addressed by Archer and Tardos in [4]. They consid­
ered the case of path auctions2, and while they quickly discount the lowest-cost set as 
a possible benchmark for truthful mechanisms, they do consider the cost of the second- 
best disjoint solution (or feasible set) to be a reasonable benchmark. They observe that, 
in the case of a path auction, there must always be at least two disjoint feasible sets 
or else some agent holds a monopoly. (We do not consider auctions where some agent 
holds a monopoly, and must always be selected, as an auction is not a useful method of 
purchasing items in such situations.)
However, in our general setting, it is easy to see that disjoint feasible sets may not 
always exist, which we can demonstrate. Returning to Example 1.2, We can easily see 
that there are no disjoint solutions, as any solution must contain at least 3 lambs, leaving 
at most 2 others. Therefore, we need some more general approach than that of Archer 
and Tardos, and here we turn to the procedure suggested by Karlin, Kempe and Tamir 
in [24] and extended by Elkind, Goldberg and Goldberg in [11].
Karlin et al. [24] decided to look at first-price auctions in an attempt to define a 
reasonable benchmark figure. Recall that first-price auctions are where the buyer is paid 
exactly their bid price, and that first-price auctions do not generally admit dominant 
strategies, and so are not truthful. They decided that, due to the lack of dominant 
strategies in first-price auctions, they would consider the concept of a Nash equilibrium.
Generally, a Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies for the agents such that no agent 
may increase utility by unilaterally deviating from its current strategy. More specifically, 
in this auction setting, we can consider an agent’s strategy to be simply the bid that it 
makes. Hence a Nash equilibrium is an assignment of bids to the agents such that no 
agent would increase utility by choosing a different bid. For completeness, a pure Nash 
equilibrium requires that each agent deterministically chooses a single strategy. There 
is an alternative — a mixed Nash equilibrium, where every agent may choose a number 
of different strategies, each with some probability.
Based upon this idea of a Nash equilibrium, they gave the following definition for a 
benchmark figure, which will be referred to throughout this thesis.
2In a path auction, the sellers represent edges in a graph, and the auctioneer wishes to purchase a path 
between two specified vertices of the graph. Path Auctions are described in more detail in Section 1.5.1.
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1.4.1 Frugality Definitions
Definition 1.2. Let the cost vector be c = (ci,..., cn). For an instance I = (£,.F,c) 
of a set-system auction, define S' as a feasible set S G F with the lowest cost, i.e., 
VS' G F, (Se'eS1' ce') — {Y^e£Sce)‘ Define NTUmin(c) as the solution to the following 
problem. 3
Minimize B = Ylets subject to
(1) ce f°r all e G S
(2) J2e€S\T be < J2e€T\S Ce for all T G F
(3) for every e G S, there is Te G F such that e ^Te and ^2e'GS\Te be' — Se'eTe\5 ce'
□
For concreteness, we will assume that that S is the lexicographically first of the 
lowest cost feasible sets. It was shown in Proposition 24 of [11], that NTUmin(c) will 
give the same result for any legal choice of S as a lowest cost winning set. So we can, 
also, without loss of generality, assume that S is minimal with regard to set inclusion.
We can regard these three conditions less formally as something like ‘fairness’ criteria 
that should be met to qualify as a reasonable benchmark. Specifically, they can be 
thought of as “1) No agent should lose out by taking part, 2) No set of agents can bid 
more than a competing set, and 3) Every agent bids as much as possible, as long as 1) 
and 2) are not violated.”
We can now define how we measure a mechanism’s ‘overpayment’ more precisely by 
referring to its frugality ratio. This is the worst-case ratio (over all possible instances) 
of the ratio between the payments made by that mechanism and the chosen benchmark 
figure. Let pm(c) be total payment made by mechanism M., given the cost vector 
c. We will then use the NTUmin(c) value to define the frugality ratio of a mechanism 
Ai — which is the supremum of the ratio of pm(c) NTUmin(c) over all possible cost 
vectors (over all instances).
More formally, we will define this as
0NTU min (A4) = sup(p^l(c)/NTUmin(c)).
C
We will now define the variations that were introduced by Elkind et al. [11]. Firstly 
the maximization version of NTUmin, as follows. Define NTUmax(c) as the solution to 
the optimization problem “Maximize B subject to conditions (1),(2), and (3)”. There 
are also similar versions that capture the idea of transferable utility. This notion is that 
some agents could possibly, rationally, bid below their costs if they could ‘privately’
3 The idea that these values come from the agents’ bids in a first-price auction, and also the notation 
be, are those used previously in the literature (see, e.g., [24, 11, 5]). However, we also use the same 
description and notation for describing the bids an agent may make to some mechanism to actually take 
part in an auction (again, consistent with the literature), even though the two concepts are not entirely 
equivalent.
Chapter 1. Introduction 12
arrange a transfer of utility from some of the other agents. Allowing artificially low bids 
from some of the agents may allow other agents (possibly more of them) to improve 
their bids, which can lead to a wider range of values4. We define this by modifying the 
first condition, such that each agent may bid below its cost value, but not below zero, 
as follows.
(1*) be>0 for all e G S'
We now use this modified constraint in the following definitions.
Definition 1.3. Let TUmin(c) be the solution to the optimization problem “Minimize 
B subject to (1*),(2), and (3)”.
Let TUmax(c) be the solution to the optimization problem “Maximize B subject to 
(l*),(2),and (3)”.
We simply define the other frugality ratios described by Elkind et al. [11] in the same 
way as we did for NTUmin.
^NTU max (At) = sup(p_^(c)/NTUmax(c)).
C
^TUmin(A^) = sup(p^(c)/TUmin(c)).
c
<£tu max (M) = sup(px(c)/TUmax(c)).
c
It was noted by Elkind et al. [11] that TUmin may be too low to be a realistic 
benchmark, as it may even be lower than the cost of the winning set, and that TUmax 
may be too liberal to use as a benchmark, as it may be much higher than the sum of 
VCG payments. Therefore, we do not use TUmin or TUmax widely here, but there 
is some comparison of other possible benchmark figures with both TUmin and TUmax 
given in Chapter 5.
An agent e G £ may sometimes be referred to by a numerical index; in order to 
maintain clarity, these agents will often be labelled as A^,... ,An rather than the less 
specific 1,..., n. In order to specify different bid vectors, we will also describe some of 
them with a label, such as a. In these cases we will simply have ba = (&“,..., 6“) and 
call the aggregate
^ = £6“
eeV
1.4.2 Benchmarks
Now that we have these definitions, we can see the NTUmin and NTUmax values from 
Mary’s VCG Auction that was given in Example 1.2. These are shown in Table 1.3, 
where the &™m column shows an NTUmin value of £40 and an NTUmax value of £60 is 
shown in the b™3* column. The existence of the alternative feasible sets Ti = {A3, A^},
4Elkind et al. [11] showed a factor of n — 1
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J2 = {Ai, A4}, and T3 = {^2,^4} implies the following constraints (from condition (2) 
of Definition 1.2) respectively 61+62 < 40, 62+63 < 40, and 61+63 < 40. It is easy to see, 
given that one of these constraints must be tight due to satisfying condition (3), that the 
minimum value possible is 40. It is also easy to see that the maximum value that satisfies 
these constraints is 60 (as adding the constraints together gives 2(61 + 62 + 63) < 120). 
In this thesis, we will primarily focus on the use of NTUmin due to its appearance in 
the literature (e.g. [24, 39, 23, 11]).
Agent p™ bmin ^max
Al 0 40 40 20
A2 0 40 0 20
A3 0 40 0 20
A4 40
Total 120 40 60
Table 1.3: Mary’s VCG Auction with NTUmin, NTUmax
Using this frugality ratio to measure overpayment, Karlin et al. [24] gave examples 
that show VCG may overpay (relative to NTUmin) by a factor of n — 1, where n is the 
number of agents. They observe that Q,(n) is obviously an upper bound on frugality 5 
and hence that the VCG payment may be undesirably large.
1.4.3 Feasible Bid Vectors and Nash Equilibrium
We will consider any bid vector which satisfies conditions (1) ,(2), and (3) of Definition 1.2 
as a feasible bid vector. It is worth observing the similarity of a bid vector to a pure 
Nash equilibrium — given a feasible bid vector, no agent has any incentive to deviate 
from its current bid (assuming that the bids of agents not in S are equal to their cost). 
A winning agent would lose utility by strictly decreasing its bid and would drop out of 
the winning set by strictly increasing its bid (reducing its utility to zero). Any losing 
agent that decreased its bid would then be bidding a value lower than its cost, which 
could only lead to it possibly receiving negative utility. Hence we can think of NTUmin 
as being something like the cheapest Nash equilibrium for a first-price auction and it is 
sometimes referred to in this way (see, e.g., [35] for an example). However, we would 
not consider this to be a conventional pure Nash equilibrium as it requires that certain 
assumptions are made, particularly to do with tie-breaking rules. For instance, even 
though NTUmin is clearly defined for path auctions, Immorlica et al. [22] have shown 
that, for first-price path auctions, pure Nash equilibria may not even exist.
5We show that n — 1 is an upper bound in Chapter 2.
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1.5 Special Cases of Set-Systems
It is very often interesting to examine special cases of these set-system auctions. There 
are many reasons for this, but an important one is that a well-chosen special case may 
provide a good model for common, real-world, requirements. There are two special 
cases that are particularly important to this thesis, they are path auctions and single­
commodity auctions.
1.5.1 Path Auctions
One of these special cases is for path auctions, which was formally introduced in 1999 by 
Nisan and Ronen [33], and involves buying, by auction, some path between two specified 
vertices on a weighted graph. Measuring the payments made by a truthful mechanism 
was studied by Archer and Tardos in 2001 [3], which they applied to path auctions 
in 2002 [4]. This work was extended by Elkind, Sahai, and Steiglitz in 2004 [12]. In 
2005, Karlin, Kempe and Tamir [24] proposed a more general framework for measuring 
frugality which could be applied to all set-system auctions. They also proposed a ‘scaling’ 
mechanism which has a worst-case overpayment (or frugality ratio) of nfy'n). They then 
show that it is within a factor of 2\/2 of optimal for any truthful mechanism. 6
In a path auction, we assume an underlying weighted graph G — (V, E) and represent 
the participation of each seller as an edge e £ E. The aim of the buyer is to purchase, by 
auction, any path between two specified vertices s and t. It is easy to imagine real-world 
examples that can be exactly, or closely, modelled with this case. Buying paths in a 
communications network or the use of transport infrastructure are natural things for a 
large organisation, like a government, to purchase. One desirable feature of the path 
auction is that an optimal solution can be computed quickly (in quadratic time, due to 
Dijkstra [9]), but with other types of set-system there may not even be a polynomial-time 
algorithm for finding a best solution. In this work, we will spend some time looking for 
reasonable auction solutions to some such ‘hard’ problems; there has been previous work 
that has attempted to do that for other hard problems (e.g. the vertex cover auctions 
in [11, 25]).
1.5.2 Commodity Auctions
Another special case that is particularly studied here, but is not seen in the literature, 
is of a single commodity auction. In this auction we have some parameter, which we 
denote by Q, of individual, identical items to purchase. Each seller e also has some 
amount, denoted by qey of these items to sell which they will only sell as an entire lot. 
Any subset of sellers with at least a quantity of Q between them is a feasible set. This 
is perhaps the most simple, yet still potentially useful, set system auction which makes 
it particularly worthy of study.
6The analysis of this mechanism has since been improved to a factor of 2 by Yan [39] and Chen et 
al. [5]
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1.6 Thesis Outline
We now give a brief description of the aims and main results of this thesis.
1.6.1 Chapter 2
Chapter 2 gives a bound on frugality for VCG of n — 1, improving on the observation of 
Karlin et al. [24] that the frugality ratio of VCG is obviously 0(n). We extend this to 
give a frugality ratio for any truthful mechanisms based on monotonic approximation 
algorithms (when the approximation algorithm is used as the selection rule).
1.6.2 Chapter 3
In Chapter 3 we mostly consider the special-case of the single-commodity auction when 
each agent has at most 2 items for sale. The aim here is to design a mechanism which 
performs better than VCG in terms of frugality, but does not have significantly greater 
time complexity. We give a formal definition for this auction and show, through exam­
ples, that the VCG mechanism can overpay by as much as a factor of n — 1 even in this 
restricted setting. It is reasonably obvious that this results from VCG possibly choosing 
a large winning set, as this requires a large number of individual payments to be made. 
The mechanism of Karlin et al. [24] improves on VCG by using a ‘scaling’ mechanism 
that biases the mechanism towards choosing smaller winning sets, and hence having 
less agents to pay. Of course, this bias must not go too far, or else a small winning 
set would still be able to attract undesirably large payments. Their approach was to 
consider two possible disjoint solutions and bias towards the smaller. Unlike path auc­
tions, monopoly-free single commodity auctions do not have the luxury of always having 
at least two disjoint solutions, but it is reasonably obvious that choosing agents with 
larger quantities will tend to result in smaller winning sets. It is this observation that 
motivates the scaling mechanism proposed in Chapter 3 which results in a frugality ratio 
that is significantly lower than VCG (recall that frugality ratios are always worst-case). 
However, we show that if we lift the restriction that sellers have at most two items then 
similar types of scaling mechanisms can only possibly have limited success in improving 
frugality.
1.6.3 Chapter 4
The challenge for the mechanism design in Chapter 4 is somewhat different. We firstly 
propose a problem that is a reasonable generalization of a path auction. In this model, 
we consider that each agent owns some collection of edges, and is willing to provide all 
of their edges for some fixed cost. If we think of ‘off-peak’ or ‘surplus capacity’ path 
auctions then we can reason that sellers may often be willing to sell access to their entire 
network for some fixed cost. Additional network usage may add little to any overheads, 
for example in transport or telecommunication networks. It is also reasonable to assume 
that having just a single payment may reduce administration (and hence costs) for both
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buyer and seller, making this model attractive. This type of path auction has been 
previously studied by Du, Sami and Shi [10]. However, in their model, they allow agents 
to incorrectly declare the ownership of the edges, which is a fundamental difference. 
They show negative results for this setting — that there is no truthful mechanism when 
only the edge costs are reported. Furthermore, other auctions of that type have been 
shown by Kempe et al. [23] to have a lower bound on frugality of fl(2n) for all false- 
name-proof mechanisms (where an agent is incentivized to give an honest valuation 
as well as an honest declaration of ownership). These results suggest that allowing 
agents to dishonestly report ownership would prove a major obstacle to finding frugal 
(truthful) mechanisms. In many real-world cases it is reasonable to assume that the 
ownership information may well be public knowledge, and hence we restrict our analysis 
to the cases that either the information is public, or analogously, that it will be honestly 
revealed.
The main result of this chapter is to show that finding the lowest-cost feasible set is 
not polynomial-time solvable (unless P=NP), hence there is no known way of running 
VCG in polynomial time. We then describe a mechanism for this that has bounded 
frugality. Although its frugality ratio is larger than VCG (by a factor of k, a parameter 
of the auction) this mechanism is significant as it may be computed in polynomial time, 
unlike VCG.
1.6.4 Chapter 5
Chapter 5 examines a number of alternative procedures to find reasonable benchmark 
figures for set-system auctions. Many of the results here can be thought of as being 
negative as they show reasons why these procedures do not give good benchmarks, but 
we do see some interesting results on the possible ranges of these values.
The question of what to use as a benchmark has been asked since the notion of 
frugality was introduced for path auctions in 2002 by Archer and Tardos [4]. In that 
setting they could use the fact that there are at least two disjoint solutions in any 
monopoly-free graph. However, this solution does not easily generalize to many other 
types of procurement auction — we have seen that often no disjoint solutions even exist.
Recall that Elkind et al. proposed a number of variations of this benchmark, (NTU- 
max, TUmin and TUmax). The variants TUmin and TUmax (that have a weakened rule 
1, allowing transfer of utility between agents) were discounted as being too weak and 
too strong respectively. They also noted that NTUmin has some undesirable properties 
— it may be non-monotonic, in that increased competition between agents may actually 
cause the benchmark to rise. They also show that this may be NP-hard to compute, 
even where finding the minimum solutions are easily computed.
As we have already noted, the NTUmin and NTUmax values can be thought of as 
equilibrium values of first-price auctions. We have seen, in recent work, a move from 
the NTUmin benchmark ([24, 11]) to the NTUmax value ([5, 25]). However, in [11] it 
was shown that there may be a large difference between them (a ratio of n — 2 exists
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for any n > 2). It seems reasonable, therefore, to ask the question ‘What else could be 
used as a reasonable benchmark’. We examine this question in Chapter 5 by looking at 
several other, natural, types of first-price auction.
As we would wish any proposed benchmark to be seen as ‘fair’ we would like our 
benchmarks to satisfy the same three ‘fairness’ rules as NTUmin and NTUmax, and 
hence we are looking for values in the range between these two (seller-pessimistic and 
seller-optimistic) values. We imagine a number of iterative processes where agents are 
allowed to make bids according to some rules (such as each bid must be lower than 
the preceding bid). Our contribution is to examine the results of these and consider 
the range of values that may possibly be obtained in comparison with NTUmin and 
NTUmax, as well as examining the complexity of actually computing the result. We 
will also show that approximating NTUmin can be NP-hard, even when the minimum 
solutions may be easily computed,
1.6.5 Chapter 6
Forward auctions are, if anything, even more ubiquitous than procurement auctions. 
There has been much research in the area of combinatorial auctions, where buyers may 
bid on particular ‘bundles’ of the items for sale (e.g. Chapter 11 of [35]). However, 
defining a ‘fair’ value to compare with the price obtained by a truthful combinatorial 
auction does not seem like an easy question to answer. There are benchmark figures 
that are used in certain special-cases, such as the value proposed by Goldberg et 
al. in 2006 [16] for digital goods auctions. As the NTUmin value is so well-defined for 
procurement auctions it seems an obvious goal to try and adapt it for use in forward 
auctions. In Chapter 6, we look at how we may attempt to define set-system auctions in 
the forward setting so that we can define a benchmark figure analogous to NTUmin. We 
take the special case of unit-demand forward auctions to give some comparison between 
the proposed benchmark, FNTUmax, and the value used previously.
1.6.6 Chapter 7
We finish, in Chapter 7, with conclusions and a discussion of some of the problems that 
are left open by this work.
Chapter 2
Frugality in General Set-System 
Auctions
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we briefly examine frugality ratios for general set-system auctions. It 
was observed by Karlin et ah [24] that there is an upper bound on the frugality ratio 
of VCG which is trivially 0(n). We present a proof that gives an exact upper bound 
of n — 1 on the frugality ratio of VCG (Karlin et al. [24] also showed that VCG has 
a frugality ratio of at least n — 1), We can then extend this proof and show an upper 
bound on the frugality ratio for truthful mechanisms which have selection rules that are 
monotonic approximation algorithms. While this result is, perhaps, not very difficult, 
it does not appear to have been documented elsewhere. Finally we give a proof that, 
for VCG, that the choice of winning set may be made to be minimal with regard to set 
inclusion.
As part of the analysis, we will often be considering the best possible (lowest cost) 
feasible set that is restricted to only a given subset of agents from £. We will define 
some notation for this, let d{V) be the best feasible set (that with the lowest sum of 
costs) using only agents in V where V C. £.
We will now see a lower bound for NTUmin(c), based upon this definition, which, 
informally, states that NTUmin must be at least as large as the worst-case cost of 
replacing one of the agents to make a feasible set without it.
Lemma 2.1. NTUmin > maxec^£^e}p
Proof. If we choose an e that maximizes then we will firstly see e can always
be chosen such that e E S. (We can assume, without loss of generality, that S El £ 
because if S does not have a monopoly then we can always choose some smaller feasible 
set S' G S instead.) We will examine this as two cases;
Case 1: Suppose that > c^.
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The set given by d(£ \ {e}) has been chosen with the minimal sum of costs, with the 
restriction that e is not included. Therefore S can only have a lower cost if it has 
benefited from including agent e, and therefore it follows that e £ S.
Case 2: Suppose that = cs-
As e is chosen to maximize ^(^{e}), and cs is the minimum possible choice for 
any e, then it follows that all possible choices of e must have equal cost. That is, 
Vj e = cs- Therefore, we can choose e to be any agent in £, and hence
we can choose e such that e 6 S'.
Now, assume an NTUmin bid vector bmin and an agent e that maximizes 
Recall the definition that 6^ln = Y^iev (^e sum of the bids for set V), and for our 
chosen agent e and that bid vector bmin satisfies condition (3) in Definition 1.2 we have
b5\re = cTe\5 (2.1)
for some Te £ J- and e ^ Te. We know from choosing d(8 \ {e}), as a lowest cost solution 
without e, that
cTe ^ Cd(£\{e})‘ (2.2)
Additionally, where bmm satisfies condition (1) in Definition 1.2 then we have
bsnTe > csnTe
and adding this to Equation 2.1 gives
bS\Te + bSnTc ^ cTe\S + CsnTe
which can be simplified to
Ltnin \ _ bS > CTe
and with Inequality 2.2, due to transitivity then
i.min°S > Cd{£\{e}) •
Therefore NTUmin(c) > maxe as claimed.
□
This lower bound for NTUmin(c) is a useful result in analysing frugality ratios, and 
we will now see how it can be used to prove an upper bound on the frugality of VCG.
2.2 Frugality of VCG
For a minimal winning set S, and for each e £ S; then we can observe that a threshold 
bid (and hence payment pe) can be upper-bounded by the bids of a replacement solution.
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Recall that a threshold bid is the largest bid that an agent could have submitted to the 
mechanism and still be selected in a winning set. Hence, for any solution Te E. J~ such 
that e ^ Te, then pe < CTe. To verify this; if e had submitted a bid be with be > ctc 
then VCG would have chosen Te instead (as Te would bid truthfully, bre ~ CTe), so any 
be > cTe is too large for a threshold bid.
Lemma 2.2. Ve E S,pe < NTUmin(c).
Proof. We have defined d(£ \ {e}) to be a feasible set, not containing e, hence where 
the threshold bid be > then agent e could not have been chosen by VCG in
preference to d(S \ {e}). This gives an upper bound on the threshold payment of pe < 
cd(£\{e})- From Lemma 2.1 we can observe that cd(£\{e}) ^ NTUmin(c), by transitivity 
we have pe < NTUmin(c). □
Theorem 2.3. For all set-system auctions, ^NTUminCc^FCG) < n — 1.
Proof. As we are always assuming a monopoly-free setting, we will have a winning set 
S such that [/S'! < n — 1. We have upper bounds on the payment for each e E S, from 
Lemma 2.2 this is
Pe < NTUmin(c).
So summing up over e E S gives
Ps <{n~ l)NTUmin(c),
which completes the proof of the theorem. □
2.3 Frugality of Approximation Algorithms
Let V be some approximation algorithm, and let S^ be the feasible set returned by V 
(which uses the bids as an input parameter). We will assume that V is monotonic in 
the bids (that is, given fixed bids of the other agents, no agent can be chosen in the 
winning set when some smaller bid may result in that agent not being chosen). So if we 
use this algorithm as a selection rule, and use threshold payments as a payment rule, 
then it is well-known (e.g. [35]) that we have a resulting truthful mechanism . Let 
k be the approximation ratio of the algorithm; i.e. some k, such that for all instances 
of the problem csv < kcs holds.
Lemma 2.4. Let k be the approximation ratio of the algorithm V. Then Ve E S^ ,pe < 
fcNTUmm(c).
Proof. We have defined d(£ \ {e}) to be a (lowest cost) feasible set, not containing e. 
Assume, for contradiction, that e were to make a threshold bid, be > fcNTUmin(c), 
and the winning set S^ (chosen by V) includes e. Assuming that all other bids are 
equal to their costs, as the mechanism is truthful, from Lemma 2.1 we can observe that
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&<f(£\{e}) < NTUmin(c). As we have assumed that be > /cNTUmin(c), and as e e Sv 
we have bs-p > fcNTUmin(c) (this holds for all choices of Sv when e € S7*). Hence, by 
transitivity, we have
bsv > kbd(£\{eyy (2.3)
When bsv > bd^£^ey^k, and d(£\{e}) is a feasible set, the approximation ratio of V is 
at least r—■ and rewriting Inequality 2.3 gives t—^— > k, showing that V does not 
have an approximation ratio of k, giving a contradiction. Therefore for the threshold bid 
the inequality be < /cNTUmin(c) holds, and hence the payment pe < fcNTUmin(c). □
Theorem 2.5. Let F be a monotonic approximation algorithm with an approximation 
ratio of k. Then the resulting mechanism AA? (with selection rule V and threshold 
payments) has < k(n - 1).
Proof. As we are always assuming a monopoly-free setting, then we will have a winning 
set S7* such that |5| < n — 1. We have upper bounds on the payment for each e € S, 
from Lemma 2.4, this is
pe < /cNTUmin(c).
So summing up over e G S gives
psr < (n — l)fcNTUmin(c)
which completes the proof of the theorem. □
2.3.1 Considering the Minimal Winning Sets
In order to avoid some needless technicalities, we wish to, without loss of generality, 
restrict the winning sets that VCG may choose to be only those that are minimal with 
regard to set inclusion. We can do this simply by choosing the winning set S' G J7 as the 
lexicographically first set of those that have the lowest cost and also have the smallest 
cardinality. We now present a proof that any choice of winning set, due to tie-breaking, 
can be made without changing the payments made.
Proposition 2.6. For all set-system auctions, having S G F* and R G F as minimum- 
cost feasible sets then PrCG = P5CG *
Proof. Assume that S is the winning set chosen. For all e R, from the definition 
of a VCG payment, we have pXCG = ce + cye — eg for a minimal cost feasible set Te 
such that e £Te. From R being a lowest-cost feasible set, we have cr < and hence 
PeCG — Ce + CR- cs giving pYCG = Ce. Summing for all e G S\R gives Ps\r = cS\r.
Similarly, assume that R is the winning set chosen, and re-arrange the labels to give 
PR\S = CR\S-
Additionally, for all e G 5 D i?, the threshold bid is not dependent on which of S or
R is chosen as the winning set, and hence we have PgFG PPsnR ~ Pr\G +PsnR giving
-VCG _ ^VCG P.<i — Pp
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□
Chapter 3
The Single-Commodity Auction
3.1 Overview
In this chapter we examine one of the interesting special-cases of set-system auctions. 
We will call this a Single-Commodity Auction; in this auction, we have some number of 
interchangeable items for sale, and a quantity parameter, which we will denote by Q, 
describing how many of these items the auctioneer requires.
While this auction is relatively simple, it is a reasonable model for the purchase of 
some number of items, where the exact properties of each may not be an important 
distinction, provided that they all meet some minimum specification. The purchase of 
stationery supplies, such as printer paper, seems to be an obvious example for this type of 
auction, but there are many purchases that can be made of different but interchangeable 
products.
We will formally define this auction in Section 3.2, and examine a further special 
case of it (when each agent may only supply at most 2 items) in Section 3.3. There, we 
will see that the well-known VCG mechanism can overpay, relative to NTUmin, by a 
factor as large as Q — the number of items required by the buyer.
The measure of overpayment by a (truthful) mechanism is the central theme of this 
chapter. It is often considered as the additional price that is paid by a mechanism 
that is truthful, above the price which might be obtained by an optimal, non-truthful, 
mechanism; sometimes called ‘the price of truthfulness’. There was a formal definition 
for a ‘frugality ratio’ given in Chapter 1, and it is the primary purpose of this chapter 
to improve on the frugality ratio of VCG for the Single-Commodity Auction.
In order to give a frugality ratio for a specific mechanism we need to compare the 
payments of the mechanism with the value NTUmin. In order to do that, we present 
an algorithm in Section 3.3.3 which computes an NTUmin value, and then use this to 
describe a characterization of NTUmin with respect to certain bid values. We then use 
this characterization to provide lower-bounds for NTUmin which can then be used to 
prove frugality ratios.
In Section 3.4 we discuss a class of alternative, truthful, mechanisms, which we call 
aAd, before showing that one of these (when the parameter a = -y/Q) has a frugality
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ratio of 2\fQ, compared to Q for VCG. We also see that this is within a factor of 2 of 
optimal for a particular given class of mechanisms that we describe.
Turning our attention back to the unrestricted single commodity auction, in Sec­
tion 3.5, we then see a lower bound on the frugality ratio that is possible for a particular 
class of mechanisms (which includes the aAi mechanism).
We finish this chapter with some observations on the results, and some ideas for how 
to naturally extend this work.
3.2 Definitions
Here we study the Single-Commodity Auction. In this setting, our auction is for a buyer 
to purchase some integer quantity, Q, of identical items from a number of sellers. Each 
seller e will have a specific, publicly known, integer quantity of items to sell that we will 
call qe, and we will require that an agent either sells all items or none. The feasible sets, 
J7, are defined from these quantity parameters, as follows;
.F = {T€2* : >Q}. (3.1)
Veer /
We will refer to the sellers as ‘agents’, and we will implement our auction as a set 
system auction, which was described in Section 1.2.1.
As a reminder, each agent e will submit a sealed bid be to the auction process. The 
auctioneer will then, by means of a mechanism A'f, use its selection rule to choose one 
of the feasible sets, which we will call SM G J7 to be the ‘winners’. The mechanism will 
then pay each agent e G SM a value , calculated using some payment rule.
3.3 The {1,2} Single-Commodity Auction
In the first part of this chapter, we will impose an additional restriction — that each 
agent e will only have for sale at most 2 items. We call this the {1,2} Single-Commodity 
Auction.
3.3.1 Auction Definition
The {1,2} Single-Commodity Auction is a single commodity auction, as defined in Sec­
tion 3.2. The additional restriction, that the {1,2} Single-Commodity Auction must 
meet is that all agents have a quantity value of at most 2,
Ve £ S,qe G {1,2}.
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While we could simply use VCG to run this auction (VCG chooses the lowest-cost 
solution and pays each winning agent a threshold value), we will see later that this per­
forms poorly in terms of frugality. In an attempt to improve frugality, we will now look 
at a class of (truthful) mechanisms that choose a winning set a little more intelligently.
3.3.2 The aAA Mechanism
Here we will be analysing a class of mechanisms, aM., each of which is uniquely defined 
by its ‘scaling’ value a > 1; a definition for this mechanism follows,
aA4 will calculate ‘virtual’ bids ve for each agent e by using a scaling factor as follows
abe, if = 1 
be, otherwise.
In order to simplify some of the later notation, we define the aggregate to be the 
sum of virtual bids over any set of agents, V,
Let Sa <G argminTejrbe the winning set. For concreteness, let Sa be the lexico­
graphically first of the feasible sets that have the lowest sum of virtual bids. It is easy to 
observe that this selection will be monotonic in the bids, which is known to be necessary 
for a mechanism to be truthful (see, e.g., [35]).
The payment rule is simple — each agent e £ Sa will be paid its threshold bid. 
This is the supremum of the amounts that the agent can bid and still be selected in 
the winning set, given the fixed bids of the other agents. It is also well-known (see, 
e.g. [34, 17]) that this threshold payment is required in order for the mechanism to be 
truthful, and that a mechanism with a monotonic selection rule and threshold payments 
is a truthful mechanism.
Let m = IS'"! and let the payment to agent e by the aA4 mechanism be denoted by 
p“, resulting in the payment vector pa = (p“,... ,p^l). Observe that when a — 1 the 
aM mechanism is exactly equivalent to VCG. The VCG mechanism chooses the feasible 
set which has the lowest sum of bids (which are equal to the costs, as VCG is known to 
be truthful, see, e.g.,[35]). Each of these ‘winning’ agents is paid its threshold value — 
the value of the largest bid the agent could have submitted but still remain in the win­
ning set, given all other bids being unchanged. Interestingly, we can see in Example 3.1 
below that the frugality </>NTUmin(VCG) > Q even for this restricted setting, so we have 
a strong motivation to find a mechanism with lower frugality.
Example 3.1. In this example we will see that VCG has poor frugality; we have a single 
commodity auction for quantity Q items and observe that the number of agents n — Q-f 1. 
For each agent e £ S the quantity qe and cost ce are given in Table 3.1. Here we can see
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thatt when = the bid vector bmm meets conditions (1),(2) and (3) for
a NTUmin vector. To verify this, for alle e S\ {A\}, then Te = S\ {Ai} U {An}. This 
satisfies condition (3) in Definition 1.2 as 6e + = cn (and any such Te set satisfies
condition (3) for A\). Conditions (1) and (2) are easily verifiable, showing that NTUmin 
< 1, The payment vector pa corresponds to the payments made by the aA4 mechanism, 
hence pa >Q and NTUmin < 1 giving NT^min > Q.
Agent Qe bmm prcG
Ai 1 0 1 1
A2 1 0 0 1
An—X 1 0 0 1
An 2 1
Total 1 n — 1
Table 3.1: Instance I with VCG (ct = 1)
Adding some additional notation, let Si C S be the subset of all agents having 
quantity 1, and let £2 — £ \ be the subset of agents having quantity 2. Observe that 
this implies q£t = j£i| and q£2 = 2|£2|-
We only consider the minimal winning sets, with respect to set inclusion. Proposi­
tion 2.6 shows us that this is without loss of generality.
3.3.3 Computing NTUmin for the {1,2} Single-Commodity Auction
Let c be the cost vector of a fixed instance of the {1,2} Single-Commodity Auction. We 
will now see a method of computing the NTUmin bid value for all e E S.
We will firstly select a winning set S, as a feasible set with the lowest total cost. 
We can do this by the use of a knapsack algorithm. A standard knapsack problem is, 
given a capacity C and a set of n items, with each item i € {1,... ,n} having value 
and weight Wi, to find the set of items with the largest sum of values such that the sum 
of weights does not exceed the capacity. Assuming integer weights and capacity, it is 
well-known to be solvable in 0(nC) time [15]. An integer commodity auction can be 
translated to a knapsack problem as follows. Let C — Qs — Q, Wi = qe and Vi — ce 
and hence the knapsack algorithm will return a maximum value set T, having weight at 
most Qe — Q, leaving S = £\T as a lowest-cost set with quantity at least Q.
We will then present Algorithm 1 that will, for the agents in the winning set S, 
calculate a bid vector b = (61,..., 6m). We will analyse the properties of any valid 
NTUmin bid vector, and we will see a proof that the bid vector b output by the algorithm 
qualifies as a NTUmin bid vector. We will then see in Theorem 3.12 how the NTUmin
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value may be given by a number of expressions, based on the composition of the cost 
vector c .
Preliminaries
Fix S as a single winning solution. (Remember that, if there are ties, the NTUmin value 
is computed from any of these choices of S). For ease of notation, let Si = 5 n £1 and 
let S2 = S Pi £i; similarly when SM is a set chosen by mechanism M., let S^ = SM n Si 
and let S^1 = ft £2.
In order to examine NTUmin we will define some ‘replacement’ sets, as follows.
Let Rx C (£\S) be a subset of non-elements of S when qRx > x and crx is minimized. 
For concreteness, if there is more than one suitable choice, let Rx be the lexicographically 
first. This will be used in this general form in Proposition 3.1, but more frequently as 
one of the following specific forms.
Let R\ Q {S\ S) be the subset from outside S when > X and is minimized. 
Note that Ri is only empty when S is the only feasible set, and hence each agent has 
a monopoly. As we are only interested in monopoly-free set systems, we can therefore 
assume that Ri is non-empty.
Let i?2 C (S \ S) be the subset from outside S when qn2 > 2 and cr2 is minimized. 
Observe that R2 may be empty, in a monopoly-free set-system, only A Q — — 1. When
the lowest-cost agent outside S has quantity 2, we may have R\ = R^.
Let R2 C (£2 \ S) be the set containing the lowest-cost agent with quantity 2 from 
non-members of S, Note that this may be empty even when there is no monopoly.
Describing the NTUmin bids.
Recall Definition 1.2, the definition of NTUmin given in Chapter 1. In this section, we 
give an algorithm to compute a bid vector bmm that meets the definition of NTUmin 
for all instances of the {1,2} Single-Commodity Auction. We then use the result of this 
algorithm to describe the NTUmin value in terms of the agents’ bids.
Firstly, for each agent e, we will see an upper bound on the bid fo™in of that agent e. 
This upper bound is simply the lowest cost of some subset Rqe C £ \ S' of non-members 
of S that could ‘replace’ the agent e and make a feasible set.
We then address the following technical difficulty; there may be many sets for Te 
that meet the definition for condition (3) in Definition 1.2, and some of these Te sets 
may be unnecessarily different to S. We will see in Proposition 3.2 a result that implies, 
when calculating NTUmin values, we only need to be concerned with the ‘minimally 
different’ Te sets — a precise definition of this is given there. Intuitively, this occurs 
when Te has chosen some agents, due to tie-breaking, but in choosing S different agents 
were chosen in the tie-breaking.
We will then use these results, in Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.5, to define the payments 
given to all agents with quantity 2. Lemma 3.5 deals with a special case, when Q is
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odd and S is made up of agents each with quantity 2, and hence qs > Q- Following 
that, there are several lemmas (3.6, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10) that give the bids of agents with 
quantity 1 under different conditions.
Our first proposition provides a straightforward upper bound on the NTUmin bids 
for sets of agents; any subset of winning agents may not bid more than some possible 
replacement from outside S. Recall from Chapter 1 the definition byin = ^™in-
Proposition 3.1. For any subset V C S having qe\s ^ QV) the inequality 6^in < CRqv 
holds.
Proof. Our assumption that qs\s > Qv provides that there is a non-empty assignment 
for Rqv. Let W = (5 \ V) U Rqv. We can observe that W is a feasible set as follows; 
from the definition of R, Rqv must be large enough to replace quantity qv and still make 
a feasible set. We can write this as
qRqv > qv (3.2)
and we can expand qw to get
qw — qs-qv + qnqv
and substituting the inequality of 3.2 we can rewrite this as qw > qs, showing that W 
is a feasible set.
Therefore, we must have < qy\£ or else W violates condition (2) in Defini­
tion 1.2. By substituting from the definition of W, this can be written as byin < CRqv. 
Hence any bid vector that does not satisfy this inequality must violate the constraint in 
condition (2) and hence cannot be a valid NTUmin bid vector.
□
We will now see that when qre\s is larger than necessary, for a Te set satisfying 
condition (3) in Definition 1.2, then there is always some other set Tg with a smaller 
?T'\5, and that this ‘less different’ set also satisfies condition (3). We will use this to 
show that we can restrict our analysis to the ‘less different’ sets, and hence finally the 
‘minimally different’ sets, which are those that have the largest intersection with the 
winning set S. Informally, this is quite obvious — when we may have some Te set given 
which contains some agents that are outside S, but could have also chosen them from 
inside S instead (in the event of a tie), we don’t need to consider that Te set, but would 
prefer to analyse the one that chose agents inside S', when possible.
Proposition 3.2. For every set Te that satisfies condition (3) in Definition 1.2 and has 
qre\s ^ 3, there exists another feasible set T'e when the equation qTj,\s — 9Te\5 — 2 holds 
and T'e satisfies condition (3) in Definition 1.2.
Proof. Observe that any set of quantity at least 2 must contain a subset of quantity 2. 
Therefore there exists a subset Y (Z (Te\ S) such that qy = 2. As QTe\s > 3, we have
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qs\T& ^ 2 (or else qs < qTe — 1 implying S is not a feasible set). Hence there is some 
subset Y' <Z(S\ Te) such that qyi — 2.
Let Ty — (iS \ Y') U y be a feasible set (it has quantity qs). As Ty must satisfy 
condition (2) in Definition 1.2, we have
jynin <-■
0S\Ty S cTy\5
which can be re-expressed as
rmin ^ _t}S\({S\Yl)uY) S C((s\Y>)UY)\S
and (as y' C S' and y C (Ty \ S))
bfr < cy. (3.3)
Let Tg = (Te \ y) U y; be a feasible set (it has quantity ), which must also satisfy
condition (2) in Definition 1.2, we can rewrite this as
bV3\Te)\Y> ^ c(Te\s)\Y (3.4)
As we have assumed that Te satisfies condition (3) in Definition 1.2, we can write this 
as
^s\re = cTe\s (3-5)
and we can trivially observe that S\Te = ((S\Te)\y/)uy/ and Te\S = ((Ty\S)\y)uy, 
which shows that the sets in inequalities 3.3 and 3.4 make partitions of the sets in 
Equation 3.5. Therefore Inequality 3.3 and Equation 3.4 can be strengthened to give
= cy (3.6)
and
&(s\tb)\y/ =: c(Te\s)\Y (3-7)
Equation 3.7 can be rewritten to give
bs\n ^ CTZ\S
showing that set Tg satisfies (3), and we can see from its definition that qTZ\s = QTe\s~^-
□
A similar proposition can be proven for some cases when Te\ S contains an agent 
with quantity 1. Recall the definition that Si = S D £i.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose there is a feasible set Te that satisfies condition (3) in Defi­
nition 1.2, qs = Q, qTe\s > 3, and qTe\s °dd. Then there exists another feasible setT'e 
when the equation qTZ\s — ?Te\5 —1 holds andT'e satisfies condition (3)in Definition 1.2.
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Proof. Observe that there exists a subset Y c (Te \ S) such that qy — 1 (as qT^s is 
odd).
As Te contains an agent with quantity 1, hence qrB = Q — qs. This implies qTe\s = 
Qs\Te and hence S\Te also contains an agent with quantity 1. Therefore there is also 
some other subset Yf C (S\ Te) such that qy/ — 1.
Let Ty — 5 \ y"7 U y be a feasible set (it has quantity of qs). As Ty must satisfy 
condition (2) in Definition 1.2, we have
tmin ^ 
os\Ty - CTY\S
which can be simplified to
< cy. (3.8)
Let T' = (Te \ y) U y' be a feasible set (it has quantity of qTe), which must also satisfy
condition (2) in Definition 1.2, we can rewrite this as
b(S\n)\Y' ^ c(Ts\S)\Y- (3.9)
As we have assumed that Te satisfies condition (3), we can write this as
&5\Te = cTe\S (3.10)
we have seen that the sets in inequalities 3.8 and 3.9 make partitions of the sets in 
Equation 3.10. Therefore Inequality 3.8 and Inequality 3.9 can be strengthened to give
6yin - Cy (3.11)
and
&(!s\Te)\y' = c(T6\s)\y- (3.12)
Equation 3.12 can be rewritten to give
bs\r,c ~ cri\s
showing that set T' satisfies (3).
□
We will now proceed to examine the NTUmin bid values directly. Recall that Q is 
the quantity required by the buyer, and observe that when qs ^ Q there are no agents 
in S with quantity 1, and Q is odd. (We have previously discounted solutions when 
superfluous agents with cost 0 have been included). We will now see a characterization 
of the NTUmin bid values for the agents having quantity 2, as separate cases for qs = Q 
and qs ^ Q.
Lemma 3.4. Given a {1,2} single-commodity auction having qs = Q, for every agent 
e £ 3% the equation = cr2 holds.
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Proof. Proposition 3.1 gives us < c#2. For the other direction, we will see this as two 
cases. Firstly, for some Te satisfying (3), when qTe\s = 2 then (3) gives us Fgyj^ = cTe\s,) 
and by the minimality of i?2, we have > cr2 , which can be simplified to b™m > cr2 .
Secondly, when qx&\s > 2 either Proposition 3.3 or Proposition 3.2 may be applied 
(possibly repeatedly) to give some set T'e such that qj^s — 2 and T!e satisfies condition 
(3), giving > cr2 and hence 6^lin > cr2 .
This has shown that < cr2 and FeTun > cr2 hold, therefore we have &™in — cr2 .
n
Lemma 3.5. Given a {1,2} single-commodity auction having ^ = Q + 1, for every 
agent e €: S the equation fr™111 = holds.
Proof. Observe that, as the largest quantity of any agent is 2, then qs < Q + 2. This 
implies that there are no agents in S with quantity 1 (as they would not be needed, and 
we assume that we do not include superfluous agents).
Let T = S'\{e}Ui?i; observe that T £ J7 and so Proposition 3.1 gives us < cr1. 
Assume some Te set that satisfies condition (3). As gs = Q 4-1, then qxe > gs1 — 1 must 
hold. Hence we must have qTe\s > qs\Te ~ 1- We will now examine this as three cases.
Case 1: qTe\s - 1
If qxe\s = 1 then qs\Te — 2, hence 6“in = cxe\s which gives > cr1 by the 
minimality of R\.
Case 2: qTe\s — 2
If qTe\s — 2 then q$\Te < 3, and as there are no agents in S with quantity 1, we have 
6™m crpa\s and hence 6™in > cr1 ,
Case 3: qTe\s ^ 3
If QTe\s > 3 then we can use Proposition 3.2 (possibly repeatedly) to show that there 
is some such that qxi\s ^ 2 and case 1 or case 2 above must apply.
Now we have seen that both 6“lln < cjr1 and fj“m > cr1 are proven, showing that 
fo™11 = cr1 as claimed.
□
Now that we have seen the bid values described for agents with quantity 2, so we 
will move on to examine the bid values for the agents with quantity 1. For |5'i| > 2 we 
will do this as three separate cases, which depend on the relationship between certain 
cost values of the instance. |S'i| = 1 will be treated as a (simple) special case.
Lemma 3.6. Given any NTUmin bid vector bmm having cr1 < cr2/2, for all e € Si, 
the equation b™m — cr1 holds.
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Proof. When Si 7^ 0 we have qs — Q, or else there is some superfluous agent e £ S 
that would not have been included. From condition (3) there is some Te such that 
^5\Te " which we will examine as three cases.
Case 1: qT,,\s — 1
As qTr = Q, by Te including some agent with quantity 1, then we have qs\re ^ 1 
(if not, this would imply that <3^ < qs = Q). This gives S \Te = {e}, and hence 
and by definition of R\, that ft™11 > c^.
Case 2: qTe\S = 2
We will see that there are actually no cases, satisfying the assumptions, when this 
holds. For contradiction, assume that qTe\s — 2, therefore qs\Te ~ 2 (if not, this 
would imply that <77^ < qs) and there exists some j such that + 6^in = cTe\s- 
From Proposition 3.1, 6™in < c^, so we can rewrite to give > cre\s ~ cRi‘ As, 
by definition, cr2 < cx£\s this can be substituted to give > cji2 — c^. As the
assumption for this lemma states that crj < cr2/2, we have > cr2 —cr2/21 hence
•>. Cr2/2, and from the lemma again fc“in > cr1 contradicting Proposition 3.1.
Case 3: qTe\s > 3
When q'j^\s > 2, from Proposition 3.2, there exists some other feasible set such 
that T' satisfies condition (3). Applying Proposition 3.2 repeatedly will give some 
set such that qx^s < 2 , and hence satisfies the definition for either case 1 or case 2 
above (although we have seen that only case 1 is possible).
This has shown that, when crx < cr2/2 holds, for every agent e £ Si then every 
possible set Te satisfying (3) gives fe™in > cr1 , and from Proposition 3.1 we have b™111 < 
cr1 , with both together giving b™m = c/q as claimed.
□
The other two cases will both make use of the following proposition, which shows 
that there is a limit on the sum of the bids of two agents that each have quantity 1, and 
that this limit is always reached provided that cr1 > cr2(2.
Proposition 3.7. Let bmm be a NTUmin bid vector and suppose the inequalities cr1 > 
cr2/2 and |5i| > 2 hold. Then, for every agent e £ Si, b^1111 = cr2 — max^s^g}) b^1111.
Proof Firstly, assume for contradiction that b™m > cr2 — max^s^^gj. b“in. This gives 
bmin fomm ^ which contradicts Proposition 3.1. For the other direction, assume 
for contradiction that b™n < cr2 — max^s^v^g} b^1111.
Using a similar method as in Lemma 3.6, we will examine the possible Te sets satis­
fying (3) for every agent e £ Si.
Case 1: qTe\s — 1
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Assume, for contradiction, that there exists some other agent, j) such that qTj\s — !• 
This would give and > crp^g. By the minimality of i?i, we would
have bfm + 6'nin > 20^. For this proposition, we assume that c^1 > cr2/2, which 
would give + 6™in > cr2 giving a contradiction with Proposition 3.1.
This shows that case 1 may be true, but for at most one agent.
Case 2: qTe\s — 2
This gives bfm + bfm = cTs\s, and hence bfm + bf[n > cr2 from the minimality of
r2.
Case 3: ^ 3
When qRe\s > 2, from Proposition 3.2, there exists some other feasible set Tj, such 
that T'e satisfies condition (3). Applying Proposition 3.2 repeatedly will give some Tg 
set such that qTe\s < 2 , and hence either case 1 or case 2 above applies.
As case 1 can hold for only one agent, the application of case 2 to all other agents in Si 
is sufficient to apply to every possible pair of agents, and thus completes the proof. □
Finally, we need to consider the cost values of the two agents in Si with largest cost. 
To that end, there are some definitions that will be used; Let be an agent in S\ with 
highest cost, more formally
€ argmax ce
and let ^2 be an agent in Si with second highest cost;
€ argmax ce. 
ee(SAPi})
Lemma 3.8. Suppose that |S'i| > 2 and cr2/2 < cr1 < cr2 — q2. Then there exists a 
NTUmin bid vector bmin such that there is exactly one agent e e Si having 6^nin = cr1 
and every other agent j £ (Si) \ {e} has bfin = cr2 — cr1 .
Proof. Recall that we can assume qs = Q, and Proposition 3.7 states that for every 
agent e e Si, the following holds;
brTm = cr„ — max &,•. 
e 2 MS.)\{e} 3
For any bid vector, b, let £ £ argmaxee5l be be an agent with quantity 1 that has 
the largest bid, and hence be = maxe€,51 be is the largest bid of any agent with quantity 
1. Observe that Proposition 3.7 implies that Ve £ (Si \ £), be — cr2 — be.
We now claim that, in an NTUmin bid vector bmin, this largest bid must be 
equal to cr1. Proposition 3.1 tells us that < CRt. Now assume for contradiction 
that when |Si| > 2 there exists a bid vector b such that bs < b™in and that be < b^in.
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Let e = ~ be (giving be — — e) and that, due to Proposition 3.7, this implies
that
Ve £ (Si \ {^}), be = 6™in + e.
Summing up over S\ gives
As we have assumed |5i| > 2, this gives bg1 > b™n. Observe that any Te set that has 
agents of both quantity 1 and 2 in Te \ 5 must have qTe\S > 3, and hence Lemma 3.2 
shows that there is some other set Tg (with Qti\s < 2) which determines the bid values of 
5\Tg. This shows that the bids of agents with quantity 1 are not dependent on the bids 
of agents with quantity 2 and hence bSl > bf™ contradicts bs < bfin (as b^n <bS2).
As we have seen that be — c/?1, then Proposition 3.7 shows that every other agent 
j G (5i \ {£}) must bid bj — cr2 — c^. As this concludes the proof when \Si\ > 2, we 
finish with |5i| = 2. Due to Proposition 3.7, we must have bs1 — cr2, which may be 
achieved with two bids of (c^, cr2 — c^1). (Although there are other bid vectors that 
would satisfy NTUmin.)
□
Lemma 3.9. Suppose liSil > 2 and > cr2 — c^2. Then there exists a NTUmin bid 
vector bmin such that there is exactly one agent e £ Si having = cr2 — q2 and every 
other agent j G (^i) \ {e} has b^ — cg2.
Proof. No agent e G *Si may bid 6™in > cr2 — ce2 or else there exists some j G {^1,^2} 
such that 6g1,ri + 6J1111 > cr2 and Proposition 3.1 would show that this contradicts bmin 
being a valid NTUmin bid vector.
Now we will see that, when |Si| > 2 there is some agent e £ Si that must bid 
^in = cr2 - ce2.
As in Lemma 3.8, let £ — argmaxee5i be be the agent with quantity 1 that has the 
largest bid, and hence be = maxee51 be is the largest bid of any agent with quantity 1. 
Observe that Proposition 3.7 implies that Ve G (Si \ {£}),be = cr2 — be.
We now claim that, in an NTUmin bid vector bmin, this largest bid b™in must be 
equal to cr2 — cg2. Assume for contradiction that when (Si| > 2 there exists a bid vector 
b such that bs < fa™*11 and that be < b™m. Let e = — be (giving be = — e) and
that, due to Proposition 3.7, this implies that
VeeS1\{^},6e = 6ri + €
Summing up over Si gives
^-6r+(iSii-i)e
As we have assumed |Si| > 2, this gives bs1 > 6gLin, giving a contradiction.
Recall that the bids of agents with quantity 1 are not dependent on the bids of agents 
with quantity 2 and therefore bs1 > b™n contradicts bs < b™m. As we have seen that
be = cr2 — q2, then Proposition 3.7 shows that every other agent j £ (Si \ {£}) must 
bid bj = ce2.
Finally, when |<S'i| — 2, then due to Proposition 3.7, we must have bs1 = cr2, which 
may be achieved with two bids of (c^2,c#2 — cg2).
□
We now finish the bids of agents with quantity 1, by looking at the remaining case 
when there is only a single agent with quantity 1 in the winning set.
Lemma 3.10. For all e £ Si, the equation 6™in = cr1 holds when j£i| = 1,
Proof. Again, using a similar method to Lemma 3.6, we will examine the possible Te 
sets satisfying (3) for the agent e £ Si.
Case 1: qTe\s = 1
This gives 6“^ = cxe\s- As Si is non-empty, we have qs — Q, and hence qs\Te — 
<lTe\s = 1) an(i hence = ore\s- From the minimality of Ri, we have > cr1. 
The other direction, bl™n < cr1 is shown by Proposition 3.1, giving 6™in — cr1 .
Case 2: qTe\s ~ 2
Observe that there is no Te set where qs\Te — 2 (as there is no other agent with 
quantity 1).
Case 3: qTe\s > 3
When qTc\s > 2 then, from Proposition 3.2, there exists some other feasible set T' 
with q^s < QTe\S such that satisfies condition (3). Applying Proposition 3.2 
repeatedly will give some T' set such that Qre\5 < 2 , and hence either case 1 or case 
2 above can be applied.
D
Computing the NTUmin bid values
We propose a simple algorithm, Algorithm 1, which computes an NTUmin bid vector. 
We use the results of the lemmas in the previous section to verify that Algorithm 1 
correctly calculates a bid vector bmin that satisfies the definition of NTUmin. Recall 
that /S' is a lowest cost solution.
Lemma 3.11. Algorithm 1 computes a NTUmin bid vector bmm for any cost vector c 
of a {1,2} Single-Commodity Auction.
Proof. If there is at least one agent with quantity 1, then exactly one element £ is 
assigned = min(c/j1, cr2 — q2 ); all other elements with quantity 1 are assigned 
minfc^jCRg — &™ln). This requirement was proven in Lemmas 3.6, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10.
All other agents with quantity 2 are assigned cr2 , which was proven to be correct in 
Lemma 3.4. Hence, as each agent is assigned a value that is consistent with the values
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm to calculate NTUmin bids
1 argmin^{cjR : R C £ \S,qR = 1};
2 R2<~ argmin^lci? : RC S\S,qR = 2}i
3 £\ 4— argmaxe{ce : e e 5x};
- argmaxe{ce : e G (5j \
l^il > 0 then
4 £2
5 if
6
7
8
mii^c;?!, c«2 - q2) ; 
for each i e (5i) \ {^1} do 
[_ bTin min(cRl, - 6gin);
9 for each j G 52 do
10 if qs — Q then
11 |_
else
L ''J1™ <- ;
14 Return bmin;
required for a NTUmin bid vector, then Algorithm 1 correctly calculates a NTUmin bid 
vector bmin.
□
Theorem 3.12. For a {1,2} single commodity auction, NTUmin(c) is given by one of 
the following expressions.
Case 1: If |5i[ = 0 and qs = Q then
NTUmin(c) = j5|Ci?2. (3.13)
Case 2: If |5i| =0 and qs > Q then
NTUmin(c) = (3-14)
Case 3: [5i| — 1 then
NTUmin(c) = (|5| - l)c^2 + cRl. (3.15)
Case 4'- If |5i| > 1 then, letting £2 be the agent from £\\ S that has second-highest 
cost,
NTUmin(c) = |.S,2|cR,J + min(cR1, cRl-q2) + |Si -1| mm(cfll, cfl2 mm(cR,, cr2-q,)j.
(3.16)
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Proof. As we have seen, in Lemma 3.11, that Algorithm 1 correctly computes the NTU- 
min value, we can examine Algorithm 1 to verify that it produces the results given by the 
cases here. In cases 1 and 2 there are no agents with quantity 1, so running Algorithm 1 
will result in the ‘if’ statement in line 5 being false. For case 1, this is followed by the 
‘if’ statement in line 10 being true — therefore each agent’s bid is allocated in line 11 of 
Algorithm 1, so each agent e £ S has &£im — cr2 proving that = | S \ cr2 and hence 
NTUmin (c) = \S\cr2.
Case 2 is similar, but being false in line 10 results in each bid being allocated in line 
13, and hence NTUmin =
For case 3, there is only a single agent e with quantity 1, which will be allocated a 
bid value in line 6. As here £2 = ® and we will consider that q2 =0, then e will be 
allocated a bid of cr1 (as cr1 < cr2 — 0). All other |,S| — 1 agents (with quantity 2) will 
be allocated a bid value in line 11 (including any agent with quantity 1 in 5 implies that 
qs ~ Q), and hence NTUmin(c) = cr1 + (|5| - 1)cr2.
For case 4, we have a single agent with quantity 1 that gets allocated a bid in line 6 - 
this is minfc/^, cr2 — q2), all other agents with quantity 1 are allocated their bid in line 8, 
this bid is equivalent to min(cit1, cr2 - min(ci?1, cr2 - C£2) (as 6^in = min(cJR1, cr2 - C£2)). 
Finally each agent with quantity 2 is allocated a bid in line 10, and summing up the 
three different bid values gives NTUmin(c) = \S2\cr2 + min(cH1,c/i2 - q2) + (|£i| — 
1) mm(cRl, cr2 - min(c^1, cr2 - C£2)).
□
Simplifying lower bounds for NTUmin
We will now briefly use the proofs in Theorem 3.12 to show some simple lower bounds 
for NTUmin. These lower bounds are easier to analyse than the complete NTUmin 
calculations, and will be used in a later section when examining frugality.
Proposition 3.13. For all instances having qs > Q, the inequality NTUmin > (l^lc^) 
holds.
Proof. This trivially follows from case 2 in Theorem 3.12. □
Proposition 3.14. For all instances having qs = Q, the inequality NTUmin > (|52|c^2) 
holds.
Proof. This follows from cases 1,3 and 4 in Theorem 3.12. □
Proposition 3.15. NTUmin > min^iSilc ,^ c#*).
Proof. When \Si\ =0 this trivially holds; when |5i| = 1 then case 3 in Theorem 3.12 
applies, and we can use Equation 3.15. This trivially shows that NTUmin> \Si [c^ and 
proves the claim for this case. We will now look at the more interesting case, when 
|Sil>l.
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The first case of this that we will examine is when cr2 < cr* (remember that R2 is 
any cheapest subset with quantity 2, and that R2 contains only an agent with quantity 
2).
Case 1: cr3 < cR*
As we know that R2 is made up of two agents, we will call these j, k where Cj = cr1 
and c/* > cjr1 . Hence cr2 = cr1 + We also know that cg2 < or else k would be in 
the lowest-cost set, hence cr2 > cjr1 + c£2, which can be rewritten as crx < cr2 — cg2. 
We can now use this to rewrite Equation 3.16 as
NTUmin + |Si - 1| , cr2 - cRl)
and clearly cr2 > cr1 + cr1 , hence cr2 — cr^ > crx , so this can be simplified to
NTUmin = |52|ch2 + cRl + (|5i| - l)cRl
and therefore
NTUmin = \S2\cr2 + \Si\cRl
which proves that NTUmin > l^i \crx and hence the claim is proven for this case. 
Case 2: cr2 = cr*
Let bfm — minfc^j, cr2 — cg2). This is the bid made by the agent with largest cost in 
.Si (from Proposition 3.7) and rewrite Equation 3.16 as
NTUmin = \S2\cr2 + bfm + (|Sij - 1) minfc^, c^2 - bfm).
We will take this as two cases, where the assumption that c_r1 < cr2 — fe)nin either 
holds or does not.
Case 2.1: cr1 < cr2 — b™in
We know that 6™in > eg > cg2, hence it also follows by transitivity that cr1 < 
cr2 — cg2) so we can rewrite Equation 3.16 as
NTUmin > \S2\cr2 + CjRl + (^l - l)cRl
and as
NTUmin > j52|cfl2 +
hence
NTUmin > iS'ijc^ 
and the claim is proven for this case.
Case 2.2: cRl > cr2 - bfn
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We can take a lower bound on Equation 3.16, using |£i| > 1
NTUmin > |S2|cr2 + bfm + minfc^, cj?2 - 6“m) 
and use our assumption in this case 2.2 (cj?1 > cr2 — 6“in) to simplify to 
NTUmin > \S2\cr2 + bfn + cr2 - b?™
and hence
NTUmin > 15210^2 + cr2.
As case 2 also assumes that cr2 = cr* then we can observe that NTUmin > cr*
2 L2
and hence the claim is proven.
□
3.4 The aM mechanism
We have seen that VCG has a frugality ratio of so we now propose a mechanism,
aAA , that has a much lower frugality ratio (f2(y/Q)). We study here, the aA4 mechanism 
when a = ^/Q, and aim to show an upper bound on the frugality for this mechanism. 
We will do this by partitioning S'0, the winning set under the aAA. mechanism, into 
three subsets — they are Sa fl Si,5° n S2, and Sa \ S. We will examine the payments 
made to each of the subsets, and then combine these payments to give an upper bound 
for Sa. Recall that, when a— 1 the aA4 mechanism is equivalent to VCG and we have 
seen 0NTUmin(VCG) > Q so we will be looking to achieve a lower frugality ratio than Q.
3.4.1 Frugality results for the aM mechanism
We first see some technical propositions that give a bound on the payment value to an 
agent, based on the cost of some set of agents that could replace it in the winning set. 
These are given as separate propositions to try and keep the notation simple, but the 
proofs are identical save for the variation in which of the agents have their bids scaled 
by a and which do not.
Proposition 3.16. For all instances of aAi, for all e 6 Sa and any set V C (£ \ Sa) 
with qs* — qe A Qv > Q the inequality pe < cya holds.
Proof. Observe that qs* — qe + qv > Q implies that Sa \ {e} U 1/ is a feasible set, and 
hence that the payment made to e is upper bounded by the maximum that e could bid 
yet still be chosen in preference to V.
Assume for contradiction that pe > cya\ as the mechanism pays threshold payments, 
thenpe > cya implies that agent e could possibly be chosen with a threshold bid be =pe. 
Hence if pe> cya then e is still chosen by the aM mechanism when we have
be > cya. (3.17)
Chapter 3. The Single-Commodity Auction 42
The mechanism chooses the winning set by comparing the virtual bids, and as both 
e and V may be added to Sa \ {e} to make a feasible set, and e was chosen, this implies 
that ve < vy. Prom the definition of the mechanism, we see that vy < bya and that 
ve > be- (As the mechanism is truthful we can substitute cy, ce for by, be). Therefore 
if ve < vy and ve > be then through transitivity be < vy. Again, through transitivity, 
with vy < bya, then we have
be ^ bya
and
be < cya
giving a contradiction with 3.17. □
Recall the notation that Sf = Sa U £1 and S% = Sa U £2, i.e. are the agents in 
the winning set Sa that have quantity 1, and are the agents in Sa with quantity 2.
Proposition 3.17. For all instances of aAi, for all e € S^1 and any set V Q (S \ Sa) 
the inequality pe < cy holds.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that pe > cy, as the mechanism pays threshold pay­
ments, then pe > cy implies that agent e could possibly be chosen with a threshold bid
be = Pe- Hence if pe > cy then e is still chosen by the aAi mechanism when we have
be > cy. (3.18)
The mechanism chooses the winning set by comparing the virtual bids, and as both 
e and V may be added to Sa \ {e} to make a feasible set, and e was chosen, this implies 
that ve < vy. Prom the definition of the mechanism, we see that vy < bya and that 
ve = bea. (As the mechanism is truthful we can substitute cy,ce for by, be). Therefore 
if ve < vy and ve>bea then through transitivity bea <vy. Again, through transitivity, 
with vy < bya, then we have bea < bya hence
be < by
and
be < cy
giving a contradiction with Inequality 3.18. □
Proposition 3.18. For all instances of aAA, for all e E Sf and any V C (£2 \ Sa) the 
inequality pe <cy/a holds.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that pe > cyja\ as the mechanism pays threshold 
payments, then pe > cy ja implies that agent e could possibly be chosen with a threshold 
bid be ~ Pe- Hence if pe > cy (a then e is still chosen by the aM. mechanism when we 
have
be > cyja. (3.19)
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The mechanism chooses the winning set by comparing the virtual bids, and as both 
e and V may be added to Sa \ {e} to make a feasible set, and e was chosen, this implies 
that ve < vy- Prom the definition of the mechanism, we see that vy = by and that 
ve ~ bea. (As the mechanism is truthful we can substitute cy, ce for by, be.) Therefore if 
ve < vy and ve = bea then through substitution bea < vy. Again, through transitivity, 
with vy = by, then we have bea < by and rewriting gives
be ^ by fa
and
be ^ cy j a
giving a contradiction with 3.19. □
We now have one more technical proposition, which tells us which agents can appear 
in {SOL \ S') and [S \ Sa). Informally, no agent with quantity 2 will be removed from an 
optimal set S, and no agent with quantity 1 will be introduced.
Proposition 3.19. For all instances of a Ad , having winning set Sa, (Sa \5') n^2 = 0 
and (S\Sa)n£1 = (i).
Proof. Firstly, for contradiction, assume that 3e E ((Sa \S)C\ S2). Let Ve C S\Sa be 
the lexicographically first subset with smallest quantity such that qs ~ Ved- qyE > Q.
Without loss of generality, assume that e is before Ve lexicographically. As Ve C S 
and e ^ S then ce < cyB (this is strict due to the lexicographical ordering assumed). 
Conversely, as e E Sa and VeC\ Sa = $ then we have ve < vyc as e was chosen by the 
mechanism in preference to Ve, based on their virtual bids.
From the mechanism definition, and assuming truthfulness, we have ve = ce and 
vyc > cye, hence we get ce > cye giving a contradiction with ce < cye, showing that there 
is no e E ((Sa \ S) D £2 and therefore (Sa \ S) D ^2 — 0- Observe that assuming Ve is 
before e lexicographically simply gives ce < cye and ce > cye instead.
As we have seen that Ve E (Sa \ S) the equation qe — 1 holds, it is simple to see 
that there is no j E (S \ Sa) with qj = 1, as the same agent with quantity 1 must be 
preferred by both the choice for S and the choice for Sa.
□
Now we move on to the body of the proof, considering the partition of the winning 
set Sa into three sets (Sa n Si, Sa n S2, and Sa\S). We will show payment bounds of 
a Ad for these sets.
Lemma 3.20. For every instance of aAd where a = y/Q, the inequality psar\Si < 
v^NTUmin holds.
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Proof, We will prove this lemma as two cases. Recalling the definition of NTUmin, 
given in Definition 1.2. Condition (3) states that
for every e G S, there is Te e T such that e £Ti and £ £ <v.
e'eSVTe e'eTe\S
Case 1: For every e G Sf there exists a Te set satisfying (3) when (Te \ S) n £i is not 
empty.
From the case definition, there is some agent j GTe\S such that qj — 1. Applying 
Proposition 3.2 or 3.3 repeatedly shows that there exists a such that <7t'\s — 1- 
We can let Tg = 5 \ {e} U {j} and hence we have = cj, giving bfin = (from 
Ri having minimal cost).
As e has quantity 1, it can be replaced by any agent, and Proposition 3.17 gives 
pe < cj. As we have = c^1, then through substitution we have pe < b™m, and 
summing over Sa n Si gives
PsanSi S bsnnS!
and
PsanSi < NTUmin.
Case 2: Otherwise (i.e. for some e G Sf there is some Te set satisfying condition (3) 
in Definition 1.2 when (Te \ 5) n £i is empty).
From Proposition 3.2 we must have some such that qT^\s = 2 (as Te \ S' contains 
only agents with quantity 2). As we have seen qs — Q then we must have qs\T'_ < 
?T'\5 (or she we would have and <7T' < Q)-
Fix j G Te\S to be any agent with qj = 2. By satisfying condition (3) in Definition 1.2 
there exists some S \T^ such that = c^vyg.
As S \ Tg C S we have > Cj and hence
NTUmin > Cj. (3.20)
We will know examine the payments to each e G (Sa ft Si) as two sub-cases.
Case 2.1: j $ Sa.
From Proposition 3.18 we have pe < Cj/a and summing up over Sa D Si gives 
PSanSi < |Sa Pi Si | Cj/a. As we have defined a = \[Q and we can observe that 
\Sa n Si | < Q then we can express this as psanS! < QcjlVQ and hence ps^^nSi <
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Therefore, with Inequality 3.20, we have
< V'QNTUmin.
Case 2,2: j £ Sa .
If we examine Lemmas 3.6,3.8, and 3.9 we see that every agent e £ Si must make an 
NTUmin bid which is one of at most two distinct values, and if these two values are 
different then only one agent may bid the higher amount. Let these two bid values 
be by, bz and assume that bz > by (if only one value exists, assume for simplicity that 
bz — by). Hence we can describe the NTUmin bids by
^n = (|51|-l)6^ + 6z. (3.21)
Recall that i\ £ argmaxi65l c* is the lexicographically first agent with the highest 
cost, and that £2 £ argmax^^.^} a is the lexicographically first agent with second 
highest cost.
We can observe, from condition (1) in Definition 1.2, that bz > C£1 and that when 
|jSi| > 1 then £2 exists and by > cg2.
Hence we can substitute in Equation 3.21 to get
«r> (ISil-ltej + c*!. (3.22)
If IS1!] = 1 then we simply have pe < and hencepe < NTUmin giving ps^nSi < 
NTUmin.
Now we will consider when iSil > 1.
We can firstly observe that qs = qsa = Q, as 55 = Q is clear from S being minimal 
and Si being non-empty. As \Si\ > 1 then for any size of Sa \ S there is some 
subset of equal quantity in S that can be removed so that qs\sa — Qsa\s and hence 
qsa — qs (as Sa is minimal with respect to set inclusion).
Therefore qs\sa > qsa\s ^ 2, and as j was not chosen by 5', we must assume that 
S \Sa must contain at least two agents with quantity 1. As A, £2 have the highest 
cost (and hence bids as aM was shown to be truthful in Section 3.3.2), we can 
assume that it,£2 E S\Sa.
As neither £1 or £2 will be chosen in Sa, and q2 < c^1 we can use Proposition 3.17 
to give pe < Q!2.
Summing up over all e £ San Si gives
Psans1 < \Sa H Si\c£2.
We have |5a fl 5i [ < | (as we saw that (S \Sa) H Si contains at least two agents)
hence we can upper bound with
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psar\S1 < (|5i| - l)c*2
Clearly, as ce1 > 0, we have (\Si \ — l)c£2 < (|5i| — 1)q2 + C£1 so we can use the lower 
bound for b™n given in Inequality 3.22 to get
^ rminPSanSi S bs1
and hence
PsanSi < NTUmin.
□
Lemma 3.21. For every instance of aAi having a = *>/($ the inequality psanS2 ^
bS°ns2SQ holds-
Proof. Recall the definition of set 1?2, which was given in Algorithm. 1, as the lowest-cost 
subset from £\S with quantity at least 2. We will examine the proof as two cases; firstly 
when the replacement set R2 was not chosen in Sa by olM..
Case 1 : R2 C £ \ .
Let e be some agent in 5“ fl As qn^ — qe = 2 then R2 could replace e in Sa 
to make a feasible set; hence pe < CR2a, from Proposition 3.16. Observe that when 
holds then qs ~ Q, and from Lemma 3.4 we have b™in = cr2. By substitution 
this gives pe < b™ina. Summing this up over every e in S'0 fl 52 gives
P5“n52 < bs°ns2a'
The second case is when the replacement set R2 was chosen in the winning set Sa by 
aM.
Case 2 : R2 C 5“ .
Let e be some agent in SaC\S2. Let R% C Sa\S be a subset such that 9sa\{e}ui?“ > Q- 
(he. qR% — 1 if qs* > Q and qR% = 2 where qs<* = Q).
As the lowest-cost winning set S included Rf in preference to R2 then we have 
cr« < cr2. From Proposition 3.16 we have pe < cr*ol and hence pe < cr2oc. from 
Lemma 3.4 we have b™in = cr2. Hence, by substitution, this gives pe < b™ma. 
Summing this up over every e in S"2 H 52 gives
PS«ns2 < bs°nSaa-
□
Lemma 3.22. For every instance of aM. when a = the inequality psa\s < \fQbrg^ga 
holds.
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Proof. Firstly, from Proposition 3.19 when Sa\S is non-empty then Si is also non-empty 
(the lemma trivially holds if Sa \ S is empty).
We will now consider the more simple case when qs<x > Q-
Case 1: qs* > Q
As (from Proposition 3.19) there is some agent i £ S \ Sa with qi — 1 then agent 
e e (Sa\S) could be replaced by agent i £ (S\Sa) as qs* —qeP<li — Q+l—2+1 — Q.
Let i £ argminj€is\£a Cj and from Proposition 3.16 we have pe < CiCt. Sum up over 
e £ Sct\S get
Vs«\s < \ S\cjOt.
Observe (using Proposition 3.19) that |S,a \ 5[ < [S' \ 5a| and we get
Ps<*\s < |S,\'S'01cj<a
and as j has the minimum cost in S\Sa then it follows that |5\ < cs\sa and
hence
Ps<*\s < cs\saa
and from condition (1) in Definition 1.2
Ps«\s < Vsis**®'
Now we consider the remaining case.
Case 2: qs<* = Q
As Si is non-empty, it follows that qs — Q also, and so qs\sa ^ Qsa\S' From 
Proposition 3.19 we then have \S \ = 2|5a \ (Sj. Let i,j £ S \ Sa be the two
agents with lowest cost.
Observe that as no two agents costs may sum up to less than c* + Cj we then have 
a lower bound on the cost of 5 \ Sa, which is cg^ga > (jS \ + Cj)/2. Using
|5\5a| = 2\Sa \ S\ we then have
> \Sa\S\{* + cj) (3.23)
For each e £ S** \S, from Proposition 3.16, we have pe < (ci + cj)a, and summing 
up gives
Ps<*\s < ^“VS'Kci + CjOa
and with 3.23
PS“\S < cS\S<*a
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and from condition (1) in Definition 1.2
Ps°\s <
which completes the proof.
□
Theorem 3.23. Suppose that there is a {1,2} single-commodity auction requiring quan­
tity Q. Then for the aA4 mechanism with a = ^/Q the frugality ratio is upper bounded 
With 0NTUmin(o:A'O <
Proof. Prom Lemmas 3.21, 3.20, and 3.20, we have the following
PSanS2 — '/Qb1g£f\S2>
PS^nSi < \/QNTUmm, (3.24)
Psa\s < VQcs\sa-
As S \Sa is obviously disjoint with Sa D S2 and both are in S, then bf^nS2 + cs\s°> < 
bmm <; NTUmin. Therefore, we have psans2 + Psa\s — V^NTUmin, and we can add 
this to Inequality 3.24 to give
Ps < 2\/QNTUmm.
This shows that the payment is upper bounded by 2-s/^NTUmin and hence we have
0NTUmin{(xAi) < 2«jQ.
□
We will now briefly consider the upper bound with respect to NTUmax.
Corollary 3.24. For {1,2} Single-Commodity Auctions with quantity Q, the aAi scal­
ing mechanism when a = \fQ, the frugality ratio is upper bounded with ^NTUmaxC^-M) < 
2v^-
Proof. From their definitions, NTUmax > NTUmin, hence the proof in Theorem 3.23 
trivially applies with regard to NTUmax.
□
3.4.2 A lower bound on frugality with the aAA mechanism
We will show lower bounds by using a series of examples. For any instance of a set- 
system auction let the total payment made to all agents be ps and let the payment 
ratio be ^Tffmin • Hence the frugality ratio for a mechanism is given by the maximum 
payment ratio over all possible instances. This means that, when we have a mechanism
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that has an instance with some payment ratio then NTlfmin is a lower boun<i for
the frugality ratio of that mechanism.
Recall that when a = 1 this mechanism is exactly equivalent to VCG (no scaling 
takes place, and all agents are paid their threshold value). Recall that Example 3.1 
showed an instance I where the frugality ratio is ^NTUmin(a-Ad) > Q. As this shows a 
small value of a does not improve frugality, perhaps some larger value of a may produce 
better results. Example 3.2 shows the same instance I with the aAi mechanism when 
a — Q.
Example 3.2. In this example we have a commodity auction for quantity Q items and 
observe that the number of agents n = Q + 1. For each agent e £ £ the quantity qe and 
cost ce are given in Table 3.2. A value bfin for a NTUmin bid vector is also given, as 
is the payment made by the aA4 mechanism p^ .
Agent <le Ce bfm Pe
A\ 1 0 1 1/Q
^2 1 0 0 1/Q
An—l 1 0 0 l/Q
An 2 1
Table 3.2: Instance I with a = Q
To verify that the payments given are correct, observe that = cn — 1, and when
there is a threshold bid be = 1/Q then applying the scaling for e < n gives ve — Q(l/Q)
so clearly ve — 1 = vn making pe = 1/Q the threshold value. Now for instance I we
would have a payment of 1/Q to all n — 1 winning agents, giving a payment ratio of
Q___-i
Q ~
While Example 3.2 having a frugality ratio of 1 is obviously a positive result, we now 
examine, in Example 3.3, another instance of the auction, F where we see that a = Q 
gives poor frugality.
Example 3.3.
In this example we have a commodity auction for quantity Q items and observe that 
the number of agents n = Q/2 + 2. For each agent e € £ the quantity qe and cost ce 
are given in Table 3.3. A value b™m for a NTUmin bid vector is also given, as is the 
payment made by the aA4 mechanism p^.
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Agent Qe Ce bfn p«
Ai 2 0 2 2Q
A2 2 0 2 2Q
An-2 2 0 2 2Q
■^n—1 1 1
An 1 1
Table 3.3: Instance I' with o> = Q
Here, there is a payment of 2Q to all n — 2 winning agents, (when the threshold bid
be = 2Q then ve = 2Q = (vn_i + vn ) making pe — 2Q a threshold value). This gives a
payment ratio of Q.
Example 3.3 shows that otM. has a frugality ratio that is no lower than that of VCG,
which was also shown to be Q in Example 3.1,
Although we can see that Instance I' does give a small payment ratio for aA4 when
P II
Example 3.4. In this example we 1have a commodity auction for quantity Q items and
observe that the number of agents n = Qj2-\-2. For each agent e £ £ the quantity qe 
and cost ce are given in Table 3.4- A value for a NTUmin bid vector is also given,
as is the payment made by the VCG mechanism
Agent Qe ce bfn pYCG
At 2 0 2 2
A2 2 0 2 2
An-2 2 0 2 2
An—l 1 1
An 1 1
Table 3.4: Instance I' with a = 1 (equivalent to VCG)
Here we see that {A\,..., An—2} is a winning set, the bid vector bmin meets the 
conditions for a NTUmin vector, hence NTUmin(c) = 2(n —2). For this instance, then, 
the payment ratio for lAi (i.e. VCG) is simply X, which we already know is optimal.
Calculation of a lower bound
The examples have shown that some instances give low frugality with large values of 
a, but some other instances only give low frugality with small values of a. We now
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generalize these examples to show possible ratios of Q/aox a and hence that any scaling 
mechanism of this type must have a frugality ratio of at least a/Q.
Theorem 3.25. For {1,2} Single-Commodity Auctions with quantity Q, the aA4 scaling 
mechanism has a frugality ratio given by 0NTUmin(o:^W) > VQ for values of a.
Proof We will now consider both the example instances I and I' under the more general
aM mechanism. By generalizing instance I in Example 3.2 for any value of a we get 
Example 3.5. Similarly, by generalizing I1 in Example 3.3 we get Example 3.6. Let m 
be some integer parameter that denotes the size of the instance. Note that for all a > 0 
then the winning sets S'ai)S'/a will not change for either instance. We will not consider 
the mechanism when a = 0, as there are no defined threshold payments.
Firstly, examining the instance I in Example 3.5; for each winning agent e E Sa, we 
can observe that pf = 1/ct. As agent Am+i could replace agent e to make a feasible set, 
the threshold payment is upper bounded by the maximum amount that e could bid, and 
still possibly be chosen in preference to agent Am+i. That is when ve = Um+i, and as 
we can see that vm+i = 1 in this instance, then when be — 1/a we have ve = 1 hence 
If a is the threshold value.
This gives Q fa as the sum of such payments over all agents in Sa. The example shows 
a feasible bid vector, bmin which has bfin — 1, and hence the NTUmin value for this 
instance is at most 1 (NTUmin(c) < 1). This gives a payment ratio of /NTUmin(c) > 
Q/at.
Now examining the instance P in Example 3.6; for each winning agent e £ Sa, we 
can calculate that pe — 2a. As before, we look for a replacement for agent e; in this 
instance it is the set {Am+i,Am+2}. Observe that v^m+1)Am+2y — 2a and when the 
threshold bid is be = 2a then ve = 2a, which gives be — 2a as the threshold value, and 
hence pf = 2a This gives a total payment of p^ — m2a = Qa. The bid vector bmiri 
shows that NTUmin (c) < Q; combining this with the payments shown gives a payment 
ratio for this instance which is pg/NTUmin(c) > a.
For Instance I we have a payment ratio of at least Q/a, and for I1 a payment ratio 
of at least a. As any aAi mechanism may be applied to both instances I and I' we can
see that
hence we can see a lower bound of frugality exists, for any aM. mechanism, of
^NTUmin > </Q.
□
Example 3.5, In this example we have a commodity auction for quantity Q items and
observe that the number of agents in the winning set m — Q. For each agent e £ £ the 
quantity qe and cost ce are given in Table 3.5. A value for a NTUmin bid vector is 
also given, as is the payment made by the aM mechanism pf.
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Agent Qe Ce Lminue __q:Pe
Ai 1 1 1 1/a
A2 1 0 0 1/a
Am 1 0 0 1/a
Am+i 2 1
Total 1 m/a
= 1 Qfoc
TABLE 3.5: Instance I with aM
Example 3.6. In this example we have a commodity auction for quantity Q items and 
observe that the number of agents in the winning set m = Q/2. For each agent e E £ the 
quantity qe and cost ce are given in Table 3.6. A value 6™in for a NTUmin bid vector is 
also given, as is the payment made by the afA mechanism p^.
Agent Qe Ce bmm Pe
Ai 2 0 2 2a
A2 2 0 2 2a
Am 2 0 2 2a
Am+1 1 1
A-m+2 1 1
Total 2m 2ma
= Q Qa
Table 3.6: Instance I' with aAi
3.5 The Unrestricted Integer Single-Commodity Auction
We now turn our attention to the general case for integer single-commodity auctions, 
and remove the restriction on the quantity that each agent may supply.
3.5.1 A lower bound on frugality for all Scaling Mechanisms
We have seen that our simple scaling mechanism works well for the {1,2} case, so we 
now consider the frugality of similar scaling mechanisms in the unrestricted case.
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Preliminaries
We will now extend the lower bound results from the {1,2} integer auction to show a 
lower bound for the more general case of the Integer Single-Commodity Auction (which 
satisfies Ve € £,qe G ^+) with scaling mechanisms similar to those seen in the {1,2} 
integer auction.
Let /3 be a scaling function, returning a linear scaling vector, a — (3{Q,k) (with 
Q!e G M). The two parameters of /3 are Q, which is given in the auction instance, and 
A; E Z which is the ‘maximum quantity5 parameter for any agent, i.e. Ve E£,qe< k.
For ease of notation we will assume for the rest of this section that we are using the 
mechanism PM, and hence both S — S^M and p = can be assumed. Let PM be 
the mechanism that uses the scaling vector a = (ai,..., a;c) returned by /3, as follows. 
Compute a ‘virtual5 bid ve for each agent e as
Ve = beQ,qe.
Let the winning set, S G J-1, he & feasible set with the lowest ‘virtual5 cost, i.e.
S G argmax vt ■
TeJ7
Each agent e will be paid its threshold value, pe.
If we consider every scaling function /?, and the resulting class of mechanisms, then 
we can think of PM as the class of all ‘blind-scaling5 mechanisms; when the mechanism 
must choose a scaling factor for each possible quantity, based only on the quantity 
required Q and the maximum quantity parameter k (so the mechanism does not look at 
any more details of each instance before deciding the scaling factors).
Proof of lower bound
The proof will be given by examining a series of example instances given, and showing 
that at least one of them must cause a payment ratio that satisfies the lower bound. We 
will begin this, simply by reminding ourselves of Example 3.5, which is duplicated here 
as Instance I1 in Example 3.7.
Example 3.7. In this example we have a {1,2} commodity auction for quantity Q 
items. Let m ~ Q and observe that the winning set is given by S = {Ai,... ,Am} . For 
each agent e G £ the quantity qe and cost ce are given in Table 3.7. A value b™m for a 
NTUmin bid vector is also given, giving NTUmin< 1. The payment made by the pM 
mechanism is also given in the table as pe.
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Agent Qe Ce Lminue Pe
Ai 1 0 1 £2.ai
A2 1 0 0 £2.ai
Am 1 0 0 £2.ax
Am+i 2 1
Total 1
Table 3.7: Instance J1
Here, there are at least Q agents in S, each is paid and NTUmin < 1 (as shown 
in Section 3.4-2); hence the payment ratio ^yfftnin — Qa%-
In order to verify that these payments are correct, we need to establish the threshold 
bids. For each agent e E S, if ve > vm+i then agent e would not be chosen, as the 
winning set would become S \ {e} U {m + 1}. When ve = agent e may still be
chosen (assuming that it is lexicographically first), hence when agent e bids be such that 
ve — ^m+i this is the threshold bid, and hence the payment made by this mechanism.
As the mechanism is truthful, we can assume 6m+i - cm+i hence - - cm+ia2 
a~2. Then, if we assume for all e E S, that be = ^ then as ve = beai we have ve = 
— a2 = um+i. This shows that be = ^ is a threshold bid for all e E S, hence the 
payment is given by pe = confirming the payment given in Table 3.7.
Example 3.7 illustrates that, in order for the frugality ratio to be less than Q, it is 
necessary for 02 < ai. The first technique used in this section will be to see that, in order 
to meet some given bound on the frugality, the consecutive scaling values (i.e. aj,aj+\) 
must be separated by at least a certain ratio. This will be achieved by generalizing 
Example 3.7, and in order to show how this example will be scaled-up to the general 
case we will now look at the next example, Example 3.8. This instance, I2, has agents 
with quantities 2 and 3.
Example 3.8. In this example we have a {2,3}-commodity auction for quantity Q 
items and observe that the winning set S is given by S = {Ai,..., Am} (with m =
For each agent e E £ the quantity qe and cost ce are given in Table 3.8. A value 
for a NTUmin bid vector is also given, giving NTUmin< 2, The payment made by the 
f3M mechanism is also given in Table 3.8 as pe.
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Agent 9e ce bf™ Pe
Ai 2 0 1 £3.
0-2
A-2 2 0 1 £3
0-2
A3 2 0 0 03
02
Am 2 0 0 03
02
A-m+l 3 1
Am+2 3 1
TABLE 3.8: Instance /2
We can note here that there are now two agents in S that can have a bid value 
bfm = 1, and that the vector bmm shows NTUmin < 2. (For all e 6 {3,... ,771} then 
from T = £ \ {l,2,e} U {m + l,ni + 2} then condition (2) in Definition 1.2 gives 
bfm + bfm + bfm < Cm+t + c^+2 giving bfin <Q).
Again, to verify that these payments are correct, we establish the threshold bids. For 
each agent e E S, if ve > vm+i then agent e would not be chosen, as the winning set 
could become 5'\{e}U{7Ti+l}. When ve — Vm+i, agent e may still be chosen, hence when 
agent e bids be such that ve — this is the threshold bid, and hence the payment.
If we assume for all e E S, that 6e = jg then as ve = bea2 we have ve — ga2 = a3 
and observe that — 03. This shows that be = is a threshold bid and hence the
payment is pe =
Here, there are at least & agents in S, each is paid jg, and NTUmin < 2; hence the 
payment ratio
P£ > Qa*
NTUmin — 4a2
Example 3.9 will now generalize these examples. Recall the assumption that k is a 
maximum size parameter, and that k < ^/Q. For each j e {1,... , fe — 1} let Example 3.9 
describe instance P. Observe the assumption that j < k < y/Q implies that m> j which 
is required by the structure of the example (m is defined in the example as m = [§]).
Example 3.9. In this example we have a {j,j + l}-commodity auction for quantity Q 
items. Let m = \Q~\ and observe that the winning set is given by S = {Ai,... ,Am}. 
For each agent e E £ the quantity qe and cost ce are given in Table 3.9. A value 
for a NTUmin bid vector is also given, giving NTUmin< j. The payment made by the 
f3Ai mechanism is also given in Table 3.9 as pe.
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Agent Qe ce Lmin Pe
A! j 0 i aj+lCbj
Aj j 0 i aj+laj
Aj+i 3 0 0 aj
Am 3 0 0 gj+iai
Am+1 i + 1 1
Am+j J+ 1 1
Total 3 a?+iaj
Table 3.9: Instance P
Firstly, we can observe that Examples 3.7 and 3.8 are special cases of Example 3.9 
with j — 1 and j — 2 respectively. We can see that with this parameter j, that there 
are j agents in S that can have a (NTUmin) bid value be — 1 (for e € S'). We can show 
that there can be no more than j agents that can each bid 1 as follows; j + 1 agents, 
each with quantity j, could be ‘replaced’ by the j agents outside S, each with quantity 
j + 1, so no set of j + 1 agents in S can bid a sum of more than j.
More formally,
Ve e S', let Te = S\{1,..., j, e} U {(m. + 1),..., (m + j + !)}■
Observe that
and
= J'O' + I)
,t=i
+l<Zm+i^ — j(j + 1)
hence qs = qr and Te is a feasible set.
Using this Te in condition (3) in Definition 1.2, for all e € {j + 1,... ,m} gives
£6rin +6min=£Cm+i
, l—l 7=1
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As Ya=i &rn = 3 and cm-\-i — j then we have 6™in = 0, which shows that for all 
e E {j + l,... ,r?7,} then vector bmm has some Te satisfying condition (3) in Definition 1.2.
For all e £ {1,..., j}, let Te — 5 \ {e} U {Am+i} which gives b^1111 = 1, showing that 
the bid vector bmin has, for all e £ S, some Te satisfying condition (3) in Definition 1.2 
and as we can observe bmm satisfies conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 1.2 then this 
shows NTUmin < and hence NTUmin < j.
We can also generalize the payment to each e £ S. For each agent e £ S,ifve> vm+i 
then agent e would not be chosen, as the winning set could become 5 \ {e} U (m + 1). 
When ve = vm+i, then agent e may still be chosen, hence when agent e bids be such 
that ve = vm+i this is the threshold bid, and hence the payment.
If we assume for all e £ S, that be — then as ue = £>ea7- we have ve = =
CLj J dj J
aj+i — vm+i. This shows that be — [s a threshold bid for all e £ S, hence the 
payment is given by pe —
Let c be a cost vector for instance P and we examine the payment ratio NTy£min as 
follows; there are at least 5 agents in S, each is paid and NTUmin < j; hence the
j dj
payment ratio satisfies the following inequality
Vs ^ 
NTUmin “ (3.25)
We can then use this as we move onto the first part of the proof.
We will initially define a ‘maximum size’ parameter, and will examine a series 
of instances when all agents have quantity at most k. From these instances we will be 
able to show a lower-bound in terms of this parameter, k. Finally we will show how to 
compute a value for k that gives a lower-bound for any given Q.
Let A; € {1,..., |_\/QJ} be a size parameter, and we will consider just the instances 
I1,... ,Ik. We will show a minimum ratio needed between any consecutive scaling values 
(aj,a,j+i) (when j < k) in order to satisfy the specific payment ratio given.
Proposition 3.26. For instance P of j3M with j < k — 1 and <Qk the inequality
k 1 aJ + l
__E£__ > Lmno
NTUmin - fc2
Proof. From inequality 3.25 we have j^rifmin — > and ^ j < k implies y? > p-
and hence it follows, due to transitivity, that
Ps ^ Qaj+i 
NTUmin — k2aj
additionally can be inverted to be expressed as
^V.>Qir
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therefore, by transitivity
ps ^ Q aj+i ^ QQ k 
NTUmin “ k2 aj ~ k2
and as QQ^ — this can be simplified to state
jt-i
ps > Q~^
NTUmin ~ k2 '
completing the proof.
□
This minimum separation required between every aj and aj+\ implies that there is 
large separation between ax and ajt. We will then see in Example 3.10 that when this 
large separation between ax and a^ exists, this will give rise to a large payment ratio 
(and hence frugality ratio).
Example 3.10. In this example we have a commodity auction for quantity Q items 
with the parameter k. Let m = and observe that the winning set is given by S — 
{i4i,..., Am}. For each agent e £ £ the quantity qe and cost ce are given in Table 3.10. 
A value b1™ for a NTUmin bid vector is also given, giving NTUmin< mk. The payment 
made by the j3A4 mechanism is also given in the table as pe.
Agent qe „ lonince ue Pe
Ax k 0 k fcoiah
Am k 0 k kaittfc
Am+x 1 1
Am+k 1 1
Table 3.10: Instance/*1
Proposition 3.27. For instance Ik of {3M the inequality holds.
Proof. For each e G S, there is exactly one feasible set not containing e — that is £ \ {e}. 
Therefore the only bid vector that could satisfy NTUmin must satisfy condition (3) in 
Definition 1.2 with Te = £ \ {e}. Therefore the NTUmin bid for each e £ S must be
= °re\s = c{m+l....m+k+i} = k
As there are m agents in S, each having a bid 6^’11 = k, we have
NTUmin < mk.
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Similarly, the threshold bid for e must be when ve = Assuming be = ^
multiplying by the scaling factor ak gives ve = ^ak = kai. The virtual bids of the 
competing agents i G {m + 1,... are Vi = ai, hence V{m+i]..mirn+ky = ka\ showing
that
be —
a/c
is a threshold bid, and hence the payment
Pe =
kai
CLk
Therefore, in Instance Ik, there are m agents in S; each is paid ^ giving a total
payment of zz^Ll. As we have seen NTUmin < mk hence
P£ > ai 
NTUmin — ak
□
We will now move on to a result which shows that, for any scaling vector that could 
be used by the /3A4 mechanism, there will be some instance, from the examples that we
fc—i
have seen, that give a payment ratio of at least @-gf-.
Proposition 3.28. For any scaling vector a given by fiM. there is some Instance P for
fc-i
— 1} or Instance Ik such that the inequality NTUm^ ~ holds.
Proof. If there existed some j e {1,..., A;-!} such that then Proposition 3.26
implies that ^^fmin > . Therefore, if the expression
Y? e {1,..., fe — 1}, —> qi (3.26)
aj+i
does not hold then the proof is complete.
Hence suppose that expression 3.26 does hold. We can see this implies that the
consecutive scaling values must have a certain separation. By way of example, this gives
S > ^ etc- By transitivity we would have ^ etc. This can
then be generalized, for j E 1, ...,& — 1 to give
aj+l
Suppose that j = /c — 1, then we have
«i— > Q * .
ak
Referring back to Proposition 3.27, Instance Ik gives
P£ > a\_
NTUmin “ ak
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hence, by transitivity,
——----> gnr.NTUmin ^
As we have seen that, if expression 3.26 does not hold, then the proposition is satisfied 
for some Instance Ij where j e — 1}. When expression 3.26 does hold, then we
k~l
have instance Ik giving N^fmin > , satisfying the proposition. Hence there is some
instance, either P for j € {1,..., A: — 1} or Ik that satisfies the proposition. □
Now that we have seen that there is always some instance that gives at least this 
(reasonably large) payment ratio in terms of A:, we can use this to prove a lemma that 
shows a lower bound on the frugality ratio for all Integer Single-Commodity Auctions.
Lemma 3.29. For all Integer Single-Commodity Auctions for quantity Q items and 
a maximum-quantity parameter k < ^/Q, every blind-scaling mechanism has a
k-l
frugality ratio which satisfies the inequality ^NTUmin (PM) >
Proof The blind-scaling mechanism {3M. must, by definition, calculate its scaling vector 
a for use on any instance that it may be given with these parameters. Once this scaling 
vector is fixed the mechanism may possibly be given either Instance Ik or Instance P 
for any j £ {1,...,A; — 1}. Proposition 3.28 shows that at least one of these instances
fc-i
gives ^ k7 . The existence of such an instance proves
<f>NT\Jmm(PM) >
^ k-l
Q k 
k2
□
Now that we have shown a lower bound on frugality for values of Q in terms of the 
parameter A;, we can specify a value of k such as to give a lower bound entirely in terms 
of Q. To that end, suppose k — and we will see this implies a lower bound of 4^|^- 
for pM mechanisms.
Theorem 3.30. Given an Integer Single-Commodity Auction for quantity Q items, 
every blind-scaling mechanism, [3Ad, has a frugality ratio which satisfies the inequality 
0NTUmm(/3A'O > '^-Q ■
Proof. Considering the proof of Lemma 3.29, suppose k = Re-arranging the ex-
k-l _2
pression given in Lemma 3.29 gives q , and hence, by substitution
0NTUmin(/?Ad) >
4Qe"2 
In2 Q
(Note that this only holds exactly when ^ <E Z as A: must be an integer parameter 
but this restriction is not important to the asymptotic result.)
□
Chapter 4
Shortest Path with k-sets
4.1 Overview
One of the most commonly studied types of set-system auctions is the path auction 
(e.g. [4, 12, 39, 23, 10]). A path auction is a special-case of the set-system auction, 
where each agent represents an edge in a graph, and the feasible sets are the sets of 
agents that include a path between two specified vertices of the graph. In this chapter, 
we propose a generalization of this path auction, and give some preliminary results.
In a typical path auction, we consider that each agent is represented by some edge 
in a graph (or multigraph), and that the feasible sets are exactly those sets that contain 
a path between two pre-determined vertices of the graph.
In real-world situations, it is normally the case that, in any given network, not all of 
the edges are owned by separate entities. While, of course, that does not preclude them 
being auctioned individually, we will see some reasons why this is not always desirable. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to generalize the path auction to allow edges to be sold 
in ‘bundles’, rather than as individual edges.
This type of auction, where agents own multiple edges, has been previously studied 
(e.g. [10]). However, one fundamental difference in our approach is that they assume 
the ownership information is private, and agents may not always honestly reveal which 
edges they own. They then study truthful mechanisms based on this assumption, and 
show negative results for this setting — that no mechanism which only requires the edge 
costs to be reported can also be truthful.
That general idea, of studying mechanisms where ownership may be dishonestly 
reported has also been studied by Kempe et al. in [23]. They consider the concept of 
mechanisms that are false-name-proof. In this setting the auctioneer does not know all 
of the set-system and the element ownership information. Thus agents can declare this 
information to the auction, which would allow manipulations such as falsely claiming 
an element that they own to be a set of agents, or to claim that individual elements are 
owned by separate agents. A false-name-proof mechanism would not allow any agent to 
gain greater utility by making a false declaration as to ownership. However, they show 
a lower bound on frugality of fl(2n) for all false-name-proof mechanisms. These results
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suggest that allowing agents to dishonestly report their ownership information would 
prove a major obstacle to finding frugal (truthful) mechanisms in this setting. However, 
in many real cases, the ownership information would be public knowledge, and not 
manipulable, and we will restrict our analysis to the cases that either the information is 
public, or analogously, that it will be honestly revealed due to some external incentive.
In this model, we consider that each agent owns some collection of edges, and is 
willing to provide all of their edges for some fixed cost. We can see that this may have 
real applications if we think of this as some ‘off-peak’ or ‘surplus capacity’ shortest path 
problem. Where network owners may have surplus capacity, for instance at certain times 
of day, then they may be willing to sell access to their entire network for some fixed cost. 
The fixed cost may represent the overhead of enabling access to the service, or simply 
what the network considers reasonable so as not to impact on their ‘regular’ sales.
In many cases, such as public transport or telecommunications, it may well be true 
that additional network use adds little or nothing to the running cost. It is reasonable 
to assume that having a single payment for access to the entire network may be quite 
desirable for the seller — it may be simpler to setup, and more attractive to potential 
buyers than dealing with smaller network bundles. We can see such an approach used by 
rail or bus companies in the UK, who will often provide some unlimited off-peak travel 
opportunities for a single payment [31, 30].
4.2 Problem Definitions and Examples
We now present definitions for the problems that we study here.
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4,2.1 Problem Definitions
Name SHORTEST PATH WITH fc-SETS (SPA;) (unweighted version)
Instance A graph G = (V, E) with two distinct vertices s, t and a collection, Z = 
{Z\,..., Zm} of subsets of E (Zi Q E ) such that \Zi\ < k (each ‘bundle’ has at 
most k edges, for some integer parameter k) and \/e € E, e occurs in exactly one
Zi.
Output The minimum size subset S C Z that contains a path from s to t. i.e. that 
there is a path P C E from s to t in G such that Ve e P; 3Zi € S such that e £ Zi.
Name SHORTEST PATH WITH A;-SETS (SPA;) (weighted version)
Instance A weighted graph G = (V, E, rti) with two distinct vertices s, t and a collection, 
Z = {Zij..., Zm} of subsets of E (Zi Q E ) such that \Zi\ < k (each ‘bundle’ has 
at most k edges, for some integer parameter k) and Ve £ E, e occurs in exactly 
one Zi. There is a weight function w(Zi) such that w(Zi) e Q and w(Zi) >0.
Output The subset S C Z with minimum weight 'w(S), that contains a path from s 
to t. i.e. that there is a path P C E from s to t in G such that Ve £ P; 3Zi £ 
S such that e £ Zi.
Problem 1: SHORTEST PATH WITH fc-SETS
We now define other problems that will be used later on to show hardness results for 
SPA;.
Name EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS (X3C)
Instance A finite set X with |X| = 3g for some q £ Z+ and a collection, C, of 3-element 
subsets of X
Output Does C contain an exact cover, i.e. a subcollection S C C such that every 
element in X occurs in exactly one member of S?
Problem 2: EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS
X3C is well-known to be NP-complete [14].
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Name MINIMUM SET COVER (MSC)
Instance A finite set X and a collection, C, of subsets of X
Output The size of a minimum set cover for X; i.e the minimum size \S\ of a sub- 
collection S C. C such that every element in X occurs in at least one member of 
5.
Problem 3: MINIMUM SET COVER 
MSC is well-known to be NP-hard [14].
Name MINIMUM fc-SET COVER (MfcC)
Instance A finite set X and a collection, (7, of subsets of X, such that VQ e <7, IQ] < k.
Output The size of a minimum set cover for X] i.e the minimum size |5| of a sub­
collection SCC such that every element in X occurs in at least one member of 
5.
Problem 4: MINIMUM fc-SET COVER
MkC is known to be NP-hard when A; > 3 and in P when fc < 3 [14]. (Although a
hardness proof will be given as a reduction from X3C).
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4.2.2 Example
In Figure 4.1 we see an example of an instance of M/cC, when /c = 3 and in Figure 4.2 
we see a similar example of an instance of SHORTEST PATH WITH /c-SETS, when 
k = 3. The purpose of these two examples is to demonstrate the connection between 
the two problems, which is that any instance of MfcC can easily be transformed into an 
instance of SPk. This will be shown in more detail later, but it is possible to see from 
these examples that any solution to Figure 4.1 implies a solution of the same size in 
Figure 4.2, and vice-versa.
[
c Cl = {X1,Xa,X5> ( C2 = {Xi,X3,X4> ^ C G> = <X2,X3,XS>
C Ci = {X3,Xt,X6y ) C f'. {.V,.A'r,,A'„> )
S={CUC4}
Figure 4.1: Example of M3C
Zi Zi Zs
Figure 4.2: Figure 4.1 as SHORTEST PATH WITH 3-SETS
4.3 Hardness results
We can observe that the SPA: problem is, when A: = 1, exactly equivalent to the shortest- 
path problem that has been well-studied. Furthermore, it is well-known that this prob­
lem can be solved optimally in time that is polynomial in the number of edges, e.g. using 
Dijkstra’s algorithm [9]. So, it is an obvious question to ask about the complexity of 
computing exact solutions when k > 2, and that is addressed in this section.
For this section, we need only consider the unweighted version of the SPA: problem; 
we will generalize to the weighted version when we examine this problem in an auction 
setting. Firstly, we will examine the SHORTEST PATH WITH 3-SETS problem, and 
show that this is NP-hard. This will be achieved by a reduction from MINIMUM 3-SET 
COVER (M3C), which we will see is a generalization of the known NP-hard problem
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EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS (X3C). We then see a reduction from fc = 3 to /c = 2, 
showing that the problem is NP-hard even when each bundle only contains 2 edges, 
giving a complete characterization for all values of k (namely, in P for A: — 1 and NP- 
hard otherwise).
4.3.1 SHORTEST PATH WITH 3-SETS
Proposition 4.1. M&C is a generalization of the NP-hard problem EXACT COVER 
BY 3-SETS.
Proof. Assume that we have an input to EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS that has |X| — 3q 
for some q € Z+, For this input, EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS(X) is equivalent to the 
decision problem Ts there a solution to M3C(X) with size Hence if M3C can be
computed exactly then this can be used to give an answer to any instance of the problem 
EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS, which is well-known to be NP-hard (see, e.g., [14]).
□
Lemma 4.2. There is a polynomial-time reduction from MkC to SPk such that the 
optimal solution to any instance of MkC can be found with an optimal solution to a 
given instance of SPk.
Proof Taking the input (X, (7) from an instance of MfcC, when m = |X| and n = 
(Cj, build an instance (G^Z)1 of SPA: as follows. Add m + 1 new vertices, labelled 
Vi,..., V^+i, and let s — Vi and t — .
For each of the subcollections C{ e C, add a bundle Z{ £ £, and for each element e in 
Ci give the corresponding bundle Zi an edge from Ve to Ve+\. Hence, every subcollection 
is mapped to a single agent, and each element in a subcollection is mapped to an 
edge going from the corresponding vertex to the next vertex in the path. Hence, for 
every set of subcollections that contains all of the elements of the groundset, there is a 
corresponding set of bundles that contain all the edges from s to t.
The construction was demonstrated in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. The groundset in Fig­
ure 4.1 consists of {1,..., 6}, hence the set of vertices are {1,..., 7} in Figure 4.2. 
Collection C\ contains elements 1,2 and 5, and so bundle Z\ has corresponding edges 
from Vi, Vj and V5 (every edge simply connects vertex V to V+i)- This is repeated for 
the other subcollections C2, C3, C4, C5 in Figure 4.1 to give the edges shown for bundles 
Z2, Zs, Z4, Z5 in Figure 4.2
We can observe that the optimal solution in Figure 4.1 is of size 2; subcollection 
Ci has elements {1,2,5} and C4 has {2,3,6} and so all 6 elements are covered. The 
corresponding optimal path in Figure 4.2 is also of size 2 and contains bundle Z\ with 
edges from V}, V2, V5 and bundle Z4 with edges from V2, V3, Ve. As there are edges from 
Yi, V2, V3, V4, V5, Ve then there is a complete path from s = Vi to i — V7.
1G is actually presented as a multigraph for simplicity, but Section 4.4.4 shows that this is not 
important.
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Returning to the proof, suppose that we have an instance of MkC (X,C)t and a 
corresponding instance of an SPfc problem (G, Z), generated as described. We will then 
see that for any solution S to M&C there exists a solution S' to SPA; such that \S\ = 
and that for every solution S' to SPA; a solution S to MA;C also exists with |S'/| =
Taking S' C C as a solution to MA;C (X, C) , construct S' C Z as a solution to SPA; 
(G, Z) by including a bundle Zi in S' if and only if the corresponding subcollection C; 
is in the solution S. Clearly this implies |S'j = \S'\, so it is sufficient to see that S' is a 
valid solution.
For S to be a valid solution, every j £ X is present in some Ci £ S. As Ci £ S <=> 
Zi £ S' then there is a corresponding Zi £ S' for every Gt £ S. As every j £ X must be 
present in some Ci £ S (or else S is not a valid solution) then every j £ {!,... ,m} is 
present in some Zi £ S'. As we add an edge from Vj to Vj+i for each j £ Ci £ C, then 
there is an edge from every Vj : j £ {l,... ,m} to Vj+i — implying a path of m edges 
from Vi to Kn+i, proving that S' is a valid solution (as s = Vi and t — Vm+i).
This procedure will be reversed to see that when S’ Q Z is a, solution to SPA; then 
there exists S', a solution to MA;C {X,C) when |S| = |£'|. This is simply created in the 
same way, and includes Ci in S if and only if the corresponding bundle Zi is in S'.
As before, clearly \S\ = |S'/|, and an edge between every Vj and Vj+i must be 
contained in some Z{ £ S'. The corresponding Ci is included in S and hence every 
element j £ X is covered by some Ci £ S.
This shows that every instance of the problem MA;C can be solved exactly with an 
instance of SPA; and the proof is complete. □
Lemma 4.3. SHORTEST PATH WITH 3-SETS is NP-hard.
Proof. Using Lemma 4.2 any instance of M3C can be polynomial-time reduced to an 
instance of SP3. As Proposition 4.1 has shown that M3C is NP-hard, this shows that
SP3 is NP-hard. □
4.3.2 SHORTEST PATH WITH 2-SETS
We will now see a reduction from SP3 to SP2, showing that SP2 is also NP-hard.
Taking as input an instance of SP3 (G,Z), we will generate a graph G' — (V',El) 
and a collection Z' as an input (G', Z') to SP2 as follows.
Let n = |Z|, and for each i € {1,... ,n} create 4 new vertices, labelled V{a) V[h 
and V70- Let W be a set containing these vertices.
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Additionally, add copies of all of the vertices in V £ C?, to complete the vertex set V.
W = U U W.
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Figure 4.3: Construction for V? to
Let = s (combine the last of the new vertices with the vertex marked as s in G).
For each i G {1,..., n} define 5 new edges, and let Y be the set of all these edges, 
as follows.
n
t=l
Now copy all of the edges in G, to give the edge set E',
let E' = Y U E.
Observe that the vertices W and edges in Y give two parallel paths from each V- to 
V7+1, one of length 3 (via V/a and V'/b) and the other of length 2 (via V(q)\ we can see 
this construction in Figure 4.3 as well as the example presented in Figure 4.5.
S = {Zi, Z2}
Figure 4.4: Example of SHORTEST PATH WITH 3-SETS
Figure 4.5: Figure 4.4 as SHORTEST PATH WITH 2-SETS
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For each Z{ G. Z if we label the three edges in Zi as (the mapping is not
important) then define the collections as follows
^ = {ea.W.^a)} (4.1)
(4.2)
^ = K,WVK'+i)} (4.3)
(4.4)
Zm = {(V^oVm)} (4.5)
That is, for every triple Zi in Z, each edge in Zi will now be ‘paired* (they will both 
be part of the same ‘collection* Z^ ) with any one of the three edges in the three-edge 
path between V( and V!+1. Both Z'ifi and Z';1 contain only one edge.
This duplicates every edge in E in E', and recall that V^+1 = s, which connects the 
end of the ‘path’ construction we created with the vertex s in the copy of the original 
graph G.
Combine these to give all of the collections
i=l
Let the two distinct vertices in G' be s' = V{, and t1 = t.
We will now see that any SP3 problem can be solved with this construction of 
SP2. We will start with two propositions which, when taken together, will show that a 
minimum solution to either problem will give a minimum solution to the other.
Referring again to the construction in Figure 4.3; informally, we will arrange these so 
that any s — t path must pass through each of these n constructions in turn. If the upper 
path is chosen, with three edges, then each of these edges is ‘bundled’ with one edge from 
Zl and all three of these bundled edges (belonging to Z^, Z[^ Z!^ z) may be selected at 
no additional cost. If the lower path is chosen, with two edges, then no further edges are 
‘bundled*. Therefore, by choosing the upper path in preference to the lower path, we 
may select all of ZiS three edges in G, which ‘costs’ one edge more than taking the lower 
path with no additional edges included. We can see that this is equivalent to adding one 
for every edge Zi chosen in a solution to SP3(G'), with a constant value of two added 
for every Zi £ Z.
Proposition 4.4. For any solution S C Z to SP3(G) there is a solution S' C Z' to 
SP2(G/) such that |S| + 2\Z\ = |S"|.
Proof. Construct a solution S' from S', as follows. When Zi is in S include all three of 
ZiiXi Z'i y and Z'i z in S', otherwise include Z'i Q, Z[ x in S’
We will see that this is a valid solution in two parts - firstly that there is a path from 
s’ to V^+1, and secondly a path from VJ+1 to G. We can see that for every i E {1, ...,n} 
there is a path from V( to V(+l (for each Zi E Z then exactly one of the two paths
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Z't x, Z! y> Zl z or ZjQfZh is included in S' and either path reaches from Ve to Ve+i). 
Hence there is a path from s' = V{ to V^+1.
We will then see that, if Z contains a path from s to £ in <3 then Z' contains a path 
from s' to tf in G'. For each Zi G S then all three of Z'i x, Z'i y, Z\ are in S' and these 
contain all of the edges that are in Zi. This shows that all of the three edges present 
in each Z\ G S are contained in some Z'ix)Z'i y or that is in S'. If a path were 
not present in Z' from V^+1 (recall that V^+1 = s) to t' in G', then Z could not have 
contained a path from s to t in G.
As we have seen that there is a path from s' to V^+1 and a path from V^+1 to t' then 
it follows that there is a path from s' to t'. Now we have seen that S' is a valid solution, 
we will continue by verifying the size of the solution.
Recalling that Vi £ {1,... ,n}, then S' contains either Z( , Z[ , Z'iz when Zi £ S or 
Z'i o, ZI-l otherwise. Hence the size of S' can be written as
IS'I = : Zi e S} + £{2 : .Zi £ S}
1=1 i=l
Which can be rewritten as
and simplified to
n
is'i = £2+£1
i=l Zi^S
|5,/| = 2n + |iS[.
Recalling n = \Z\, this proves the proposition |5| + 2|Z| — \S'\. □
Proposition 4.5. For any solution S' C Z' to SP2(Gf/) there exists a solution S C. Z 
to SP3(G) such that \S\ + 2\Z\ =
Proof. As an intermediate step, firstly we will create a new, more structured, solution 
S" to SP2 having |S"| = |5,|. For any i £ {1,... ,n} when S' contains exactly one of 
{Z'i x, Z'i y, Z'i z} and both Z'i Q and Z'^ then S" contains all three of {Z'i x, Z'^y1 Z'i z] but 
not Z'iQ and Z^. For any i £ {1,... ,n} when this does not hold, S" simply contains 
whichever of , Z'i y, Z'iz, Z'i Q and Z'i lL that were present in S'.
Observe that, as the only edges removed from S' were those contained in q, 
for some i, and these do not contain any edges that are between V^+i and t (i.e. in the 
G portion of G'), then when S' contains a path from V^+i and t then so does S".
As the only substitution replaces exactly three edges in S' with three in this tells 
us that |S"| = |,S"|. Now construct a solution 5, by including Zi in S if and only if there 
is at least one of Z'i x, Z'i y} Z'i}Z in S". Observe that when {Z'i}Qi Z'itl} C S" nothing is 
added to S, otherwise Zi is added.
Firstly, see that this makes a valid solution - when S" contains any of Z'i x, Z'i y or 
ZI z then S contains Z{. Suppose, for contradiction, that S does not contain a path from
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s to t. As S" contains a path from s to t', then there must be some edge (between 
s and t') that is present in S" but not in S. (Only the edges between s and t' exist in 
both G and G'). As ew is in A", it is present in some Zli^Z'i y or Z'iz that is in S" - 
but not in Z;. The construction of S includes Z{ 6 A, whenever Z( x, Z[ y or Z[z is in 
S" , hence it can only be the case that ^ Zj. However, recall that the only edges 
between s and t' in Z'^Z'^y and Z'i z were constructed from the edges in Zj, giving a 
contradiction. This shows that when A" contains a path from s to t', then A contains a 
path from s to i, making it a feasible solution.
Now, finally, we need to see that |A| + 2|Z| = \S"\. We can observe that, if at 
least two edges from Z^., Z^y and Z^z were in the lowest-cost solution, S', then both 
{Z-0, Z'iA} would not have been included (as all three of ZJ , Z- y and Z- would have 
been a lower-cost path from V! to Vl+l). By creating A", we removed any cases when 
there is only one edge included from Z^, Z[^ and Z'^z, hence there are only two possible 
cases left, either {Z^Z^} C A" or {Z^Z^Zy C A".
Case 1 : {Z^0, Z-^j c A"
As we have {Z^, Z^y, Z^zj D S" — 0 then we can write the contribution to A" as
Case 2 : Z-x, Z‘i y and Z'i z are all present in A"
Here> {^,o> C A" = 0 so we have |{Z^, Z(y, Z'^, Z')0, Z^} n A"| = 3.
So, for all % when Zi e S then l{Z(>x, Z^y, Z^, Z-)0, Z^j fl A"| =3. When Zi^S then 
\{zitx>zi,y> Zi,z’ Zl,0, z'i,i} n A/7| = 2. This gives us
n n
|S"'| = ^{3 : Z, € S} + -ZiiS}
i=l i=l
Which can be rewritten as
i=l Zi£S
and further simplified to
|A"j — 2n + jA|
Recalling that n = |Z|, this gives |A| +2|Z| — |A,,|. Recall that |A'| = lA") and the proof 
of the proposition is complete. □
Theorem 4.6. SHORTEST PATH WITH 2-SETS is NP-hard.
Proof. Taking Proposition 4.4 and Proposition 4.5 together shows that the optimal so­
lutions to SP2 and SP3 differ in size by only the constant additive factor, 2|Z|.
As SP3 (G, Z, s, t) was already shown to be NP-hard in Lemma 4.3, this shows that 
SP2 is also NP-hard. It is worth noting that, unlike the reduction from M3C to SP3 in 
Lemma 4.2, this reduction is not approximation preserving.
□
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Corollary 4.7. SHORTEST-PATH WITH fc-SETS is NP-hard for all k> 2,
Proof. Any instance of SHORTEST-PATH WITH 2-SETS, which was shown to be NP- 
hard in Theorem 4.6, can be solved by being given as an input to SHORTEST-PATH 
WITH fc-SETS, wherever k>2.
□
Corollary 4.8. The weighted version of SHORTEST-PATH WITH fc-SETS problem is 
NP-hard for all k > 2.
Proof. As the NP-hard unweighted version is simply a special case of the weighted 
version, (with w(Zi) = 1), the weighted version is also NP-hard. □
4.4 Auction Design
We will now use the weighted version of the SPfc (G, Z, w, s,t) problem in a set-system 
auction setting. Let the set system be (<f, J"). Let £ = {Ai,..., An} be the set of n 
agents owning the edge bundles {Z\,... ,Zn} respectively. Let P be the set of solutions 
for SPA:, i.e. T £ P implies that there is a path, P, between s and t in (?, such that 
Ve e P, 3A{ G T and e £ Z; (path P uses only the edges ‘owned’ by the agents in T). For 
all e £ £, let ce = w(Ze), that is the cost of each agent is equivalent to the weight. As 
we will be interested in truthful mechanisms, we will also generally assume that be = ce.
We can consider that this auction implements the SPA: problem; finding a lowest- 
cost solution for the auction is equivalent to finding a minimum-weight solution to the 
NP-hard problem SPA:.
4.4.1 Using VCG
We saw in Theorem 2.3 that VCG has a frugality ratio of at most n — 1. The simpler 
shortest-path problem (when every edge is owned by a unique agent), is trivially im- 
plementable as a special case of SPA:. Therefore we could use the example instances 
from [24] to show a lower bound on frugality of VCG for SPA: auctions of n — 1. (The 
same lower bound will be proven later in Lemma 4.12, as for A; = 1, VCG and the 
approximation mechanism we use are identical.) However, implementing VCG would 
require finding an exact solution to the SPA: problem. We have seen that finding an 
exact solution is NP-hard when A: > 2, so we know of no way to do this in polynomial 
time. As we would like to find some way of running this auction in polynomial time, we 
will now turn our attention to a polynomial-time mechanism that uses an approximation 
algorithm.
4.4.2 Mechanism
We will now define a specific mechanism, we will denote this by This mechanism 
can be performed in polynomial time, and we will see it has an upper bound on frugality 
of k(n — 1), which is within a factor of k of the upper bound on frugality for VCG.
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Algorithm 2 is an approximation algorithm for SPA;. This algorithm computes a 
shortest path on the underlying graph G, as if each edge was owned separately and 
given the entire weight (or bid) of the agent that owns it. For each edge e' in the 
shortest path, where bundle Ze contains e' then the corresponding agent Ae is included 
in the winning set.
Algorithm 2: Approximation Algorithm for SPA;
1 Take as input an instance of SPk(G,Z,wys,t);
2 Let G' = G. (and hence V1 = V^Ef = E, s' = s, l' — t) ;
3 Let w'{e') = w{Zi) for e £ Zi)
4 Compute S' C E' as the lowest-weight path from s' to t' in G' (use 
Dijkstra’s algorithm);
5 Let S' = 0;
6 for each e' E S' do
7 add Ae to S, when e' € Ze\
8 return S^ — S;
Let M'P be a mechanism with a selection rule that chooses a solution S^ E J7 by 
choosing the solution returned by Algorithm 2. As we will be using the bids provided 
by the agents, in place of weights, let be — w(Ze).
Let the payment rule for this mechanism pay threshold values, and let p^V be the 
sum of payments made by mechanism Mv to all agents in Sv.
4.4.3 Frugality Results for M7*
We will aim to show that the mechanism is truthful, and has a frugality ratio of 
A;(n — 1). Firstly, we will see an upper bound on the approximation ratio for the algorithm 
that is used. Then, once we have confirmed that A/f^ is a truthful mechanism, we will 
use the result about its approximation ratio to determine its frugality.
Proposition 4.9. Algorithm 2 returns a ^approximation for an exact solution.
Proof. Let OPT C Z be an optimal solution to SPA;(G, Z, io, s, £). We can construct 
a path OPT' C E' in G' using every edge in every agent in OPT. Recall that Ve E 
S, jZej < k, hence each agent in OPT contributes at most k edges to OPT' (each with 
weight w(Ze) from line 3). The weight of this path can therefore be upper bounded by
w'(OPT') < w{OPT)k. (4.6)
Observe that as OPT is a solution in G, OPT' is a solution in G'. When Sv is a solution 
in G', we can also consider the path S', (which was chosen in Algorithm 2), which is a 
solution to the shortest path in G'. As S' contains every edge in S^ then we have
w'(S') > w(S'p). (4.7)
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As the selection rule chose S' we know that
w'(S') < w'(OPT') (4.8)
and hence we can arrange inequalities 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 such that 
w(Sp) < w'(S') < w'(OPT') < w(OPT)k
which simplifies to
w{Sv) < w{OPT)k.
This completes the proof that Algorithm 2 returns a solution that is within a factor of 
k of the optimal solution, and hence may be called a fc-approximation. □
Proposition 4.10. is a truthful mechanism.
Proof. As the mechanism Mv pays threshold values, it is well known that it is truthful 
if the selection rule is monotonic (see, e.g., [24]). We will now show that the selection 
rule in is monotonic.
Let I and V be identical instances, other than there is exactly one agent e where
b'e * be.
Assume, for contradiction, that agent e is in the winning set with bid be, but is not 
in the winning set with a lower bid b'e. Let 5 be the winning set chosen by for
instance I (with bid vector b) and let T be the winning set chosen by for I’ (with
bid vector b').
We have defined the weights to be equal to the bids, w{e) = £>e, so we can consider the 
bids to the mechanism to be equivalent to the weights that are used in the approximation 
algorithm.
We know, from the definitions of b and b' that
b's < bs (because e £ S and b'e < be) (4.9)
bT = b'T (because e ^ T and all other bids are equal.) (4-10)
As S is chosen as optimal for /, therefore T could not have been a better choice, giving
bs bj1 (4.11)
similarly, the assumption that T is chosen in I1 gives
b'T < b's. (4.12)
By transitivity, from inequalities 4.9 and 4.11 we get
b's < bT (4.13)
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and by substitution of Equation 4.10 into Inequality 4.12 we get
bT < b's (4.14)
then by transitivity of inequalities 4.13 and 4.14 we get
< £(5 < bj1
giving bT < bT and hence a contradiction. This shows that given fixed bids by all other 
agents, no ‘winning’ agent can become a ‘losing’ agent by lowering their bid - hence that 
the selection rule is monotonic and, given the threshold payment rule, the mechanism 
is truthful.
□
Theorem 4.11. is a polynomial time truthful mechanism for SPk auctions that 
has a frugality ratio of at most k(n — 1).
Proof We use the Ai^ mechanism, which is based on the approximation algorithm 
given in Algorithm 2. We saw in Proposition 4.9 that Algorithm 2 has an approximation 
ratio of k. Additionally, we saw in the proof of Proposition 4.10 that Algorithm 2 is 
a monotonic algorithm, and that Mv is a truthful mechanism. Recall that we saw 
in Theorem 2.5 that, for all set system auctions, when a mechanism has a monotonic 
approximation algorithm with an approximation ratio of fc, it has a frugality ratio of at 
most k(n — 1), and hence it follows that Mv has a frugality of at most k(n - 1).
□
Lower bounds for A4^
In order to see a lower bound, we will see how to construct an example from any size 
parameter, m > k E Z.
Lemma 4.12. For any n > 2, there exists an instance of that has a payment ratio 
of k(n — 1).
Proof. The structure can be seen in Figure 4.6, and most importantly consists of a 
‘long’ path from s to t, which has m edges, each owned by a separate agent, which has 
weight 0. The only alternative solution will consist of a ‘short’ path of k edges from the 
same agent, with weight 1. More formally, construct an instance for the size parameter 
m £ Z > /c as follows.
Let the set of agents be £ = {Aq, ..., Am} having the edge bundles {Zq, ..., Zm} 
respectively. Define the sets of vertices V = {u0,..., vm} U {tuo,..., iwfc}. Now define a 
long path (with m edges) ; Vi G {1,..., m} let Ei — (u;*-!, tu;), and define a ‘short’ path 
(with k edges) Vi G {1,..., let Di = Then allocate all edges in the short
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path to Zq, let Zq = {D\,... £>*.} and allocate each edge in the long path to one agent; 
Vi € {1,..., m} let Z{ = {Ei}.
Give Zq a weight of 1 (and hence Aq has a cost of 0, which will be given to the 
mechanism as a bid for agent -Aq) and all other bundles a weight of 0. To define the 
graph, let E = {£1, U {D\,..., Dm} and let G = (V, E).
Finally, define the start and end points as s = vq = wq and t = Vm = Wk-
The lowest-weight path is clearly {Z\,..., £m}, having weight 0. Hence the winning 
set S = {Ai,..., Am} with bids 65 = 0. Also we can observe that NTUmin < 1, e.g. 
bm'n = (1,0,... ,0) satisfies conditions (1),(2) and (3).
The path chosen by the mechanism is the same, Sv = S. However, note that if 
any agent e > 0 had a threshold bid be < k (with all others being the same) then the 
mechanism would still choose Sv = S (as u/({/?o}) = k in G')] therefore the threshold 
bid for each agent e is be > k, hence Ve e Sv,pf > k. As (S^l = m = n — 1 then we 
have Pf > (n — l)k and hence pV > (n — l)k. The payment ratio is defined as the sum 
of payments, divided by NTUmin, which is • Hence this shows a payment ratio
exists of at least fc(n — 1). □
As Lemma 4.12 shows that, for any n > 2, there exists an auction with a payment 
ratio of A:(n — 1), which shows that the upper bound on frugality given in Theorem 4.11 
is tight.
E...
Bundle
Zi {£1} 0
Zm{Em}0
Figure 4.6: Construction of Example for Lower Bound of Mv
4.4.4 Inapproximability Results
Based on the reduction from MkC to SPA: (as given in Lemma 4.2) it is clear that the 
MA:C problem can be solved optimally with an instance of SPA:. Although the reduction 
gives an instance of SPA: that is presented as a multigraph, suppose that each edge 
is replaced by the original edge, and an extra edge, in series, which is part of a new 
subcollection for each extra edge. The resulting simple graph is identical, other than all 
paths now have twice the length of the original, and hence there is just a constant factor 
of 2 between the size of the optimal solutions to the original multigraph and the simple
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graph. Furthermore, the reduction can easily be generalized to include the weighted 
case for both problems.
It is known that the M/zC can be approximated to within a constant factor, but that 
no better than a constant factor is possible unless P=NP. (see, e.g., [13, 20]). We have 
already seen in Proposition 4.9 a A:-approximation for SPfe, so it is worth comparing this 
with the approximation ratios that are known for M&C. The best approximation ratio 
for MfcC remains something of an open problem — the best known result for (weighted) 
MkC is currently where i th harmonic number [20].
We may also consider the formulation of SP/c which does not provide an upper- 
bound on the number of edges that are bundled with each agent. Let this version of the 
problem be called SHORTEST PATH WITH SETS. The reduction given in Lemma 4.2 
from M/cC to SPk can equally be applied to reduce from MINIMUM SET-COVER to 
SHORTEST PATH WITH SETS.
Theorem 4.13. No approximation ratio of (1 — e) Inn exists for SHORTEST PATH 
WITH SETS for any e > 0 under the assumption that NPc Dtime (nloglogn).
Proof. Lemma 4.2 has given a reduction which shows that all possible solutions to the 
MINIMUM SET COVER problem exist with the same weight in an instance of SHORT­
EST PATH WITH SETS, and vice-versa. Hence, as the solutions have identical weights, 
the reduction is approximation-preserving.
As we have an approximation-preserving reduction, this shows that any approxima­
tion ratio for SHORTEST PATH WITH SETS would give an equivalent approximation 
ratio for the MINIMUM SET COVER problem. It was shown by Feige in [13], for the 
MINIMUM SET COVER problem, that no approximation ratio of (1 — e) Inn exists for 
any e > 0 under the assumption that NP c DTiME(nioslogn). This implies that no 
approximation ratio of (1 — e) Inn exists for SPA: (with arbitrary k) for any e > 0 under 
the assumption that NPc DTiME(nlos[°en). □
Chapter 5
Benchmarks and First-Price 
Auctions
5.1 Overview
In previous chapters we have considered benchmark values, such as NTUmin and NTU- 
max, that have previously been seen in the literature for set-system auctions (e.g. [24, 
11, 5, 25]). One possible observation is that each can be thought of as an equilibrium in 
a first-price auction, which was described by Karlin et al. [24]. Recall that, in a first- 
price auction, the outcome is the price paid when each agent receives exactly their bid 
value. However, Karlin et al. concentrated on the properties of NTUmin, as a type of 
equilibrium, but did not suggest any method of finding it (or any other equilibrium). In 
this chapter we will look at some other possible concepts for types of first-price auction 
that also reach some sort of equilibrium, and examine the range of payments associated 
with them. While first-price auctions do not generally incentivize the participants to 
bid truthfully, they are quite often implemented in reality. As we noted in Chapter 1, 
some examples are property auctions, which is particularly common practice in Scotland 
and parts of Australia amongst others [29], Other items that have been sold in this way 
include vehicle registration numbers, uranium and radio broadcast licenses.
Before beginning to study other first-price auctions we firstly take a look at some 
properties of the NTUmin and NTUmax values that we have seen, and consider another 
method of representing the constraints imposed by conditions (1),(2) and (3) in Defini­
tion 1.2. These conditions represent what we might think of as ‘fairness’ criteria and we 
will be interested in what we call feasible bid vectors, which are those that satisfy these 
criteria without necessarily being the maximum possible (NTUmax) or the minimum 
(NTUmin).
Choosing a lowest-cost solution is an obvious goal for the auctioneer, and it is natural 
that the auctioneer would not wish to pay a large amount for one set when there might 
be a competing set that would cost less. This notion is captured, more formally, by 
condition (2) that we saw earlier in Definition 1.2. Looking more closely at condition
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(2) tells us that, when comparing the winning set S with some other feasible set T, we 
can disregard the common part, S' fl T, and consider the effect that those outside the 
winning set (i.e., T\S) has on the payments (or bids, in this setting) to the remainder 
of the winning set (S\T).
This tells us that no subset of agents can bid a value which is larger than the bids 
of some other subset of agents that could constitute a ‘replacement’ in the winning set. 
(i.e., asT\S could replace S\T and would make an alternative feasible solution, namely 
T, we can consider T \ 5 as a possible replacement for S \T). Effectively, this means 
that each feasible set, other than the lowest-cost set S, may provide some upper bound 
on the bids of some subset of S. Conceptually, it is possibly easier to imagine these 
alternative sets as providing constraints, and we will see in Section 5.2 how to express 
the constraints given by condition (2) in Definition 1.2 as a hypergraph.
One of the drawbacks to NTUmin noted by Elkind et al. [11] was that computing 
NTUmin is NP-hard. However, they note that computing NTUmax does not require 
condition (3) in Definition 1.2 (as it will be satisfied by maximizing anyway), and hence 
finding NTUmax is equivalent to solving a linear program. Hence, where a polynomial­
time separation oracle exists for the constraints of (2) then NTUmax may be computed 
in polynomial time (e.g. using the well-known ellipsoid method [26, 27]). A separation 
oracle is some function that, given a possible solution, can either determine if the solution 
satisfies the constraints or can indicate a constraint which is not satisfied. A function 
that finds the lowest-cost feasible set could be used to construct a separation oracle, as 
follows. Given some possible bid vector, if the feasible set that is returned was equal 
to S (with tie-breaking in favour of S) then no constraint was violated, and the bid 
vector is feasible. If a different feasible set T was returned, then this would indicate the 
constraint that was violated (bs\T < or\s)- Hence, when the lowest-cost feasible set can 
be found in polynomial time, a polynomial-time separation oracle exists and NTUmax 
can be computed in polynomial time. Some of the procedures that are described in this 
chapter also make very similar use of a separation oracle to find the solution to a linear 
program.
In Section 5.3 we begin our analysis with a procedure inspired by the progressive 
auction introduced by Demange, Gale and Sotomayor in [8], In their auction, the auc­
tioneer begins by starting at a low price and repeatedly increases the prices on any items 
that are over-demanded (more than one agent is prepared to pay the current price for 
that item). We take a similar approach, translated it into a reverse setting. We start 
with high prices, and repeatedly decrease prices when there is still an ‘over-supply’, until 
we reach an equilibrium — when no agent would be willing to decrease their price any 
further. We do this by choosing a ‘current’ winning set, then offering the new price to 
agents not in the winning set. Those who are not currently chosen can either agree to 
the new price, or their cost value, whichever is higher. Hence, when there is at least 
one agent that is not currently chosen but can lower her price, we have an ‘over-supply’ 
situation and have not yet reached equilibrium.
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We show that such an approach can not only give us a complete range of what we 
consider fair results (between NTUmin and NTUrnax), it may also give some that are 
unfair (in the sense of not satisfying conditions (1),(2) and (3)) and hence we believe 
that it is not suitable for a reasonable benchmark.
We then consider a special case in Section 5.4 when we allow only simultaneous bid 
decrements, so that all agents must lower their bids uniformly. We show that this may 
still produce ‘unfair’ results.
Alternative processes, in Sections 5.5 and 5.6, begin by choosing an optimal winning 
set based on the costs, and allowing iterations of bid raises. We show that this does meet 
the fairness criteria but can result in any of the complete range of values from NTUmin to 
NTUrnax. Even when this is restricted to simultaneous raising, in Section 5.7, we see an 
almost-complete range of possible values. We do note that, when the problem of finding 
an optimal feasible set can be solved in polynomial time, then we have a polynomial-time 
separation oracle and this value may be computed in polynomial time. Additionally, we 
consider versions where the agents begin from bidding zero and subsequently raising 
their bids. As much of the literature regarding frugality began with the study of path 
auctions (e.g. [4, 36, 12]), Section 5.8 considers these different approaches in the special 
cases of path auctions.
Section 5.9 then modifies this method so that we consider a strictly ordered approach. 
Every agent is called upon, in turn, to submit a bid value. We assume that each agent 
will raise its bid as much as possible while remaining in the winning set, hence achieving 
the fairness criteria, as all agents have an opportunity to raise their bids. We see, via 
examples, that this procedure may indeed limit the range of values. It depends on the 
set system as to which part of the range is favoured by this approach: in some cases no 
value close to NTUrnax may be obtained, and in some others, no value close to NTUmin. 
Given an ordering, and when a polynomial-time separation oracle exists, this may also 
be computed in polynomial time. However, finding an ordering that gives a minimum 
value (OMBmin) is not only hard to compute, we show that it is hard to find an order 
that approximates the minimum value. We can then use instances when NTUmin and 
OMBmin are equal to show that NTUmin is equally hard to approximate (extending 
the previous NP-hardness result of [11]).
5.2 Hypergraph Representation of Constraints
Sometimes it can be difficult to see how the feasible bid vectors for a set-system auction 
are related to each other. In order to assist with visualizing this, we propose a method 
of representing the constraints, which are implied by a set-system auction, in the form 
of a hypergraph. While understanding this representation is not critical, it does help to 
illustrate the underlying structure of some of the examples. Furthermore, in Section 5.9, 
we will see how the constraints of certain set-system auctions can be represented as a 
graph, which is an important reduction in the hardness proof given in Section 5.9.6.
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Fixing S, we can see that the costs of agents outside S are referred to in conditions 
(2) and (3), and only take the form of cT\s for some T £ F. Therefore we can, without 
loss of generality, consider only the sum of costs in each set, rather than the costs of 
individual agents. Specifically, each feasible set, T G T \ {S'}, imposes a constraint on 
the total bid of agents in S' \ T as follows,
^S\T < CT\S-
It is obvious that for each distinct subset of S there is at most one value of ct\s 
that provides a minimal (and hence meaningful) constraint in terms of conditions (2) 
and (3). Hence, if there is some feasible set T' € F \ {5} such that S \ T = S \ T' and 
Ct\s < op/\s, then the constraint implied by T' is not minimal, and we do not need to 
include Tf in a representation of the constraints.
In order to try and make the structure easier to visualize, we will now represent these 
restrictions in the form of a hypergraph H = (X, E) with a weight function w on the 
hyperedges. Make each agent e in 5 a vertex in the hypergraph
Let X. > • • • >
For each feasible set, T, that ‘minimally constrains’ some subset of 5, add a hyperedge, 
Ee, to exactly those vertices
VT G J-, let £e = S \ T
and weight the hyperedges with the value of the constraint.
VT G F, let w(Ee) = or\S'
Example 5.1 shows how these constraint sets and values are constructed from a 
set-system auction.
Example 5.1.
Given 8 agents {1,..., 8} with costs given in Table 5.1.
Suppose we have feasible sets F = {Ti = {Ai, A2, A3, A4, ^2 = {A7, A3, A5, AejjTs
{A7, A2, A4, Ae},T4 = {As, Ai, A4, A5}};
Thtis S = T\ is the cheapest feasible set.
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Agent Ce
Ai 0
a2 0
A3 0
A4 0
A5 0
Ae 0
A? 1
As 2
Constraint set (S \ Tf) Agents Constraint value (cj^s)
s\t2 {1,2.4} 1
s\n {1,3,5} 1
s\n {2,3,6} 2
Table 5.1: Showing Constraint Sets for a Set-System
Table 5.1 shows constraint set and the corresponding constraint values. The feasible 
set with lowest cost is T\, with cost 0. Hence all the agents in T\ are the vertices of 
the hypergraph (they are Next, take feasible set T2) and let (S\T2) be
the constraint set. Condition (2) in Definition 1.2 gives us bs\T2 < CT2\S which can be 
rewritten as &{Ai,A2,Ai} ^ c{7>- Hence C{7} = 1 is a constraint value for the constraint set 
S\T2, and bg\T2 < 1, which is indicated on the hypergraph by the hyperedge containing 
{A\, A2, A4} with weight 1. The same process can be applied to the two other feasible 
sets, T3 giving b{AliA3)As} < 1, and T4 giving &{A2,A3,A0} < 2, both as shown in the 
hypergraph in Figure 5.1.
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<1 <1
Figure 5.1: Hypergraph Representation of Constraints for Table 5.1
5.3 Descending Price Auction
In this section we consider procedures similar to those of Demange et al. [8]. Recall 
that, in their auction, the auctioneer begins by selling items at a low price, and increases 
prices on any items that are over-demanded — and hence due to the competition for 
those items, the price can be increased. We firstly take a similar approach, but translate 
it into a reverse setting. We start off by buying at high prices, and then decrease prices 
when there is still an ‘over-supply’, until we reach an equilibrium — where no agent 
would be willing to decrease their prices any further.
We analyse this class of descending-price auctions and find that while any feasible 
bid vector can result, the scheme is not guaranteed to result in a feasible bid vector.
Algorithm 3 gives a definition for such an auction, for a given function / and let (3 
be the bid vector returned by this Descending Price Auction. The function / uses the 
current state of the auction (i.e., the instance and a current vector of bids) to decide 
which agent will be called upon next to reduce its bid. The agent chosen by / will then 
be asked to reduce its bid, and the process will repeat until no agent would be willing 
to reduce their bid any further.
A more intuitive description is that the procedure initially sets the bids to large 
values, identifies a winning set S and then repeatedly allows those outside the winning 
set, in some order, to lower their bid values by some small amount e with the aim of 
entering the winning set. It is assumed that a bidder whose cost has been reached, would 
decline to reduce his bid and would exit the competition. We repeat this ‘choosing and
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lowering’ process until all losing agents bid their cost; hence no further reductions can 
take place and the process terminates. (For the sake of consistency, we call the final 
winning set S; observe that this will be equal to a lowest-cost feasible set assuming a 
suitable choice of e and tie-breaking rules). As we will see, the choice of the selection 
function, /, allows the auctioneer to create a wide variety of outcomes to this auction 
process.
We could consider a slightly more complex version of this auction, whereby an agent 
is chosen and simultaneously given a price that it must reduce its bid to (if possible). 
It is easy to observe that, given a small enough parameter e, this could be simulated by 
simply calling upon the same agent repeatedly until the desired price is reached. For 
that reason, and the additional simplification of the selection function, here we consider 
just the version with an e parameter and assume that all bids and costs are an exact 
multiple of e (such as for a discrete currency value).
Algorithm 3: A Class of Descending Price Auctions
The algorithm defines a class of auctions, each is uniquely defined by the selection 
function /(/, t/). The set T represents the current winning solution, given bids
b'.
1 Let e be some small value, as a parameter of the auction;
2 Let i € M be some large value such that t>C£n\
3 for each e € £ do
4 Let b'e = t\
5 Let T £ argmin^jr ;
When at least one agent, not currently chosen in T, can still reduce its bid then 
the selection function f will choose one such agent to reduce its bid by e.
6 while ^ T, such that > a do
7 Let e = f(I, b');
8 Let b'e — max(5e — e, ce);
9 _ Let T = ajcgmmR€jrb'(R);
10 Let S — T;
11 Let /5 = b';
12 return
Example 5.2 shows that we may get a bid vector as low as eg, even when cs <TUmin 
<NTUmax,
Example 5.2. (a commodity auction:) Suppose there are 4 agents, each Ae £ {A\, A2, A3, A4} 
with a quantity qe and cost ce given in Table 5.2. Assume the buyer desires 3 units.
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Agent Qe ce 6nun
Ai 2 0 1 0
A2 1 0 0 0
A3 1 0
A* 3 1
Total 1 0
Table 5.2: Descending Price Auction Reaches 0
We will describe how the final bid vector ft may be reached as a three-stage process, 
as follows.
Stage 1: When 64 > 1.
When {^4} is the winning set, call upon A2 to reduce its bid when > 64, or call 
upon A\ otherwise. When {A4} is not the winning set, call upon A4 to reduce its bid. 
This stage can be repeated whenever b'4 > 1, as A4 can always be called upon unless 
T = {A4} , and then we can call upon Ai or A2 (as above) until 64 + b'2 < b'4 at 
which point T = {Ai, A2} becomes the lowest-cost winning set (due to lexicographical 
ordering).
Stage 2: When 64 = 1 and 64 >0.
Call upon A\ to reduce its bid. Because A3 has not yet reduced its bid, and we only 
called upon A2 when b^ > 64 then we have b'3 > b'2 > 64. Hence the current winning 
set is T — {A4} and A\ can be repeatedly call upon to reduce its bid until 64 =0.
Stage 3: When 64 = 1 and 64 =0.
Call upon A2 or A3 to reduce its bid, whichever is not in the current winning set T. 
When 63 = 0 then A2 can be called upon to reduce its bid until b2 = 0 and the winning 
set is given byT= {Ai, A2} due to lexicographical ordering.
While, in this example we have cs = 0, it is trivial from the algorithm that cs is 
a lower bound, as each bid chosen must be at least the cost of the agent (in line 8 of 
Algorithm 3).
One feature of this auction is that, by choosing the method of selecting agents, the 
auctioneer may be able to obtain any feasible bid vector as a result. A proof of this 
follows.
Theorem 5.1. Any feasible bid vector, b (that satisfies conditions (1),(2) and (3)) is 
achievable with a Descending Price Auction.
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Proof. The definition of the Descending Price Auction begins with a bid vector such 
that Ve € £,b'e > cgn. Observe that NTUmax < and that for any feasible bid 
vector b then Ve E S,be < NTUmax by definition of NTUmax, and hence Ve E S,be < 
NTUmax < c^n.
This shows that the starting state meets the condition Ve E £,b'e > be.
We now claim that, providing this condition Ve £ £,brc > be is maintained, then 
Algorithm 3 must reach b' = b (and terminate with this), as follows.
Let b be any feasible bid vector and let (3 be the bid vector obtained from the 
Descending Price Auction. We will consider that b is a ‘target’ vector — that is the bid 
vector that the auctioneer wishes to obtain. We can now see that as long as / chooses 
e such that Ve E S,b'e> be and Ve S,b'e> ce then we will reach /3 = W = b.
We claim that when b is a specified feasible bid vector, b; is a current bid vector 
in Algorithm 3 and the following hold; Ve E S,b'e > be and Ve S, Ue > ce, then there 
exists a function /, such that b' = b is achievable with a Descending Price Auction as 
follows.
Let S be the lexicographically first lowest-cost feasible set (which will be the set 
returned by Algorithm 3).
If we can show that, unless b’s < bs, there is always some agent e that can be chosen 
by / to reduce its bid, then reaching b7 = b is inevitable, as trivially when both b's <bs 
and Ve E S, b'e > be hold then b7 = b. We do this as follows;
Let T be the current winning set, that has been chosen by Algorithm 3 at Line 9.
Case 1: S^T .
If T is chosen in preference to S, then we must have b'T < b's (as ties are broken 
lexicographically, both when selecting S and T). This trivially implies that
^T\s < &s\r (5-1)
(as each can be added to SnT to make a feasible set). As we know that the algorithm 
does not allow bids below the cost, then we must have
cT\s — ^t\s •
By transitivity (with Inequality 5.1), this gives us
cT\s < b's\T-
We know, from the fact that 5 is a cheapest solution, that cs\T < cT\s (or else we 
could add S'nT to each and we would have ct < cs). Hence, by substitution, we have
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Therefore there is some agent e G (S \T) such that ce < h'e and hence there exists 
some agent e ^ T that can be chosen by / to reduce its bid.
Case 2: S = T .
When S — T and b's > bs (from the property we wish to maintain) then there is some 
e such that b'e > be. As b is a feasible bid vector, then it must satisfy (3), and hence 
for e there is some Te such that bs\Te = cTe\g (and e G S\Te). We have specified that 
there is no j such that 6' < bj, and we have b'e > be, then it follows that
b's\Te > bS\Te- (5*2)
In order for the algorithm to choose S, instead of Te} then it must not have a higher 
bid — hence < bfT^s (this is trivially implied by b's < b'Te). By including
Inequality 5.2 we can rewrite this as
bS\Te < b's\Te - bTe\S
and substituting the equation from condition (3) in Definition 1.2 again {bs\Te = cTe\s) 
we get
cTeVS < bTe\S
therefore there is some agent j ETe\S (and hence not in 5 = T) that can be selected 
to reduce its bid next.
This has shown that, providing that bfs > bs, function / can always choose some 
agent to reduce its bid. By repeatedly choosing such an agent, we must eventually reach 
b's < bg, and hence that any ‘target’ vector that is feasible can be achieved with a 
Descending Price Auction. Clearly, condition (2) in Definition 1.2 implies that once we 
have reached such a target vector, and all other bids are at least their cost, then there 
is no other feasible set that would be chosen in preference to S, and the algorithm will 
terminate, with b' = b. Therefore, there is a selection function /, for which Algorithm 3 
will return {3 — b for any feasible bid vector b.
□
5.4 Uniformly Descending Price Auction
A natural-looking restriction of the Descending Price Auction is to give the agents initial 
bids equal to some large (common) value, and then call upon them to reduce the bids in a 
round-robin manner. Thus, the prices of bidders who continue to stay in the competition 
would go down at the same rate.
A formal definition is given in Algorithm 4.
If we consider this with the simple commodity auction in Example 5.3 it shows that 
we may not always get a feasible bid vector from this process.
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Algorithm 4: A Uniformly Descending Price Auction
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
The current bid value is represented by t, and starts at a large value t > c^n. All 
agents that are not in the current winning set S will reduce their bids, as t 
reduces with each iteration until either they are chosen in S, or their bid reaches 
their cost value.
Let g(x,B.,X) = argmmr€jr&r where Ve £ X,be = ae and 
Ve £ X,be = max(r, ce);
A function g(x,£i,X) which returns the lexicographically first, lowest-cost feasible 
set, based on values from the input vector (if the agent is in the current winning 
set specified), or the larger of the input value given and the agent’s cost (for those 
agents not in the current winning set - they would like to lower their bids to the 
specified value, if possible).
Let i G M be some large value such that t > C£n\
Let 5 = 0;
Let b; = ();
while 3^ < t such that 5) ^5 do
maximize t' subject to 
gft, b', 5) ^ 5; 
t' < i;
Finds the next interesting value of t, which is when the winning set can 
change.
9
10
11
12
Let t = t' ]
Let 5 — 5(t,b',5); 
for each e ^ 5 do 
|_ b'e — max(t, ce);
13 Let b^ = b';
14 return 5, b^;
Example 5.3. (a commodity auction:) Suppose there are 4 agents, each Ae £ {Ai, A2, A3, A4} 
with a quantity qe given in Table 5.3. Assume the buyer desires 3 units.
Agent Ce blUmin ue
Aj 2 0 1 1/2
M 1 0 0 0
M 1 0
a4 3 1
Total 1 1/2
Table 5.3: Descending Price Auction as low as TUmin/2 
Observe that there are three (minimal) feasible sets, they are
F — A.2}> {Ai, A3}, {A4}}.
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We can verify the descending bid values given in Table 5.3 by following the process of 
Algorithm 4 on this instance as follows. When t = 1 at line 9, we must have S = {A4}, 
as if S ^ {^4} then 64 = 1 and therefore 64 < b's and {A4} is chosen. Then, when we 
reach t — 1/2 we will have either S = {Ai, A2} or S = {Ai,As} and these two feasible 
sets may alternate until t = 0, giving b'i = 1/2 and 62 = 63 = 0.
5.5 Ascending Price Auction
We will now consider a similar process where the bids ascend (initially from their cost), 
rather than descend. Again, we will see that by choosing the order in which agents are 
called upon to raise their bids, the auctioneer is able to obtain any desired feasible bid 
vector.
Algorithm 5 gives a definition for such an auction, which we will call an Ascending 
Price Auction.
The agents all start by being given a bid value equal to their cost. A lowest-cost set 
S is chosen. Then the auctioneer can repeatedly ask some agent e £ S' to increase its 
bid by some small value e. The auctioneer chooses the next agent e by means of some 
function e = f(I,h'), when I is the instance and b7 is the current bid vector chosen in 
Algorithm 5. We assume that an agent that is currently chosen will behave rationally 
and never raise its bid when requested if that would remove it from the winning set. 
When there are no agents (in S) that can increase their bids and remain in the winning 
set, then f(I}W) will return an empty set, and the process will terminate. As we will 
see, the choice of the selection function, /, allows the auctioneer to create a wide variety 
of outcomes to this auction process.
Let be the bid vector obtained by the Ascending Price Auction given selection 
function /.
Algorithm 5: A Class of Ascending Price Auctions
The algorithm defines a class of auctions, each is uniquely defined by the selection 
function f(I,W). The set S represents the winning solution.
1 Given some selection function /(/, b');
2 Let e by some small value, as a parameter of the auction;
3 for each e £ € do
4 Let b'e = ce‘,
5 Let S = argmin#€jr b'R; 
Breaking ties lexicographically
6 while /(/, b') is non-empty do
Let e = /(/,b');
Let b' = 6' + e;
9 Let b^’-f = b';
10 return S, b* 1 2 3 4 5 6 * * 9 10^ ;
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Let b be any feasible bid vector, which we may consider as a target vector that we 
wish to obtain. Let b' be the bid vector obtained during the Ascending Price Auction. 
We will now verify that as long as function / chooses e in order to maintain the property 
Ve e 5, < be then the algorithm will reach b1^ = b' = b.
Theorem 5.2. Any feasible bid vector b (that satisfies conditions (1),(2) and (3)) is 
achievable with an Ascending Price Auction.
Proof. The definition of the Ascending Price Auction begins with a bid vector b', such 
that b' = c. As any feasible bid vector b must satisfy condition (1) in Definition 1.2, it 
has Ve £ S,be > ce and we can substitute to give Ve £ 5,6e > b'e.
We will now see that, as long as this property (Ve £ S,be > b'e) is maintained during 
the run of Algorithm 5 then the algorithm will reach b' = b, and subsequently terminate.
Let S be the lexicographically first, lowest-cost feasible set which is chosen by Algo­
rithm 5.
When b's — bs and Ve ^ 5, b'e < be, then b' = b and hence b' additionally satisfies 
condition (2) and condition (3) in Definition 1.2. Therefore, when b' = b, no agent can 
raise its bid, and the algorithm will terminate. We have assumed a discrete parameter 
for e such that no agent e can have consecutive bids, b'e,be, such that b'e < be and b" > be 
(i.e., the bids and target are exactly some multiple of e, hence it is not possible to raise 
to strictly more than its target in one increment). Therefore, we only need to show that, 
unless b's > bs, there is always some agent that can be called upon by function / to 
increase its bid; i.e., that there is some e such that b'e < be.
When b's < bs there is some e such that b'e < be (as we may not have a set V C. S 
such that by > by).
For every T E J7, condition (2) in Definition 1.2 gives us
bs\T < CT\S
and for every Te € p when e e S\Te then (as b'e < be) we have
bs\Tc < bs\rc
and from condition (2) in Definition 1.2
bs\Te < bs\Ts < citvs-
Therefore, as < ore\s is a strict inequality then, for agent e, there is no Te set that 
gives an equation satisfying condition (3) in Definition 1.2, and hence agent e can be 
chosen to increase its bid next.
This has shown that, providing that tfs < bs, then there exists some agent e to 
increase its bid next, which may be chosen by the selection function /. By repeatedly 
choosing such an agent, we must eventually reach b's >bs, and hence that any ‘target’ 
vector satsfying condtitions (1*),(2), and (3) can be achieved with an Ascending Price
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Auction. As described earlier, once we have reached such a vector, then no agent can 
raise its bid and still be chosen (due to condition (3) in Definition 1.2), and the algorithm 
will terminate, with b^’-f — b; — b.
This shows that the bid vector b is achievable with an Ascending Price Auction (and 
hence for any NTUmin <bs< NTUmax). □
5.6 Ascending from Zero Auction
We now see a very similar auction, which differs only in that agents start their bidding 
from zero, rather than their cost value. The definitions and proofs are otherwise almost 
entirely duplicated, in an attempt to maintain clarity at the expense of verbosity. 
Algorithm 6 gives a definition for this auction.
Algorithm 6: A Class of Ascending from Zero Auctions 
The algorithm defines a class of auctions, each is uniquely defined by the selection 
function /(/, b7). The set S represents the winning solution.
1 Given some selection function /(I,^);
2 Let e by some small value, as a parameter of the auction;
3 for each e £ £ do
4 Let — 0;
5 Let S = argmin^gjr b#;
Breaking ties lexicographically
e while /(/jb') is non-empty do
7
8
Let e = /(J,b'); 
Let b'e — b'e + e;
9 Let b^*’^ — h1; 
io return S, b^*’^;
Let b be any bid vector satisfying conditions (1*),(2) and (3) from Definition 1.3, 
which we may consider as a target vector that we wish to obtain. Recall that condition 
(1*) is a relaxed version of condition (1) in Definition 1.2, that allows transferable utility, 
and states that 6e > 0. Let b' be the bid vector obtained during the Ascending from 
Zero Auction, using function /. We will now verify that as long as function / chooses 
e in order to maintain the property Ve £ S,b'e < be then the algorithm will reach 
b7 = b = b^.
Theorem 5.3. Any target bid vector b (that satisfies conditions (1*),(2) and (3)) is 
achievable with an Ascending from Zero Auction.
Proof. The definition of the Ascending from Zero Auction begins with a bid vector b', 
such that Ve £ £,b'e = 0 — therefore trivially, this gives Ve £ S,be > b'e.
We will now see that, as long as this property (Ve £ S,be> b'e) is maintained during 
the run of Algorithm 6 then the algorithm will reach b7 = b, and subsequently terminate.
Let S be the lexicographically first, lowest-cost feasible set which is chosen by Algo­
rithm 6.
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When b's — bg and Ve ^ S,bfe < 6e, then b7 = b and hence br satisfies condition 
(2) and (3) of Definition 1.2. Therefore, when b' = b, no agent can raise its bid, and 
the algorithm will terminate. Again, we only need to show that, unless b's > bg, there 
is always some agent that can be called upon by function / to increase its bid; more 
formally, there is some e such that bfe < be.
When b's < bg then there is some e such that b'e < be.
For every T e J7, condition (2) in Definition 1.2 gives us
bs\T < CT\S
and for every Te G J7 when e £ S \ Te then (as b'E < be) we have
b's\Te < bS\Te
and due to condition (2) in Definition 1.2
b's\Te < bs\Te < PfAs-
Therefore, as VS\Ta < ore\g is a strict inequality then, for agent e, there is no Te set with 
an equation satisfying condition (3) in Definition 1.2, and hence agent e can be chose to 
increase its bid next.
This has shown that, providing that bfs < kg, then there exists some agent e to 
increase its bid next, which may be chosen by some selection function /. By repeatedly 
choosing such an agent, we must eventually reach 6^ > bg, and hence that any ‘target’ 
vector that is feasible can be achieved with an Ascending from Zero Auction. As de­
scribed earlier, once we have reached such a feasible vector, then no agent can raise its 
bid and still be chosen (due to condition (3) in Definition 1.2), and the algorithm will 
terminate, with b1^ = b' = b.
This shows that the feasible bid vector b is achievable with an Ascending from Zero 
Auction (that is, for any TUmin < bg < TUmax). □
5.7 Uniformly Ascending Auctions
We now consider the special-case of this auction when all of the bids rise at the same, 
uniform, rate. In this setting it is unnecessary to specify a discrete parameter e as we 
can compute the exact value that agents may maximally raise their bids to while still 
remaining in the winning set.
Algorithm 7 gives a definition for this first-price auction, when all bids increase at a 
uniform rate, until an agent stops bidding any higher because then it would no longer be 
in the winning set. We call this a ‘Uniformly Ascending Auction’. Observe that line 6 
ensures that all rises are performed uniformly (on any agents that have not already 
reached a maximum bid).
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Algorithm 7: A Uniformly Ascending Price Auction
Choose S as a lowest-cost solution, then we use a variable t to determine how 
much more than its cost an agent can bid. Once an agent, e, can bid no higher, e 
is added to set X (to record this information), and the current bid value b'e is 
memorized in be. Therefore, when all agents have increased, and none can bid 
any higher, X — S (where S is the winning set) and b represents the final bids of 
all agents b — (&i,..., bn). 
l Let S' = {1,, m] = argminj-€j- cj-;
2 Let X — 0;
3 for each e E £ do 
Set a starting bid b'e for each agent e £ S 
Let b'=0;
5 while X ^ S do
maximize t subject to
Find the next interesting value oft — the amount that all of the 
remaining agents (not in X) could simultaneously increase their bids by 
without changing the winning set. 
for all T £ X, 6(s\r)ux + cs\(TuX) +\ (T U X)| <
8
9
10
11
12
13
Note that this can be solved in polynomial time as an LP where a separation 
oracle exists, as described in Section 5.1. 
for each e e .S' do
Set a current bid b'e for each agent e £ S — its stored bid be if it has 
already stopped, or else it keeps ascending with t.
_ Let tfe = be+ t;
Let S' — argminj-Gj7 b'T; 
for each e E £ do
If agent e can raise its bid to b'e and still be chosen in the winning set, 
then it will now bid b'e. If this raise would cause it to drop out of the 
winning set, then it will not raise its bid now, and will stop raising it in 
future (its ‘final' bid value was stored in be in a previous iteration. 
if e £ S' then 
|_ Let be = b'e;
14
15
else
|_ Let X = X U {e};
16 return 51, b;
We can observe that this uniformly rising process gives a feasible bid vector, and 
hence is in the range NTUmin(c) to NTUmax(c), as follows. As each agent starts from 
its cost, condition (1) in Definition 1.2 is satisfied, no agent will continue raising when 
it would no longer be in the winning set, hence condition (2) is satisfied, and each agent 
continues raising until it must stop, satisfying condition (3).
Also observe that this can be solved with at most n iterations of solving the linear 
program at line 6, (to determine the next value of t that will result in a change to 
the current winning set S') so it can be solved in polynomial time wherever there is a 
polynomial time separation oracle for the constraints. (Recall from Section 5.1 that,
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when the lowest-cost feasible set can be found in polynomial time, a polynomial time 
separation oracle exists).
This auction appears to be very natural, and it is an obvious question to ask about 
what range of values it may give. It may appear that this restricted version could possi­
bly give results that are within some restricted range between NTUmin and NTUmax. 
However, we will see examples that show it can attain NTUmax and may also be arbi­
trarily close to NTUmin (and even equal to NTUmin, when < 2). Note that
it can attain NTUmax exactly even in cases when this ratio is much larger than 2 (and 
proportional to n).
In Example 5.4 we can see that NTUmax is attainable by this process, and note that 
NTUmin<NTUmax (this result would be trivial if NTUmin and NTUmax were equal). 
This example uses the single-commodity auction, as described in Chapter 3.
Example 5.4.
This is a commodity auction with € +1 agents in which we wish to purchase i items. 
The quantity held by each agent Ae is given by qe in Table 5.4- In this example, bmin 
denotes a NTUmin bid vector, bmax is a NTUmax bid vector, and b1' is a uniformly 
ascending bid vector.
Agent Qe hmin Lmaxue bi
1 0 2 1 1
A2 1 0 0 1 1
At 1 0 0 1 1
Ag+i 2 2
Total 2 e £
Table 5.4: Uniformly Ascending Bid Equals NTUmax
Observe that this example shows a Uniformly Ascending bid vector b^ is reached 
when all of the bids have the same value. Recall that a Uniformly Ascending Bid vector 
satisfies conditions (2) and (3) in Definition 1.2. It is possible to verify that this bid 
vector does not violate condition (2); if it did then there would be some subset with 
quantity at most 2 that has a bid of greater than the cost of A^+i =2. It is equally 
possibly to verify that condition (3) is satisfied, as for every 2 agents in S, the sum of 
bids is exactly 2.
As all the bids have increased by the same value, they have stopped ascending at 
the same time. Hence there can be no smaller value (i.e., t' < 1) that they could have 
stopped at, as if this smaller value would have satisfied condition (3) in Definition 1.2 
then condition (2) in Definition 1.2 must have been violated by reaching t — 1, as all 
bids will be strictly greater than if they had stopped at t'.
Chapter 5. Benchmarks and First-Price Auctions 96
This principle can be applied to some of the other examples of Uniformly Ascending 
bids that will be shown. Given a bid vector b satisfying conditions (2) and (3), when 
all bids have risen from their cost by an equal value, then b is the vector that would be 
returned by the Uniformly Ascending auction.
Example 5.5 shows that this process may obtain the value NTUmin, when NTUmin 
< NTUmax. Note, however, that this example does not easily generalize to instances 
when NTUmax > 2NTUmin. When NTUmax> 2NTUmin, for a single-commodity 
auction, then we do not know of any examples where the uniformly ascending process 
can give a value exactly as low as NTUmin.
Example 5.5. A commodity auction with 5 agents where we wish to purchase 5 identical 
items. Each agent Ae £ {A\, A2, A3, A4, As} has the quantity qe and cost ce given in 
Table 5.5. In this example, bmm denotes a NTUmin(c) bid vector, bmax is a NTUmax(c) 
bid vector, and b^ is a uniformly ascending bid vector.
Agent Qe Ce Lminue 6max bt
Ai 1 0 1 0 1
A2 2 0 1 2 1
A3 2 0 1 2 1
a4 1 1
A5 3 2
Total 3 4 3
TABLE 5.5: Uniformly Ascending Bid equals NTUmin
Observe that every bi bid has the same increase in value from the cost, and can be 
verified to satisfy condition (2) and (3) in Definition 1.2. Hence b^ is a valid Uniformly 
Ascending Bid.
It is also the case that a value close to NTUmin (again, when NTUmin < NTUmax) 
can be obtained when there is no restriction on the ratio between NTUmax and NTUmin. 
As a brief description of how this may be achieved, if we consider some example when 
NTUmin and NTUmax may differ by a large factor, there will be some agent(s) that 
receive a relatively large bid in an NTUmin vector. By using many agents to ‘simulate’ 
the effect of these particular agent (s) (that would command a large bid) then as the 
bidding rises uniformly, the sum of the bids for these many agents will rise quickly. As 
other agents, which would receive a lower NTUmin bid, will rise much more slowly in 
comparison (not being simulated by multiple agents), then we will end the uniformly 
ascending process with a bid vector with a value close to NTUmin (introducing the extra 
agents will not affect the value of NTUmin).
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In a commodity auction this can be done by having many agents with a small quantity 
replace a single agent with a large quantity, and we will see examples of how this may 
occur.
Recall that Example 5.4, shows a single-commodity auction showing a large difference 
(a factor of £/2) between NTUmin and NTUmax, when the ascending price is equal to 
NTUmax. As an intermediate step, we will scale up all of the quantities, by some 
constant factor /c, to give Example 5.6.
Example 5.6.
This is a commodity auction with £+1 agents to purchase £k identical items. Each 
agent Ae E {Aj,..., A^+1} has the quantity qe and cost ce given in Table 5.6. In this 
example, bmm denotes a NTUmin bid vector, bmax is a NTUmax bid vector, and b^ is 
a uniformly ascending bid vector.
Agent 3e Ce 6mm 6max bl
Ai k 0 2 1 1
A2 k 0 0 1 1
At k 0 0 1 1
A^+i 2k 2
Total 2 £ £
Table 5.6: Example 5.4 Multiplied by constant k
Observe that every bl bid has the same increase in value from the cost, and can be 
verified to satisfy conditions (2) and (3). Hence b1 is a valid Uniformly Ascending bid 
vector.
In Example 5.7 we then remove the single agent Ai (when qi = k) and replace it 
with k other agents, A'^,..., A'^ (when = &). NTUmin and NTUmax are
unchanged, but the ascending price auction now gives a result much closer to NTUmin 
(specifically, it is 2 + 2(£ — l)/k which approaches 2 for large k).
Example 5.7. This is a commodity auction with k-{-£ agents to purchase £k identical 
items. Each agent A!e has the quantity qe and cost ce given in Table 5.7.
In this example, bmin denotes a NTUmin bid vector, bmax is a NTUmax bid vector, 
and b^ is a uniformly ascending bid vector.
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Agent Qe ce 6min 6fax bl
1 0 2 1/k 2/k
1 0 0 1/k 2/k
1 0 0 1/k 2/k
A2 k 0 0 1 2/k
Ae k 0 0 1 2/k
2k 2
Total 2 £ 2 + 2(£-l)/k
Table 5.7: Example 5.6 substituting Ai with ..., A'k
Observe that the Uniformly Ascending bids are all equal, and can be verified to satisfy 
conditions (2) and (3). Hence is a valid Uniformly Ascending bid vector.
5.8 Path Auctions
We will also examine the range of values that are possible in the well-known path auction 
(described in Chapter 4). In Figure 5.2 we see an example for a shortest path auction 
that shows the ascending price auction gives a value that is close to NTUmin. Note 
that the ratio shown of = 2 is equal to the upper bound of ^ Provei1
in [11]. This construction is a variation of the ‘diamond graph’ that was shown by Karlin 
et al. [24] and used by Elkind et al. [11] to demonstrate a lower bound of 2 on the ratio 
of NTUmax/NTUmin . In this example, the direct path shown between s and t (via u 
and v) has cost 0, and hence is chosen as the winning set. In order to satisfy condition 
(3) in Definition 1.2, the winning edges between s and v must have a sum of bids equal 
to 1. The winning edges between u and t must also have a sum of bids equal to 1. As 
the edges between u and v occur in both constraints, minimizing their sum of bids has 
the effect of maximizing the bid vector, and vice-versa.
As previously, in order to maximize the sum of bids between u and u, in a uniformly 
rising process we ‘simulate’ an edge between u and v with some large number, k, of 
separate edges. Hence there are /c 4-1 edges between s and v and also between u and 
t. In a uniformly rising bid process, when each of these winning edges has a bid of 
l/(fc + 1), condition (3) in Definition 1.2 is satisfied. (Figure 5.3 behaves similarly and 
Figure 5.4, instead, uses k edges to simulate the two outer edges of the winning path, 
resulting in higher bids.)
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C=1
edges
NTUmin = 1
c=l
c=0, 6=1 c=0, 6=1
NTUmax = 2
c=l
— (fc+2) /(fc+l)
Figure 5.2: Uniformly Ascending Price Auction for Shortest Path Auction
Observe that the Uniformly Ascending bids are all equal, and can be verified to satisfy 
condition (2) and (3) of Definition 1.2.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, should the uniformly ascending-price auction start from bid 
values of zero, rather than the cost, a larger range of values is possible, as any bid vector 
obtained would have to satisfy condition (1*) in Definition 1.3 rather than condition (1) 
in Definition 1.2.
In Figure 5.3 we see an example when beginning from zero would produce a bid 
vector, whose total is below NTUmin (but above TUmin). When we have NTUmin= 
3 and TUmin = 2, we can have bg = 2 + for any constant k > 1. In Figure 5.4 see 
that beginning from zero could produce a bid vector, which is above NTUmax; we 
have NTUmax= 3, TUmax = 4, and we can have bg = 3 + f°r ariy constant k > 1.
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c=2
c=l, 6=1 c= 1, 6=1
(l,...,jfc) edges
NTUrain = 6 =
c=2
c=l, 6=0c=0, 6=2, 6=0, 6=0
(l,...,fc) edges
TUmin = 6=2
c=2
c=0, 6=2/(fc+l), 6=2/(Jt+l)
6t" = 2/(Jt+l) + fc(2/(Jt+l)) + 2/(A:+l) 
= 2 + 2/(fc+l)
Figure 5.3: A Shortest Path Auction Where the Uniformly Ascending from Zero Price
is Below NTUmin
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c=2
'c=0, 6=1, 6=0, ..., 6=0
(l,...,fc) edges
NTUmax = 6 = 3
c=2
(l,...,fc) edges
TUmax = 6 = 4
c=2
T=0, 6=2/(fc+l), ..., 6=2/(fc-f 1) c=0, 6=2/(fc+l), ..., 6=2/(A:+l)
6t* = k{2/{M))+ 2/(fc+l) + fc(2/(A:+l))
= 3+(A:-l)/(fc+l)
Figure 5.4: A Shortest Path Auction where the Uniformly Ascending from Zero Price
is Above NTUmax
5.9 Ordered Maximal Bidding
In Sections 5.3 and 5.5 we saw the idea that agents may be required to make their 
bids in some order, with later bids depending on the value of the earlier bids. In those 
auctions, we required that the bid increased by some small increment. If we remove this 
restriction, and allow the agents to each choose their own bid, then it is obvious that 
any rational agent will simply make their bid as large as possible, such that they are 
still in the winning set. Therefore each agent bids exactly once. As no agent could gain 
greater utility by bidding again, later on, there is no loss of generality in restricting the 
ordering function to a single permutation of the winning set.
We will now examine this process for a first-price auction, which we will call ‘Ordered 
Maximal Bidding’. In this process, given a specific ordering of the winning agents, each
Chapter 5. Benchmarks and First-Price Auctions 102
will, in turn, choose a bid to be as high as possible (until we have some Te satisfying 
(3), giving a ‘tight’ constraint). Bid totals are always in the range between NTUmin 
and NTUmax, as any bid vector produced is feasible — all bids start from their cost, 
satisfying condition (1) in Definition 1.2, no agent can raise such that there would be 
a cheaper feasible set, satisfying condition (2) in Definition 1.2, and every agent will 
raise until it can bid no higher due to the presence of an alternative feasible set, thus 
satisfying condition (3) in Definition 1.2.
As in the previous first-price auctions, we would like to understand what range of 
values are obtainable from this process. For example, can we always choose an ordering 
that may result in NTUmin? If not, can we achieve a bid total that is within some 
constant factor of NTUmin? Would this hold even for restricted settings?
5.9.1 Definitions
We will fix a winning set S (let m — |5'| and S — {ei,..., em}), and a cost vector c. Let 
as denote a permutation, or sequence, of the elements in S. During this section, we will 
fix S' as the lexicographically first winning set (amongst those with lowest cost), and to 
simplify the notation, let as be denoted by a. For brevity, when <j“ denotes a specific 
ordering on S, let ba be the ordered maximal bid vector for that ordering, rather than 
the more clumsy notation baa. Likewise, let c“ be the vector of costs, given the ordering 
aa.
If cr = (ej,..., e^) is some ordering of S then define the resulting bid vector bCT = 
(6f,..., b^) as follows:
£>i = max{6i : (&i, c^,..., ce>m) satisfies (2)} 
b% = max{&2 : (^i,^,^, • • • ,<Vm) satisfies (2)}
&3 = max{&3 : (6", &2,63, c*./,..., CejJ satisfies (2)}
6^ = rnax{6m : (bf,..., W satisfies (2)} 
in general, for t = (1,..., m) (in order)
bf = max{&i : (bi,..., b?_i, ce/+i,..., ce/J satisfies (2)}
Let b*s = Y2iesV be the sum of bids for the winning set S', and now define the 
minimum and maximal bids that are obtainable with a maximal ordered bid. Let
OMBmin(c) — min 65
and let
OMBmax(c) = max £>5.
Cf
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We will now see some examples of the ordered maximal bid process, and the values 
that result.
5.9.2 Examples
In Example 5.8 we see that the choice of permutation can give either NTUmin, NTUmax, 
or some other value which is between the two. This example is presented as a single­
commodity auction where 9 items are desired.
Example 5.8. Suppose there are 8 agents, each Ae G {Ai,... with a quantity qe 
and cost ce given in Table 5,8, Assume the buyer desires 9 units.
Agent Qe ce 6? tS bl
Ai 1 0 3 2 2
A2 1 0 0 1 1
a3 2 0 2 3 2
A4 2 0 2 3 2
As 3 0 4 4 5
Ae 2 3
A7 3 5
As 5 7
Total 11 13 12
Table 5.8: Ordered Maximal Bid Auction for 9 items giving differing results
The winning set is S = {Ai, A.2, A3, A4, Ag} and the permutations used are aa — 
(Ai, A2, A3, A4, Ag), cd3 = (A3, A4, Ai, A2, A5), and a1 = (As, Ai, A2, A3, A4) giving the 
ordered maximal bid vectors 6“,6f,be respectively.
Let ba be the bid vector calculated from the ordering a01, and this has bids increased 
in order depending on the quantity of each agent (qe — 1, ge = 2, ge = 3).
Let be the bid that uses , and is in order (qe — 2, qe — 1, qe — 3) and b7 uses 
in order (qe = 3, qe = l,ge = 2). We will now see exactly how the bid vectors were 
calculated for each of these orderings; Procedure 1 describes the process for ordering 
Ga, giving one of the possible tight constraints at each step, and showing how the bid 
value is determined from that tight constraint as well as the previously determined bids. 
Likewise, Procedure 2 describes the ordering and Procedure 3 the ordering <t7. Order 
Ga gives total — 11, order a@ gives bg = 13, and order a7 gives b^ = 12.
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Procedure 1 Calculating Bids for ba
6f is restricted by 64 <= fc»g = 6“ = 3
6“ is restricted by 6“ + 62 <— &6 (f = W - fcf) = (3 - 3) = 0
63 is restricted by 64 + 63 <= 5“ 6“ — 5® — 5“ — 5 — 3 — 2
64 is restricted by 6“ + 64 <= 6“ ^4 ~ ^7 — — 5 — 3 — 2
65 is restricted by 6^ + 65 <= 6g = 7 - 3 = 4
Procedure 2 Calculating Bids for
63 is restricted by 63 <— 6g
64 is restricted by 64 <= feg
is restricted by 63 + <= bj
62 is restricted by 64 + 63 <==
65 is restricted by 63 + 65 <= fcg
°4 \w6/ 0
6? - (6? ~ = (5 - 3) = 2
*>! = (i>6—i>i) = (3-2) = l 
^5 = (tfi ~ ^3) = (7 — 3) = 4
Procedure 3 Calculating Bids for b7
6g is restricted by b'l <= by b^ b? ^ 5
bj is restricted by bg + 64 <= bg bJ = (bZ-b2) = (7-5) = 2
b^ is restricted by b^ + bg <=:: bg ^ = W-^) = (3-2) = l
bg is restricted by bg + bg <= bg bJ = (bJ-b2) = (7-5) = 2
b^ is restricted by bj + bj <— bg bj — (fr7 — 57) — (7 — 5) — 2
Random Orderings
Theorem 5.4. There exists a sequence of set-system auctions indexed by n, where 
NTUmax/ NTUmin > n — 2, such that, for any ordering a that is chosen uniformly at 
random, the bid b^ approaches NTUmax in expectation.
Proof. In Example 5.9 we see that any ordered maximal auction, choosing a sequence 
uniformly at random, gives an expected value of NTUmm+(^~1)NTUmax which is close to 
NTUmax for large £ (and hence large n). □
Example 5.9.
This is a commodity auction with £ + 1 agents to purchase 2^ + 1 identical items. 
Each agent Ae £ {Aj,... has the quantity qe and cost ce given in Table 5.9.
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Agent Ce bmin Lmaxue
Ai 1 0 1 0
A2 2 0 0 1
Ai 2 0 0 1
Ae+i 3 1
Total 1 £-1
Table 5.9: Ordered Maximal Bid Auction, choosing randomly
We see that any ordered maximal auction, choosing a sequence uniformly at random, 
will select Ai first on \[t occasions and any other agent on (£ — !)/£ occasions. It is only 
by choosing A\ first that NTUmin will be obtained, otherwise NTUmax will be obtained.
Bounds for Values Achievable with Ordered Bidding
In Example 5.10 we see that any ordered auction will result in NTUmin being selected, 
whereas NTUmax is not achievable, regardless of the order (i.e., OMBmax < NTUmax).
Example 5.10, This is a commodity auction with £ -\- 1 agents to purchase £ iden­
tical items. Each agent Ae € {Ai,... ,Ae+i} has the quantity qe and cost ce given in 
Table 5.10.
Agent Qe 6min 6max
Ai 1 0 1 1/2 1
A2 1 0 0 1/2 0
Ae 1 0 0 1/2 0
Ae+i 2 1
Total 1 £/2 1
Table 5,10: Ordered Maximal Bid Auction may not find NTUmax
Any agent e that appears first in the ordering will have b° = 1, and so every other 
agent j ^ e must bid bj — 0. Hence, by this symmetry, OMBmax = 1.
However, Example 5.11 shows that NTUmin may not be achieved by any ordering 
(OMBmin > NTUmin), even with as few as 5 agents in S.
Example 5.11. In this auction there are 7 agents, {Ai,.. ., A7} with feasible sets as 
follows.
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F = {{A\,A2, A3, >14, As}, {Ae, A3, A4, A5}, {Ae, Ai, A4, As}, {Ae, A2, A4, As},
{A7, A4}, {A7, As}} . The cost ce for each agent Ae is given in Table 5.11. Observe that 
the winning set S = {Ai, A2, A3, A4, A5} .
Agent Ce bmm K
Ai 0 1/2 1
A2 0 1/2 0
A3 0 1/2 0
a4 0 1/2 1
As 0 1/2 1
Ae 1
a7 2
Total 5/2 3
Table 5.11: Ordered Maximal Bid Auction may not find NTUmin when |S| = 5
Figure 5.5: Hypergraph Representation of constraints for Table 5.11
To verify that this has OMBmin > 3, we can examine all possible orderings; when 
A\ appears first in the ordering, then b\ = 1 and the feasible set {Ae, A3, A4, A5} would 
mean that 62 < 0, and the feasible set {Ae, A2, A4, A5} would imply 63 < 0. Then we 
will have both 64 = 1 and 65 = 1 (as only the sets {A7,As} and {A7,A4} respectively 
are alternative solutions for A5 and A4) giving OMBmin > 3.
Similarly, when A2 appears first then 62 = 1 and the feasible sets {Ae, A3, A4, A5} 
and {Ae, Ai, A4, As} would give 61 = 63 = 0 and hence 64 = 65 = 1 and OMBmin> 3. 
When A3 appears first, 63 = 1 and the feasible sets {Ae, A2, A4, A5} and {Ae, Ai, A4, A5} 
would give b\ = b? = 0 and hence 64 = 65 = 1 and OMBmin> 3. Now, consider that 
when A4 appears first, then 64 = 2, and the set {A7, A5} would give 61 = 62 = 63 =
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and hence £>5 ~ 2 and OMBmin> 4. Finally, when As appears first, then £>5 = 2, and 
the set {A7, ^4} would give bi—b^ — b^ — 0; and hence 64 = 2 and OMBmin> 4.
Example 5.12 also shows an example where OMBmin > NTUmin, with \S\ = 6. We 
present this example primarily as a precursor to a more general result. The structure of 
this example will be generalized, in Example 5.13,to give a lower bound of ft(n) for the 
ratio of OMBmin/NTUmin.
Example 5.12. In this auction there are 7 agents, {Ai,... , A7} with feasible sets as 
follows.
F = {{M, A2, A3, A±, A$, Ae], {A7,As,As,AG}, {A7,A2,A4;)Aq}, {Aq, A2,A4,As},
{Aj,Ai,A4,As}} . The cost ce for each agent Ae is given in Table 5.12. Observe that 
the winning set S = {Ai, A2} As, A4> A5, AG].
Agent Lminue K
Ai 0 1/2 1
a2 0 1/2 0
As 0 1/2 0
a4 0 0 0
A5 0 0 0
Ae 0 0 1
A7 1
Total 3/2 2
Table 5.12: Ordered Maximal Bid Auction May Not Find NTUmin
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Figure 5.6: Hypergraph Representation of Constraints for Table 5.12
Theorem 5.5. For any n > 9 there exists a set-system auction with cost vector c such 
that OMBmin(c)/NTUmin(c) > 2n/9 — 2/3.
Proof. In Example 5.13 we have some integer parameter £ > 0. (While this may appear 
to be a complex example, it is simply a generalization of Example 5.12, which has £ = \). 
Here, we see that there exists a feasible bid vector such that = 62 = 63 = 1/2. As 
any two of these agents sum up to 1, (61 + 62 = 62 + 63 = 61 + 63 = 1) and as all 
constraints share at least two of these agents, no other agent may bid higher than zero, 
giving NTUmin(c) < 3/2. Observe that any ordered bid vector must give some agent e 
a bid of 6e = 1 (i.e., agent e is first in the ordering). If 61 = 1 then in order to satisfy 
the constraints on 61 + 62 and 61 + 63 we must have 62 = 63 = 0. There are £ agents that 
share a constraint only with and A3 (namely agents A^+z,..., A4+2£-i)i and hence 
each of these agents may bid 1. Therefore that are at least £+1 agents that will bid at 
least 1. By symmetry, observe that this would also be true if we had 62 = 1 or ^3 = 1 • If 
none of {Ai, A2, A3} bid 1, then each agent has some neighbours that can bid 1, and so 
all other 3£ agents (A4,..., A4+3/_i) will bid 1, hence we have OMBmin > £ + 1. There 
are a total of 3£ + 3 agents, so we can give this lower bound in terms of n, the number 
of agents.
As £ must be an integer parameter, there is some suitable £ such that n < 3£ + 3 + 2, 
and hence £ > (n — 5)/3. (If n is not divisible by 3, then we may add at most 2 agents 
to the example, that are in no feasible solutions, to give an instance of size n.) Starting 
with
OMBmin(c) > ^ -f 1
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substitute the lower bound for £
OMBmin(c) > (n — 5)/3 + 1
and rewrite to give
OMBmin(c) > (n — 2)/3
As we have NTUmin(c) <3/2 therefore we can rewrite to give
OMBmin(c)/NTUmin(c) > 2n/9 — 2/3
Example 5.13. In this example of a set-system auction we have a parameter £ and a 
total of3£ + 4: agents (Aq, ..., Am+s)- The feasible sets are given as follows.
F={£\{A0}:
£ \ {^4i> ^2,^4}, £ \ {^i, A2, Ai+i}, ... £ \ {Ai, A2,
^ \ {A2, A3, A4+^}, £ \ {A2, As, A4+£+i}, ... £ \ {A2, A3, A4+2^_i},
^ \ {-4.1, A3, A4+2^}, £ \ {Ai, A3, A4+2^+i}, ... £ \ {Ai, A3, A4+3£_i}}
For each agent e E £ the cost value ce is given in Table 5.13, as is a bid value
for a NTUmin bid vector and a bid value, b°, for a minimum Ordered Maximal Bid 
vector.
Agent &mm
Ai 0 1/2 1
4-2 0 1/2 0
A3 0 1/2 0
A4 0 0 0
0 0 0
Ai+e-i 0 0 0
d-4+t 0 0 1
0 0 1
^4+2^-! 0 0 1
A.4+2£ 0 0 1
0 0 1
^4+3£-l 0 0 1
A0 1
Total 3/2 £ + 1
Table 5.13: Ordered Maximal Bid Auction May Be Much Higher than NTUmin
Observe that the winning set S = £ \ {Aq}.
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V
Figure 5.7: Hypergraph Representation of Constraints for Table 5.13
5.9.3 Restricted Setting
We will now consider the special case where every constraint is restricted to a single 
value (for simpler notation, we will assume this to be 1, but any other value would be 
equivalent by rescaling), and that the cost of the winning agents is cs = 0. We will also 
impose an additional restriction that we will only have binary constraints — that is we 
will restrict the cardinality of the constraining sets to 2. More formally,
Vr<E(J-\{S}),|(S\T)|=2.
We will see, later on, that even in this restricted setting, calculating both NTUmin 
and OMBmin is NP-hard to calculate, and also NP-hard to approximate within a factor 
of n1-e for any constant c > 0.
One effect of the restriction to binary constraints is that the hypergraph representa­
tion of the constraints, that was described earlier, will now be a graph. Borrowing from 
this graph representation, we will call any two agents i and j ‘neighbours’ if they are 
share some common constraint . (i.e., 3T G J7 such that S\T =
Let N(i) be the set of neighbours of agent i. More formally, j € N(i) <*=> 3T G 
F such that S\T = {i,j}.
In this setting, we will firstly see a lower bound on the ratio between OMBmin and 
NTUmin.
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Example 5.14 shows that NTUmin < OMBmin even when the instance is restricted 
to binary constraints with a single value. (We will see that this setting is of importance 
later on).
Example 5.14. In this auction there are 10 agents, {/li,..., Aio} with feasible sets as 
follows.
F — {{^1) ^2) As, A4, A5, Aq, A7, As, ^9}, {^4l0, -^3) ^4, -^5) ^6? ^7, -^8) -^9},
{A10, A2, A4, A5, Aq, Aj, ylgj ^9}, {^io, ^5) ^6) A7, Ag, -Ag},
{^4x0, ^2) -^31 ^5) ^6) ^7) ^85^9}) {^10; ^2) ^3) ^4) ^6) ^4?) ^8> ^9)5 
{^4io, ^4i, ^3) A4, As, Aj, /Ig, ^9}, {^4io> ^1,-^3, A4, As, As, As, Ag},
{■^10, ^4i,^2) ^44; ^6, ^7)^g}; {-4io, ^4i, -42,-44, ^5,yigs -47, ^4g}}.
The cost ce for each agent Ae is given in Table 5.If.
Agent ce bmm b“
-4i 0 1/2 1
-42 0 1/2 0
-4s 0 1/2 0
-44 0 1/2 0
-4s 0 1/2 0
-4e 0 1/2 1
-47 0 1/2 1
-4g 0 1/2 1
-4g 0 1/2 1
-4io 1
Total 9/2 5
Table 5.14: Ordered Maximal Bid Auction may not equal NTUmin in restricted
setting
Observe that the winning set S = {-4i,...,-4g} and assume an ordering aa = 
(-4i,-42,-4a,-4s,-4e, Ay,-4g,-4g) resulting in bid vector bf.
Figure 5.8: Graph Representation of Constraints in Table 5.14
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The bid vector ha shows the bids of one possible ordering. We will see that there is 
no other ordering possible that will give a lower total bid. Firstly, observe that every 
ordering a' must give b^' € {0,1} for all e £ S. Secondly, any ordering that gives a 
b°' = 1 to agent Ai must give b^' = b$' =0 fas bf' + < 1 an^ +^3^1 )• order
to make the bids tight with regard to some constraint, then b^ = b^ — b^ — b^ — 1 
giving bg > 5. The constraint sets are symmetrical, so similar results for b^ — 1 and 
b^ — 1 are easily observed. Alternatively, b^' = b^' = b^' = 0 would clearly give bg > 6^ 
as all other agents would bid 1 to make some constraint tight.
By generalizing Example 5.14 we are able to prove that there exists a class of auctions 
for which the ratio between OMBmin and NTUmin can approach 2.
Theorem 5.6. For every small constant 0 < e < 1, there exists a set-system auction, 
which is restricted to binary constraints with a single value, with cost vector c such that 
OMBmin(c)/NTUmin(c) > 2 — e.
Proof. Consider Example 5.15, with some integer parameter £ > 0. This is, perhaps, 
more easily seen in Figure 5.9. This consists of a central clique, of size £, (Agents 
Aoti,..., Aqj) and each of these agent shares a constraint with an additional £ agents. 
There exists a bid vector, b, when each agent may bid 1/2, giving a total of ba — 
{£2 + £)/2 and hence NTUmin < {£2 + £)/2 — there are £ agents in the central clique, 
and £ agents attached to each of them, hence £2 -\- £ total agents.
We will now examine possible ordered bid vectors, as two cases;
Case 1: There is some i such that i>o,i — 1 •
Some agent Ao,t in the central clique may bid bo,t — 1, which results in the other £—1 
agents in the clique bidding 0 (boj = 0 when i ^ j). As an agent Aqj in the clique 
is attached to £ other agents ..., Ajj), by sharing some constraint, there are
£{£ — 1) other agents that must bid (bj^ = 1,..., bjj — 1), and hence £2 — £ + l in 
total, including the single agent in the clique who bids 1.
Case 2: There is no i such that boti = 1 .
As no agent in the central clique bids 1, all £2 outside agents may bid 1, (bXty — 1 
when x > l,y > 1) hence a total bid of £2.
For a large value of £, both £2 and £2 — £ + 1 will approach £2, and hence the ratio 
of OMBmin/NTUmin approaches £2 f{£2/2). Therefore, for the small constant e, there 
is some large value of £ such that > 2 — e. □
Example 5.15.
In this example of a set-system auction (with binary, single-valued constraints) we 
have a parameter £ and a total of £2 + £ + 1 agents (Ax,y E £ for every Q < x < £ and 
1 < 2/ < ^ and also agent Aq £ £). The feasible sets are given as follows.
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^ \ •••, £\{Ao^,A^}}
The cost ce for each agent e £ £ is given in Table 5.15, along with a bid value 6^liri for 
an NTUmin bid vector and a minimum Ordered Maximal bid value Pf.
Agent Ce bmm
Ao.i 0 1/2 1
0 1/2 0
Aqj 0 1/2 0
Al,! 0 1/2 0
0 1/2 0
Ai/ 0 1/2 0
0 1/2 1
0 1/2 1
0 1/2 1
A^i 0 1/2 1
0 1/2 1
Ae,e 0 1/2 1
Aq 1
Total {i2+£)/2 £2~i + l
Table 5.15; OMBmin approaches 2 NTUmin
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A
Figure 5.9: Graph Representation of Constraints in Table 5.15
Single-Commodity Auctions
As we have spent some time studying single-commodity auctions, it might also be in­
teresting to study the ratio between OMBmin and NTUmin in that simple setting. We 
show here a lower bound for this ratio, again approaching 2.
Theorem 5.7. For every small constant 0 < e < 1, there exists a single-commodity 
auction with cost vector c such that OMBmin(c)/NTUmin(c) > 2 — e.
Proof. We will consider Example 5.16, with £ as some integer parameter.
Example 5.16. This is a commodity auction with £+ 7 agents to purchase 2£ + 7 
identical items. Each agent Ae € {Ai,..., has the quantity qe and cost ce given
in Table 5.16.
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Agent Qe Ce bmm % 4
A! 1 0 1/2 0 1
A2 2 1 3/2 2 1
^3 2 1 3/2 1 1
A4 2 0 1/2 1 1
A-4+g 2 0 1/2 1 1
As+e 3 2
Ae+g 4 3
Ar+e 7 4
Total (£ + 8)/2 £ + 4 £-h 4
Table 5.16: OMBmin approaches 2 NTUmin for Single-Commodity Auctions
Observe that the bid vector hmm given is a feasible bid vector, and hence NTUmin 
< (^ + 8)/2. To verify this satisfies condition (3) in Definition 1.2, let e £ {4,... ,4 + £} 
and let Te — »S\{Ai, A2,-As, Ae} U which gives ^ ^ — 4, so Te satisfies
condition (3) for all A\,, A^#, Less formally, no agent can raise its bid due to the 
constraint implied by a replacement subset of quantity 7, with cost 4-
We consider the ordered maximal bid process on Example 5.16. Let e be the first 
agent in the ordering a, and we will examine this as two cases.
Case 1: qe — 1 .
Agent A\ may raise first and will be constrained by the bid of A^+e — this can be 
written as bf <2. This gives bf < 2 — C2, and as C2 ~ X, therefore < 1. Once 
we have bf — 1, then the same constraint gives + 5J <2 for all j € {2,..., 4+1?— 1}, 
and all other agents will bid 1. This gives each agent e £ S a bid 6g = 1, and therefore 
b°s = ]S\=£ + 4.
Case 2: qe — 2.
If the first agent in the ordering e has qe — 2, then this will be constrained by both 
As-t-g and Ag+f. As Ag+f gives b^ ■+ bj < 2 , and bf — 0 (as we have bf = c\ until we 
reach agent A\ in the ordering) then we have 6^—2. By the same constraint (from 
As+g), this will give bf = 0. As Aq+£ will constrain b° + 6J for all j e,j > 1 we will 
have bj=l for all such j. This gives one agent e, a bid of Uf — 2, agent 1 a bid of 
bf = 0 and every other agent j has bj = 1. Therefore we have = |5| — ^ + 4.
In Example 5.16, we have seen that every ordered bid vector bCT has =^ + 4, and 
we have seen NTUmin(c) < (1? + 8)/2. Hence, for any small e then there is some large 
value of £ such that > 2 — e.
□
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This has shown that single-commodity auctions may give ^]pUmin(cj > 2 — e for 
some small value of e < 1. In the general case, we have seen that this ratio is f2(n), 
so it is an obvious open question whether ratios of larger than 2 are possible for single­
commodity auctions.
In Example 5.16, we saw that OMBmin approaches 2xNTUmin for single-commodity 
auctions, but we have not seen any instances that must give ratios of larger than 2.
We are, therefore, going to look at some seemingly reasonable approaches to choosing 
an ordering in order to determine what ratios they may give with respect to NTUmin. 
Example 5.9 shows that choosing a random ordering may give an expected value that is 
close to NTUmax, even when this is close to a factor of n larger than NTUmin.
In looking for an ordering that gives OMBmin close to NTUmin, one approach that 
may seem reasonable is to partition S into subsets of a given quantity, then choose 
the ordering simply based on the cardinality of these partitions. Example 5.17 and 
Example 5.18 show that this would be unsuccessful in always finding a bid vector close 
to NTUmin. In Example 5.17, a minimum value would be obtained by soliciting bids 
from the agents with the lower cardinality first (i.e., there are fewer agents with quantity 
£> so they are ordered first). Example 5.18 shows that a minimum value would only 
be obtained by soliciting bids from the agents with the higher cardinality first. Both 
examples show that choosing the order incorrectly gives a bid vector b that is much 
higher than optimal. We have bg>£—l and NTUmin = 1, and as £ = (n/2) — 1 then
nttLk £ ^(n)-
Example 5.17. This is a single-commodity auction with 2£ + 2 agents to purchase 
£2 4-£-f 1 identical items. Each agent Ae G {Ai,..., A2tJr.2} has the quantity qe and cost 
ce given in Table 5.17
Agent Qe ce Lminue hae
Ax £ 0 0 1
At £ 0 0 1
A*+x 1 0 1 0
A2Gfl 1 0 0 0
A2L+2 £ + 1 1
Total 1 £-1
Table 5.17: Ordered Maximal Bid Auction, Lowest Cardinality First
Observe that the winning set S — {Ax,..., Aa^+i} and let a = (Ax,..., A2£+i) be a 
permutation of S and b'7 be the resulting ordered maximal bid vector.
Chapter 5. Benchmarks and First-Price Auctions 117
Example 5.18. This is a commodity auction with 2^ + 2 agents to purchase t!2 + 1 
identical items. Each agent Ae £ {Ai,.,. ,^2^+2} has the quantity qe and cost ce given 
in Table 5.18.
Agent <le Ce Lminue K
Ai £ 0 0 1
A^+i £ 0 0 1
A^f2 1 0 1 0
Mt+i 1 0 0 0
Ml+2 £ + 1 1
Total 1 £
Table 5.18: Ordered Maximal Bid Auction, Highest Cardinality First
Observe that the winning set S = {Ai,..., A^+i} and let a = (A\,..., A^+i) be a 
permutation of S and b*7 be the resulting ordered maximal bid vector.
We may also consider choosing the ordering, based on the quantity of items that 
each agent has. If we were to choose the agents with the largest quantity first, then we 
could see from Example 5.17 again, that ^TUmm — ^(n)- However, choosing the agents 
with the smallest quantity first could also result in a ratio of NTTfmjn > This
can be seen in Example 5.19. Hence, we have seen that the most obvious heuristics for 
finding a minimal ordering fail for single-commodity auctions, and we leave as an open 
question whether is is even possible to find a minimal ordering in polynomial time for 
the special case of single-commodity auctions.
Example 5.19. This is a commodity auction with £ 2> agents to purchase 2f? -|- 1
identical items. Each agent Ae £ {Ax,..., has the quantity qe and cost ce given
in Table 5.19.
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Agent Qe Lmin K
Ax 1 0 0 1
A.2 2 0 2 1
A3 2 0 0 1
A*+i 2 0 0 1
A*+2 4 2
A^+3 1 1
Total 2 £ + 1
Table 5.19: Ordered Maximal Bid Auction, Lowest Quantity First
Observe that the winning set S — {Ai,..., Ai+i} and let a = (Ai,... ,Ai+i) be a 
permutation of S and ha be the resulting ordered maximal bid vector.
5.9.4 Results for |5| < 4
In this subsection, we will see that for any set-system auctions when l^l < 4 we have 
OMBmin = NTUmin. This is trivial for \S\ — 1, and initially we will see this for |Sj = 2, 
then |5'| = 3 before progressing to the main result. Example 5.11 shows that we may 
have OMBmin>NTUmin for |S,| = 5, which can easily be applied to all j«S'| > 5 (e.g. by 
substituting agent 1 with k other agents), and so this represents a result for all values of 
|5|. (Intuitively, this threshold of 5 agents is reasonably easy to see using Example 5.11 
— it takes at least 3 agents, in an odd-length path, such that their OMB bids are less 
than the maximum possible. When this triangle bids less than maximum it can, by 
sharing a constraint, require other agents to bid more than the minimum. Hence at 
least two of these are needed such that their increases outweigh the decreases made by 
the agents that are in the triangle.)
As an intermediate step, we will briefly consider a smaller problem, when there are 
only 2 agents in S.
Lemma 5.8. Given a set system auction having winning set S and (S'! — 2; OMBmin = 
NTUmin.
Proof. We will see that all feasible bid vectors have equal value, and as NTUmin and 
OMBmin are both feasible bid vectors, it follows that OMBmin = NTUmin.
Assign labels S — {Ai,./I2} and define some alternative solutions, as follows.
Let — argmin ct,
TG.T and A\£T
letX2 = argmin 071, and
TG-J" and
let Xs = argmin c'p.
Te? and S’nT=0
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X\ and X2 are the cheapest alternative solutions for agents A\ and A2 respectively, 
and are non-empty assuming that the set-system is monopoly-free. Xg is the cheapest 
alternative solution to both agents in S' — and note that there may be no solution to 
this. Observe that only the sets meeting these definitions could possibly satisfy condition 
(3) in Definition 1.2 and hence determine the bid values.
Case 1: Xs exists and < cXl\s + cX2\s .
As X\ and X2 must satisfy condition (2) in Definition 1.2, we have 61 < cXl\S and 
&2 < cx2\S' However, Xg must also satisfy condition (2), which gives bg < cXs. 
With the inequality cXs\g < cXl\s 4- cx.^s, this implies that both X\ and A2 cannot 
simultaneously satisfy condition (3) in Definition 1.2. Hence there must be at least 
one agent that has condition (3) satisfied by Xg — giving bg = cXs for all feasible 
bid vectors.
Case 2: Xg does not exist or cXs\S > cXl\g + cx2\s •
If Xg satisfied condition (3) in Definition 1.2, then we would have bg > cXl\g + 
CX2\S hence either &i > cXl\g or 62 > cX2\s which would violate condition (2) in 
Definition 1.2. As Xg cannot satisfy condition (3) in Definition 1.2, then both X\ and 
X2 must giving b\ — cXl\g and 62 = cx2\s f°r ah feasible bid vectors.
□
We now continue by extending this result to winning sets of size 3.
Let S = {Ai,A2,A3} and label the bids and costs as &i, 62,63 and ci,c2,C3 respec­
tively.
We will use the existence of the Te sets (described in (3)) to apply some constraints 
to the bids depending on the value of cre\g for each Te, in the manner described earlier. 
Recall that each subset of S may have at most one relevant constraint value. There 
are seven non-empty subsets of S, and we will label the values for the constraints as 
ci,,.. ,07. That gives the following possible set of constraints, for any bid vector b.
61 < Cl (5.3)
62 < C2 (5.4)
63 < S3 (5.5)
61 + 62 < c4 (5.6)
61 + 63 < c5 (5.7)
62 + 63 < CQ (5.8)
61 + 62 + 63 < cy (5.9)
Taking a NTUmin(c) bid vector,bmm, we can examine it in terms of the constraints 
given here — for each e E {1,2,3} at least one of the constraints including 6e must be 
tight, (in order to satisfy condition (3) in Definition 1.2).
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Lemma 5.9. Given a set system auction having winning set S and IjS1! = 3, OMBmin = 
NTUmin.
Proof. We will see that there is an ordering a such that the maximal ordered bid vector 
b", gives bg —NTUmin(c). There are four possible cases for a set of tight constraints, 
and we will now examine those in turn.
Case 1: Be € {1,2,3}, such that b° = ce.
For e e {1,2,3}, where ce may be tight (i.e., Wf = ce) then an ordered maximal bid 
process may firstly raise the bid of e to = ce. Then we need only consider how 
to get a minimum bid from the two remaining agents, with just the constraints that 
apply to them, (frf <^2,63 < C3,62 + < min(c6,67 — bf)). Lemma 5.8 tells us that
either ordering will give us a minimum bid, and hence bg =NTUmin(c).
Case 2: b^ + b2 B- b^ — cj holds.
Where bf B-b^ + 63 = C7 holds in a NTUmin(c) bid vector, then we have NTUmin(c) 
= £7. As the constraint fef + 62 + frf < £7 applies to all bid vectors that satisfy (2), 
then any such bid vector has &£ + £>2 + ^3 =NTUmin(c). Observe that the ordered 
maximal bid process must give a bid vector that satisfies (1), (2) and (3), hence when 
£>? + £>2 + £>3 < £7 may be tight the ordered maximal bid process gives bg =NTUmin(c).
Case 3: Exactly two of {bf + b^ = £4, £>1 + £>3 — £5, ^2 + ^3 = £e} hold.
Observe that when only 1 may be tight, either Case 1 or Case 2 above must apply, 
otherwise there is some e £ S that does not have a tight constraint.
Then we can choose an e that occurs most frequently to raise first. We will assume 
w.l.o.g. that the two tight constraints are as follows;
bf B~ b 2 = C4 
£>2 + £>3 = ce
and we can observe that bg — b^ B- b^ B- £>3 and bf + bf + ^3 = 04 B- cq — b^. Hence 
when b^ is maximized, bg is minimized, which is proven as follows.
Assume, for contradiction, that there exists a bid vector b' where b^ = bf — <5 for some 
<5 > 0 and that bg < bg. As both b[ + b'2 = £4 and bf + b£ = c4 will hold, we can 
rearrange to give b'i — bf + J. The same applies to bf + bg = eg, giving bg = bg + <5. 
Therefore b's — bg — 5B-SB-S, contradicting bg <bg.
In order to maximize b^ we simply place A% first in the ordering. We can then consider 
only agents 1 and 3, and the constraints that apply to them, and Lemma 5.8 shows 
us that we can minimize these bids with an ordered maximal bid.
Case 4: bf + bf = c4, bf + b£ — C5 and bf + bf = ce hold.
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This can be rewritten to give 2(6f+6£+&f) = c4+C5+c6) hence NTUmin(c) = l/2(c4 + 
C5 + ce). Reverting back to the inequality form of these equations, they represent 
upper bounds on any bid that satisfies condition (2) in Definition 1.2. Therefore 
we have for any such vector b', 2(&f + b'<? + b'g) < c4 + c5 + c6. As an ordered 
maximal bid vector b'7, for any possible order <r, satisfies condition (2) then this gives 
2&g < c4 + C5 + ce and therefore bg <NTUmin(c). As NTUmin(c) is a minimum, it 
follows that b% >NTUmin(c).
Case 1 deals with any case where b° = ce, and Case 2 where 61+62+63 — c7. Hence any 
other cases left must only have some subset of {6f + 6£ = c4,6f + 6f = C5,6£ + 6£ — c6}. 
In order for all agents to have some tight constraint, at least two of these must be 
tight, and hence Case 3 and Case 4 cover these. Therefore all the possible sets of tight 
constraints must be covered by at least one of the 4 cases already outlined.
As we have now seen that all possible cases have an ordering a which will give 
the value bg =NTUmin(c), the claim that there always exists an ordering a giving 
bg =NTUmin(c) is proven. □
Now we will consider when |lS'| — 4; firstly we note (in the same way as before) that 
we can use the fact that there is a ‘locally optimal’ solution for any three of the agents.
Theorem 5.10. Given a set-system auction, having the winning set S with l^l < 4 then 
OMBmin = NTUmin.
Proof. Let bmin be a NTUmin bid vector.
When jiS'l = 4, there are a small number of configurations for the tight constraints. 
Firstly, we can assume that the tight constraints make a single connected component. If 
not, then the components can be ordered separately, and each component (of size < 3) 
has an ordering that gives a minimum value, from Lemma 5.8 and Lemma 5.9.
We saw in Lemma 5.8 that when we have only 2 agents, then either ordering gives 
the same value, hence the minimum and maximum are equal. We can now consider the 
different ways that a set of size 4 can have tight constraints.
Case 1: All tight constraints are of size 2.
Firstly; we will consider only those that do not have a tight constraint of size 3; hence 
all the tight constraints are of size 2. We will do this as sub-cases.
Case 1.1: There is no odd-length cycle of tight constraints.
When there is no odd-length cycle (i.e., no triangle) then the resulting tight con­
straints can be represented as a bipartite graph. W.l.o.g. assume that we have 
partitions £>1 = {Ai, A3},£>2 = {A2, A4} such that these two partitions are bipar­
tite; i.e., VTc G {l,2},i G A*, 4^ N(i) £ Ap.. We can observe that increasing the 
bid of some agent in would then reduce the bid of at least one agent in S2 by 
the same amount (as they share a tight constraint). When increasing the bid of 
one agent in £1 would reduce the bids of both agents in £2 (this must be by the
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same amount), then the other agent in Si will be sharing a tight constraint with 
one agent in S2, and hence it will be able to increase its bid by the same amount. 
This shows that increasing a bid to its maximum possible value will have no effect 
on the overall bid. Therefore, by taking a NTUmin bid, it would be trivial to assign 
any ordering to the bids which may ‘amend’ the individual bids as described, but 
would still produce an equal sum, and hence NTUmin(c).
Case 1.2: There is an odd-length cycle of tight constraints.
Where there exists an odd-length cycle of tight constraints, then we have a tri­
angle of tight constraints, along with one other tight constraint attached to one 
of the nodes of the triangle. Hence, there is some agent (Ai) that shares a tight 
constraint with 3 neighbours. Therefore, any minimum bid vector must maximize 
&in111. Assume, for contradiction, that bmm is a minimum bid vector, but b^m is not 
maximized — hence by the tight constraints, there exists some b' when b[ = + c
then &2 — &2im — e, 63 = &31111 — e and 64 — b™m — e, giving b's < h™111 contradicting 
bmin being a minimum. As b™111 may be maximized by choosing it first in any or­
dering, there exists an ordered maximal bid vector b^ when is maximum. When 
is maximum, then the bids of all other agents can be raised in any order, as each 
shares a tight constraint with Ai\ thus showing that when b^ is maximized, then 
6^ is minimized, and we have =NTUmin(c).
Case 2: We have some tight constraint of size 3.
We will also examine this as sub-cases.
Case 2.1: There are two sets of tight constraints, both of size 3.
There are two agents that exist in both these sets of tight constraints. Ordering 
these two agents first, in either order, will result in a maximum for the sum of their 
bids. (This follows from Lemma 5.8. When these two agents have raised their bids, 
the other two agents can raise theirs, in either order, to make the constraints tight.
Case 2.2: There are at least three sets of tight constraints of size 3.
As there is at least one agent that is in all sets of tight constraints, then clearly 
the bid for this agent must be maximized. By ordering this agent first, its bid is 
maximized and hence the other three agents can be raised in order to make the 
constraints tight.
Case 2.3: There is one set of tight constraints of size 3.
Case 2.3.1: There is one set of tight constraints of size 2 and one set of tight 
constraints of size 3.
In order for all agents to be involved in a tight constraint, there is at least one 
constraint of size 2. When there is only one constraint of size 2, there is one agent 
that appears in both sets of tight constraints, let us assume that this is agent Ai.
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Let ci and C2 be the values of the constraints, and the sum of the bids will equal 
ci + c2 - &i. Hence if we order this agent first, its bid is maximized and the sum 
of bids is minimized; then the other three agents can be raised in order to make 
the constraints tight.
Case 2.3.2: There are two sets of tight constraints of size 2 and one set of tight 
constraints of size 3.
When there are two constraint of size 2, there are three agents that appear in 
these two sets of tight constraints, let us assume that they are agents Ai,A2>A3. 
Let ci, c2 and C3 be the values of the constraints, and the sum of the bids will 
equal ci + C2 + £3 — — b% — b^. Hence if we order agent A4 last, its bid is
minimized and the sum of bids is minimized.
Case 2.3.3: There are three sets of tight constraints of size 2 and one set of tight 
constraints of size 3.
As all agents are covered by tight constraints of size 2, case 1 above applies, and 
shows that an optimal ordering a gives bg =NTUmin(c).
□
5.9.5 Upper Bound for Restricted Settings
We will now return to the special case described in Section 5.9.3. Recall that, in this 
setting every constraint is restricted to a single value (we assume this to be 1), the cost 
of the winning set is cs = 0 and that the constraints are binary — every constraining 
set (T \ S) has a cardinality of 2.
Recall Example 5.14, where we saw that even in this restricted setting, NTUmin(c) 
may not be achievable with a maximal ordered bid vector. However, our examples have 
only shown a ratio of OMBmin(c)/NTUmin(c) < 2, while for ternary constraints in 
Example 5.13 we saw ratios larger than any constant OMBmin(c)/NTUmin(c) = 2n/9.
So, we may ask the question, what is the largest ratio possible between the OMBmin 
and NTUmin(c) in this restricted setting? We will see that OMBmin(c) is always within 
a factor of 2 of NTUmin(c).
We will firstly show how to convert a NTUmin bid vector bmin, into another bid 
vector b, where bs — feg1111, and b satisfies some additional properties on the bid values. 
We will then use these properties to compare b with an OMBmin bid vector ba.
Lemma 5.11. For an instance of a set-system auction with binary single-value con­
straints, a given winning set S such that cs = 0 and a given NTUmin bid vector bmin; 
a bid vector b exists such that M?111 = bs and Ve £ S,be E {0,1/2,1}.
Proof. Consider a NTUmin bid vector bmin, we will show how to create some bid vector, 
b such that bfin — bs and Ve E S,be e {0,1/2,1}.
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Let d E [1/2,1) be a bid value, and partition S into subsets for each distinct value 
of d.
Let Sd+ = U {e}.
eeS,b™in=d
Let Sd. = U {e}.
(i.e., if d = 6e E [1/2,1) then e E 3(1+ and if d = 6e ^ [1/2,1) then e E Sd,_). Now 
fix d as some bid value, such that Sd+ ^ 0. We can observe that every e E Sd- has a 
neighbour j E N(e) such that j E Sd+ (If no such neighbour exists, then there is no 
tight constraint that would give b™m + = 1 contradicting e being in Sd~). Similarly
every e E Sd+ has a neighbour j E N(e) such that j E Sd~. When is optimal, this 
implies that \Sd+\ ~ |S,(./„|, as follows;
Assume, for contradiction, that 15^+1 ^ \3d-\ and is a minimum. If \Sd+\ > 
|5rf_|, then choosing some small e, there exists a bid vector b where e E Sd+ be — 
6™'" — e and e E Sd- be — 6^in + e. For all e ^ {Sd+ U Sd~) let be — The only
agents that share a tight constraint with agents in Sd+ must be present in Sd-, and 
vice-versa. Let e be small enough such that no other constraint may become tight in b 
that was not tight in bmin. As this would now allow more agents to decrease by e than 
increase by e this contradicts b™111 being a minimum. Similarly, if 15^-1 > jS^+l there 
exists a bid vector b' where e E Sd+ <^b'e — b™in + e and e E Sd- —»■ bg = b™111 — e. This 
would also allow more agents to decrease by e than increase by e, which contradicts b“m 
being a minimum.
We have seen that each agent e E Sd+, there exists at least one neighbour j E N{e) 
such that b™in + b™111 = 1, and hence that b™m = 1 — b“in. For each d, when Sd+ 7^ 0, 
for each e E Sd+ let be = 1, and for each e E Sd- let be = 0. As, in each turn, we have 
added 1 — d to the bid of elements in Sd+ and subtracted 1 — d from the bid of elements 
in Sd_, we will have bsd+ = b™^ + \Sd+ |d and bsd_ = b™n — \Sd_ |d. As we have seen 
that \Sd+\ = jSrfJ, this gives bSd+uSd_ = b'sdlusd- and> summing over all d, we have 
bs = Vf*-
This has shown that b exists such that Ve E S,be E {0,1/2,!} and that bs = bg1111, 
therefore there exists some bid vector b such that bs =NTUmin(c) and Ve E S,be E 
{0,1/2,1} which satisfies the lemma.
□
Now that we have seen the existence of a NTUmin bid vector b'min with this property 
(Ve E S', be E {0,1/2,1}) on the bid values, we will see how an ordering <7 can be derived 
such that bg < 2b,gnm.
Theorem 5.12. Let I be an an instance of a set-system auction having binary single­
value constraints and a winning set S such that 0,5 = 0. Then there exists an ordering 
a such that the resulting bid vector b17 has Ug < 2NTUmin(c).
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Proof. Let bmm be a NTUmin bid vector, satisfying the property that for all e e S, 6^in 6 
{0,1/2,1}. Lemma 5.11 has shown that such a bid vector exists for any instance / of a 
set-system auction with binary single-value constraints.
Let cr be an ordering of S in decreasing order, according to an agents bid in bmin. 
More formally, a is an ordering of S such that V(i,j) G S,ai < aj 6fin > 5Jlin. (That 
is, if an agent i appears before agent j in the ordering cr, then agent i did not bid less 
than agent j in the NTUmin bid vector bmin). Partition S into Sq,S1/2,S1, based on 
the bids in bmin, i.e., Vi G = x.
Now we claim that every agent i £ Si will bid 6f = 1. For any agent i when &™iri — 1 
there is no neighbour j G N(i) such that bf1111 > 0 or bmm would violate a shared 
constraint (recall that being neighbours implies + 6™in < 1). As the ordering a 
will require that i is raised before all of its neighbours, then we will have bf — 1 and 
Vj G iV(i),&J — 0. Equally, to show that Vi G Sq then bf = 0, then i must have some 
neighbour j G N(i) that has = 1, (or else i has no tight constraint). As, we have 
seen that bf = 1 will already be set when we reach agent i in cr, then we must have 
bf = 0 or else we would have 6f + 6J > 1, violating the shared constraint.
It is trivial to observe that no agent i £ S may bid more than 1, as every agent has 
some constraint, so it follows that Vi £ < 1. We can write the sum of bid
vector bmin, as follows
^ = |51| + (1/2)|51/2|
and similarly we can upper bound the bid vector bf* using the results we have just seen 
on individual bids.
bs < 1^11 + 2|5'i/2|
rewrite to give an upper bound
bf; < 2(|5i| + IS1/2I)
and as bffm = |5i| + (1/2)|5'1/2| then < [S’iI + |5'1/2| and by substitution, we have
bf < 2(brg[n)
As we have assumed that bfm = NTUmin(c), this shows that for the ordering cr defined 
earlier, we will get an ordered maximal bid vector ba such that bf <2 NTUmin(c), as 
claimed.
5.9.6 Hardness and Approximation Results
We will firstly see a straightforward reduction from the MINIMUM INDEPENDENT 
DOMINATING SET problem on a graph G, to finding OMBmin(c) on a set system 
derived from G. We will use this fact to show that finding OMBmin(c) is NP-hard to 
even approximate.
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We now give the definition of a known problem, Problem 5.
Name MINIMUM INDEPENDENT DOMINATING SET (MIN-IDS)
Instance Graph G — (V,E).
Output Cardinality of a minimum independent dominating set for G, he., \V'\ for a 
subset V' C.V such that for al\ u V — V there is a u € V7 for which (u, v) e E, 
and such that no two vertices in V are joined by an edge in E.
Problem 5: MINIMUM INDEPENDENT DOMINATING SET
The decision version of Problem 5 is well-known to be NP-complete [14].
Lemma 5.13. For any graph G, there exists a polynomial-time reduction to a set- 
system auction with cost vector c such that OMBmin(c) equals the size of a minimum 
independent dominating set of G.
Proof Taking a graph G = (V, E), create a set-system auction I as follows.
Copy the vertices with cost 0.
£ = {Au...tAn} = {Vlt...,Vn}
C\,..., Cji — 0
Create a new agent, Aq, with cost 1.
£ = £\J {Ao} 
cq — 1
Note the winning set S,
5 = {Ai,...,An}
Create feasible sets for every edge e G E, with endpoints Vi, Vj 
Ve G £, Te = S \ {Af, Aj } U Aq 
Define the feasible sets.
= 5 U |J Te
eeE
Observe that there are at most n + 1 agents in 7, hence I can be created from G in 
polynomial time. Let ba be the Ordered Maximal bid vector, for the optimal ordering 
a (i.e., =OMBmin), and let M be a minimum independent dominating set of G.
There exists a constraint, on each edge e G E such that agents at the two end 
points Vi and Vj may not bid such that bf + bf > 1 (or else feasible set Te would give 
^S\T '> showing that b'7 does not satisfy condition (2) in Definition 1.2).
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Observe that Ve £ S}b° £ {0,1}, as each bid starts at 0, and then takes the form 
bg — 1 maxjejv(e) b?. We partition the agents into Sq and S\t depending on their bid, 
as follows. Let Sx C .S' be a set such that Ve £ Sx,b° = x. Recall that N(e) is the set of 
neighbours of agent e; the constraint property of condition (2) in Definition 1.2 implies 
that Ve £ Si, jV(e) ^ Si — i.e., that no two neighbours may bid one. This implies that 
Si is an independent set in G. The ‘tightness’ property of condition (3) in Definition 1.2 
requires that Ve £ S, ({e} UlV(e)) n Si ^0 — if an agent bids zero, one of its neighbours 
must bid one. This implies that Si is a dominating set in G.
Therefore, the set Si is an independent dominating set in G, and is at least as large 
as M, by definition. As OMBmin(c) = )Si|, from the definition of Sq and Si, this shows 
that OMBmin > |M[.
For the other direction, let u be an ordering such that every agent in M appears 
before all agents not in M. As M is an independent set, each agent in M can raise its 
bid to 1 while its neighbours still bid 0. As M is dominating, no agent outside M will 
then be able to bid more than 0 due to the presence of a neighbour in M already bidding 
1. Hence bg = |M[, and OMBmin < \M\.
This shows that computing OMBmin(c) gives the size of the minimum independent 
dominating set.
□
As we have seen a proof that computing OMBmin can be used to compute the size of 
a minimum independent dominating set of a graph, this is sufficient for an approximation 
hardness result.
Theorem 5.14. For any set-system auction I, having cost vector c, there is no constant 
e > 0 for which OMBmin can be approximated within a factor of n1~e in polynomial 
time, unless P=NP.
Proof. From Lemma 5.13 we see that for any graph, G, the size of the minimum indepen­
dent dominating set can be calculated by determining OMBmin(c) for instance I (which 
is derived from G in polynomial time). Therefore, if OMBmin(c) could be approximated 
within n1-e for instance /, this would imply a polynomial-time approximation within a 
factor of n1_G for the minimum independent dominating set of G, and [19] shows that 
this would imply P=NP, n
We will firstly see a technical theorem, that shows for particular (bipartite) restricted 
set systems, that there exists a NTUmin bid vector such that all agents bid either 0 or 1. 
We will use this fact to show that, for these cases, NTUmin(c) is equal to OMBmin(c). 
We can then leverage the result of Theorem 5.14 to apply to computing NTUmin(c), 
showing that NTUmin(c) is similarly hard to approximate.
Considering the hypergraph representation of set-system constraints described in 
Section 5.2, we are interested in those set-systems that result in a bipartite graph. 
Recall that each constraint imposed by the set-system must have cardinality 2, (i.e.,
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VT G J7 \ {5}, \ Tj = 2) which can be represented by an edge in a graph. We will
be interested in auction instances such that this resulting constraint graph is bipartite, 
and will refer to these as ‘bipartite1 constraint sets.
Theorem 5.15. For any set-system auction I, having cost vector c, there is no constant 
e > 0 for which NTUminfc^) can be approximated within a factor o/n1_e in polynomial 
time, unless P=NP.
Proof. We will firstly show that, for any instance I with binary and bipartite constraint 
sets, a given winning set S such that cs = 0 and a given NTUmin bid vector bmin then 
a vector b exists such that bs — b™111 =NTUmin and Ve E S', E {0,1}.
Let bmm be NTUmin bid vector bmm such that Ve E S, 6™in E {0,1/2,1}, Lemma 5.11 
shows that such a bid vector exists. We know that every agent e with = 1/2 
has at least one neighbour, y with b™m — 1/2. Let Sh be a subset of S such that 
Ve E S^, 6™" = 1/2.
For all e E S \ Sh let be - &™n.
Divide Sh into two partitions, Shi and Sh2, such that Ve E Shi, there does not exist 
a y such that (y E (jV(e))) and (y E Shi) (there are no edges between vertices that are 
in the same partition). This is possible only because we require the constraint set to be 
bipartite.
No agent in Sh has a neighbour outside Sh with a non-zero bid; as any such agent e 
would have a neighbour j with b™m — 1 and hence b^m + > 1 violating their shared
constraint. As all agents in Shi have neighbours in Sh2 and vice-versa (or else we do not 
have any e, j such that + b™m = 1), then we can choose new bid values of 0 and 1.
More formally we have e E Shi if and only if 6e = 1 and e E Sh2 if and only if be = 0. 
If \Shi\ — |<5/121 then we have 6™n = bsh. Clearly we may not have l^ij < jS/^l as this 
would give bs < b™m contradicting 6<?in being a minimum vector. Simply swapping the 
labels for sets Shi and Sh2 would equally imply that \Shi\ > jS/^l is not possible.
As this shows we have 6^n = bsh, and we have assigned bids such that Ve £ S,be £ 
{0,1}, it implies that any such restricted system with bipartite constraint sets has a 
NTUmin bid vector with Ve E S,be E {0,1}. We can observe that any ordering a gives 
an ordered maximal bid vector b^ such that Ve E S, Ff E {0,1}. Let a be an ordering 
such that all agents with a bid bid of 1 in b appear before any agent that bids 0, which 
gives an ordered maximal bid vector of bCT = b. Therefore, when the set system has 
binary and bipartite constraint sets, we have NTUmin(c)= for a minimum ordering 
a, therefore NTUmin(c)=OMBmin(c).
If we take a bipartite input graph, G, then from Lemma 5.13 this would give the 
size of the minimum independent dominating set on G. Similarly to Theorem 5.14, 
if we could approximate NTUmin(c) within n1-e for instance 7, this would imply a 
polynomial-time approximation within nl~e for the minimum independent dominating 
set of the bipartite graph G, and [7], shows that this would imply P=NP.
□
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As finding NTUmin (or OMBmin) involves firstly finding the lowest-cost solution to 
a possibly inapproximable problem, an approximation hardness result may appear to 
be trivial. However, it is also easy to see that these approximation hardness results for 
NTUmin and OMBmin can be applied even when the underlying problem is polynomial­
time computable. One such example is a problem based on MINIMUM WEIGHT EDGE 
COVER.
Name MINIMUM WEIGHT EDGE COVER
Instance A graph G = V>E and an edge-weight function w{e) for e £ E).
Output A set of edges S C. E such that every vertex r; G V is incident to an edge e in 
S and J2e£Sw(e) 18 minimized.
Problem 6: MINIMUM WEIGHT EDGE COVER
MINIMUM WEIGHT EDGE COVER is known to be polynomial-time solvable [32]. 
It was shown in [11] that NTUmin(c) is NP-hard to calculate exactly, even when the 
problem of finding the minimum-cost solution is polynomial-time solvable.
Given an arbitrary bipartite input graph G = (V,E)} assuming at least one edge in 
E, define an instance of WEIGHTED EDGE COVER as follows.
Let V' — V VJ {A0}.
let E' = Eu U{{u,4)}}-
vev
let w'(e)
0, if Aq e e 
1, otherwise.
From this instance of MINIMUM WEIGHT EDGE COVER, we create a set-system 
auction, with the feasible sets as the valid solutions to the edge cover problem, as follows. 
Let £ = Er, Let E — {T : E V7, 3D e T such that v £ D}, and let ce = w'(e) for all
e £ £.
Observe that the set S = covers all vertices in V and has weight 0
(and hence cost 0), so may be chosen as a winning set.
We define a subset of the feasible sets that differ from the winning set by only one 
‘edge’.
Let Ji — < S', [J S \ {{u, A0}, {^, A0}} U {u,
^ (u,v)€.E
Observe that J~i Q E (every feasible set T £ E\ has u>(T) < 1, and every feasible 
set T $ Ei has w(T') > 1).
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Consider that every feasible set T £ (Pi \ {S'}) gives S \ T = {u, v} for some 
{u,v) £ E and c^^g = 1. This shows that the constraint implied by condition (2) 
in Definition 1.2 on any NTUmin bid vector brain may be given by bjfin + b^,n < 1, 
hence we can observe that the constraints for this set-system mirror the input graph G. 
(We can ignore the constraints with values greater than 1, as they would imply some 
agent bidding more than 1, which would already violate an ‘edge’ constraint). NTUmin 
must allocate bids such that every two neighbours (u, v) £ E must bid b™m + b™m < 1 
(from condition (2)) and that Vu £ V, 3(u, v) £ E such that b™m + 6™in = 1 (from 
condition (3) in Definition 1.2), and hence NTUmin gives exactly the size of a minimum 
independent dominating set in graph G. Hence, there are auctions based on instances 
of the polynomial-time solvable problem MINIMUM WEIGHT EDGE COVER where 
it is hard to even approximate NTUmin.
Chapter 6
Benchmarks for Forward Auctions
6.1 Overview
Our area of study has been, thus far, that of procurement auctions, where some central 
authority is distributing revenue in return for some service. In this chapter we take the 
natural step of considering the opposite approach, where the central authority may be 
distributing services in return for revenue.
The set-system auctions of Karlin et al. [24] that we have been studying are often 
referred to as an auction for ‘hiring a team’ (e.g. [4, 36, 24, 11]); they nicely characterize 
the concept. We may like to consider a forward set-system auction as one of ‘providing 
a service’ and we give a definition of such an auction here. In these auctions we assume 
that we have a single seller that is able to provide services, and that there are various 
buyers that would wish to purchase these services — but that it may only be possible 
for certain subsets of buyers to receive these services simultaneously. As the seller must 
choose which subsets he will provide to, we will consider that those who receive a service 
as ‘winners’, and those that do not as ‘losers’.
As we have been interested in frugality for set-system auctions, we would like to 
consider the same concept for these ‘providing a service’ auctions. In order to do that 
we will need to consider what we might use as a benchmark figure, a question which this 
chapter aims to go some way to addressing.
We will firstly see a definition for a forward set-system auction, and show some 
comparison with the more commonly studied combinatorial auction. We then examine 
some possibilities for computing a reasonable benchmark figure, and compare it with the 
benchmarks that are already used for the unit-demand special-case of the combinatorial 
auction.
6.2 Definitions
In these auctions we assume that the seller can perform some service and that there are 
also ‘feasible sets’ of buyers who could be served.
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We define a forward set-system auction analogously to the set-system auction de­
scribed in Section 1.4.1.
Let a set system be specified by a set £ of n elements, each representing an
agent, and a collection J7 C 2£ of feasible sets; these are the subsets of agents that make 
a possible solution for the seller (i.e., for all T £ T then every agent e £ T can be served 
simultaneously).
Let the valuation vector v = (di ,..., vn) represents the (private) valuation ve that 
each agent e will place on being chosen at the auction. For ease of notation, let vw — 
X)eeW Ve ke an aggregate function.
Each buyer e then makes a bid be to the mechanism. The mechanism may then 
choose a ‘winning’ set S of agents to serve, and ask that each agent e £ S' will pay some 
price pe £ [0, ve) for the service provided and agents that are not in the winning set 
do not pay, Ve ^ S,pe = 0. These are the commonly-made assumptions of ‘no positive 
transfers’ and ‘voluntary participation’ (see, e.g., [35]).
Unlike some other forms of auction, we only consider that agents are ‘winning’ (in 
the chosen solution) or ‘losing’ (not in the chosen solution). We do not consider that 
an agent could receive more than one service or that the agent may value the services 
differently.
Raising revenue by auction has often been studied in the literature, as Combinatorial 
Auctions (e.g. [38, 35]). We now consider the similarities between these combinatorial 
auctions and the set-system auctions proposed.
6.3 Comparison with Combinatorial Auctions
In order to provide some context for a comparison, we begin with a commonly-used 
description of a Combinatorial Auction.
6.3.1 Definitions
There is a set of m indivisible items and a set of n bidders that each wish to purchase 
some combination(s) of these items. Every bidder e has a valuation function t>e, which 
specifies the value that bidder e has for each subset (or bundle) of items. We assume 
that these valuations are monotonic -— that S C T ve(S) < ve{T) and that ^e(0) = 0.
A solution to a combinatorial auction is an allocation of the items (Ai,..., An) to the 
bidders, when Ae is the set of items allocated to agent e, such that no item is allocated 
to more than one bidder. Each bidder pays some price pe, depending on the allocation 
the bidder receives. (We assume that if ve{Ae) — 0 then pe = 0, that any agent does 
not pay if he does not receive a bundle that he was interested in). Let A be the set of 
all possible allocations.
There are different ways of looking at the effectiveness of Combinatorial Auctions, 
such as maximizing the social welfare (i.e., ]Cee{i,...)n} ve{Ae))> but as our interest is with
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the payment bounds, we will be concerned with the total revenue raised by the auction 
(i.6.,
6.3.2 Comparison of Set-System Auctions and Combinatorial Auctions
Both standard combinatorial auctions and our forward set-system auctions deal with 
the same scenario — when bids are invited, by some authority, for the purchase of goods 
or services. We will briefly look at some of the differences between the two settings.
Very often, combinatorial auctions are considered with free-disposal — that not all 
items must be allocated. This is also generally assumed in the case of reverse set-system 
auctions, as there is never any benefit in making payments to more agents than are 
strictly necessary.
The value of this assumption is not so obvious for a forward set-system auction, as 
it may actually raise more revenue by choosing to sell to fewer agents, so the difference 
between the two settings (of having open or closed sets) may be pertinent. For example, 
consider that a truthful mechanism wishes to sell two items to more than three buyers. 
However, only two of the buyers have a non-zero valuation for the items. A truthful 
mechanism could sell two items, at a price of zero, or possibly actually just sell one item 
at the second-highest price, and gain some revenue. Therefore, it may be advantageous 
to allow winning sets that are subsets of other feasible sets. Clearly in a procurement 
auction, it is never advantageous to buy more items than needed. If a mechanism were 
satisfied with buying one item, at the second-lowest price, then buying two items instead 
would result in paying the third-lowest price for both of them. Hence there is never an 
advantage to have winning sets that are supersets of other feasible sets.
In some cases we may wish to have only an open set of feasible solutions. By way of 
example, consider an auction of radio services to subscribers. It may be that, in order 
to reach some particular set of subscribers, that a particular transmitter would need to 
be activated — but that this transmitter may also inevitably reach some other set of 
subscribers, who can then also receive the service.
We will briefly take a look at comparing the expressivity of forward set-system auc­
tions and combinatorial auctions. In order to do this, we will assume that set-systems 
are closed downwards, and that combinatorial auctions allow free disposal so that the 
two settings are similar.
We see that the special-case of single-minded combinatorial auctions (when each 
agent values exactly one bundle) are not expressive enough to describe all set-system 
auctions, and that set-system auctions are trivially not expressive enough to describe 
all general combinatorial auctions. (It seems likely that set-system auctions lie strictly 
between single-minded and general combinatorial auctions, in terms of expressivity, but 
no proof is shown here).
Proposition 6.1. There exists a forward set-system auction that may not be described 
by a single-minded combinatorial auction.
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Proof. The proof consists of a short example, as follows
Let € = {1,2,3}
Let 7-= {{1,2},{1,3},{2,3}}
Let vi — V2 = V3 = 1
That is, there are three agents who wish to buy some service, but only (any) two 
may be served simultaneously. In a single-minded combinatorial auction, each agent 
may value only one bundle of items; hence if two agents share a common item in their 
bundle, they may not both be selected. Clearly, if this allows the feasible sets given 
({1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2,3}) then none of the agents may share a common item and all three 
agents could be allocated items simultaneously — giving a possible solution ({1,2,3}) 
which is not one of the feasible sets. This set-system auction can, therefore, not be 
properly described by a single-minded combinatorial auction.
□
We also observe that general combinatorial auctions can express auctions that for­
ward set-system auctions cannot, as follows.
Consider any auction where one agent values two items with different, but non­
zero, valuations in a combinatorial auction. A set-system auction allows an agent to 
be selected, or not, but does not allow a choice of valuations for any agent, so trivially 
cannot describe a combinatorial auction that allows a choice of valuations.
6.4 Benchmarks
We will now consider the problem of benchmarking forward set-system auctions, in 
order to be able to provide a reasonable way of measuring the performance of truthful 
mechanisms, in terms of payments.
6.4.1 Optimal Solution as a Benchmark
As we saw in Chapter 1 for reverse auctions, perhaps the first approach to look for 
a benchmark would be to take the value of OPT - an optimal solution that may be 
obtained by an omniscient mechanism,
OPT = max ve.
e€S
However it is well-known, and easy to observe, that attaining even close to an optimal 
solution may not be possible in the realm of truthful mechanisms. An illustration of 
this can be seen when only one of the bidders e has a non-zero valuation ue > 0 for 
some service. An optimal mechanism may be able to offer the service for a fixed price
Chapter 6. Benchmarks for Forward Auctions 135
of va and agent e may accept, raising revenue ve. Truthful mechanisms are known to be 
bid-independent (see, e.g., [16]), hence if agent e wins in a truthful mechanism he will be 
expected to pay some amount relating to the bids of the competing agents — hence no 
more than zero. (Observe that this property is satisfied by threshold payments.) Being 
bid-independent means that the particular payment to some agent must not depend on 
the value of that agent’s bid (or else, given two possible winning bids of b and V and 
respective payments p, p' then when p1 > p sna. agent with valuation b may falsely declare 
b* and strictly increase utility, hence the mechanism could not be truthful). With all 
other bids being fixed, any variance in one agent’s bid may decide if it is chosen in the 
winning set, or not, but not the payment value that is received if it is chosen. So no 
truthful mechanism will obtain any revenue for this auction.
As it seems that OPT would be hard to attain, or even approximate, for truthful 
mechanisms it seems that we need some less demanding benchmark. We will firstly 
try the relatively naive approach of simply mirroring the NTUmin definition to give 
FlNTUmax (and observe that 0 < FINTUmax <OPT). We will also try another obvious 
variant, F2NTUmax, before settling on a third, which we will denote FNTUmax.
6.4.2 Considering FINTUmax as a Benchmark
As we are looking for a benchmark for selling items, rather than buying, it is reason­
able to choose some maximum value rather than the minimum that we used in reverse 
auctions. Let FINTUmax (for Forward Non-Transfer able Utility max) be defined as 
follows.
For a given set-system (S,F), let n = \£\ and suppose there is a valuation vector 
v = (ui,..., vn). For an instance / = (£, J7, v) of the problem, define FlNTUmax(I) as 
FlNTUmax(/) — B when B is the solution to the following problem.
Let S G argmax^j- vs and maximize B = subject to
(P) be < ve for all e £ -S'
(20 Ee^vr be > Ee€T\5 for bX\ T G F
(30 for every e e S', there \sTeG F such that e ^ Te and Ee'eS\Te be' = J2e'£Ts\s ve'
Now consider Example 6.1 below as a setting for an auction, which shows FINTUmax 
may be arbitrarily lower than the revenue obtained by VCG.
Example 6.1.
Let there be Q identical items to be sold amongst n — Q + 1 (unit-demand) bidders. 
Each competing agent would like to be served, with some valuation for the service, but 
only Q agents may be served simultaneously. (This is obviously comparable with the 
single-commodity auctions that were presented in Chapter 3 for the reverse setting.)
Let the valuation vector be
v = (1,...,1,0)
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(i.e., only the final agent n values an item at 0; all other agents value an item at 1). 
Choosing S optimally gives S = — 1}, and as max^sve = 0 in order to satisfy
condition (tf) we will have be = 0 for all e £ S and hence FlNTUmax= 0. Observe 
that we could use the VCG mechanism for this auction, and could sell Q items with the 
VCG payment being the same for all agents, the (Q + l)s£ highest valuation.
However, now let us assume that we have an auction where the auctioneer may 
choose to leave some agents unserved (or some items unsold — this is comparable to 
the notion of ‘free-disposal’ in combinatorial auctions). Considering Example 6.1 again, 
perhaps the mechanism will have chosen, in advance, to implement a fc-item Vickrey 
auction with k = Q — 1. A /c—item Vickrey auction is a single-price auction that sells 
k items to the k highest bidders at the price equal to the k -I- 1st highest bid (see [37]). 
In this case, each of the Q — 1 agents chosen would pay a threshold value of 1 (as there 
is some agent not selected with valuation 1), and the total revenue obtained would be
Q-i-
It is important to discuss how the mechanism would choose how many items to 
sell. If the mechanism were to examine the bids first, and then choose k accordingly to 
optimize revenue then this mechanism would not be truthful.
To illustrate this, consider an example with 2 identical items for sale, to be sold 
amongst 3 bidders who each value either item equally. Let the valuation vector be 
v = (8,5,2). If all agents bid truthfully, then the mechanism chooses k — 1 to sell 1 
item to agent 1 at price pi = 5, and agent 2 has utility = 0. Alternatively, agent 2 
may bid 62 = 3. Now it is optimal for the mechanism to sell 2 items to agents 1 and 
2 at price pi = P2 — 2; and agent 2 will receive utility U2 — ^2 — P2 = 3. Therefore, 
agent 2 has strictly increased utility from 0 to 3 by submitting some bid other than the 
valuation; which proves that this mechanism is not truthful.
Randomized Mechanisms
If we consider Example 6.1 again, we can propose a randomized mechanism that will 
choose the number of items k to be sold uniformly at random from {1,..., Q} and then 
proceed with a fc-item Vickrey auction. For a randomized mechanism, there is more than 
one meaning for truthfulness (see,e.g., [2]) — a mechanism that is truthful in expectation 
means that no agent will be benefit, on average, by submitting an untruthful bid, but it is 
possible that there are occasions when an agent may gain greater utility by submitting an 
untruthful bid, depending on the choices made by the randomized mechanism. However, 
there is also a stronger notion of truthfulness — that of being universally truthful, which 
is when, no matter what decisions are made by the randomized algorithm, an agent 
always maximizes its utility by submitting truthful bids.
Here, we can see that this mechanism is not only truthful in expectation, but also 
universally truthful, as follows. No bid can affect the choice of k and, given that k has 
been decided, the fc-item Vickrey auction is known to be truthful.
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The expected revenue of this mechanism on Example 6.1 is easy to compute, when 
k = Q then the mechanism obtains revenue 0 and when k ^ Q then the mechanism 
obtains revenue k. Hence this randomized mechanism will achieve revenue of approxi­
mately Q/2 in expectation, yet our benchmark figure FINTUmax would suggest a value 
of zero, as it has assumed k — Q being the optimal choice of winning set. This suggests 
that FINTUmax may be too weak to use as a benchmark, certainly for measuring the 
payments of randomized mechanisms.
As randomized mechanisms are commonly studied in the literature, (e.g. the Random 
Sampling Optimal Price (RSOP) auctions and Sampling Cost Sharing (SCS) auctions 
of Goldberg et al. in [17, 16, 1, 28]) then it would seem prudent to require that any 
reasonable benchmark should not be arbitrarily smaller than the expected revenue of a 
truthful randomized mechanism.
Non-Optimal choices of winning set
In the procurement auction the goal of the auctioneer was to minimize the payment. As 
a consequence of this, it is reasonable to always choose a minimal feasible set — adding 
superfluous agents to a winning set is undesirable as it will both increase the number 
of agents that need to be paid and increase the bid values that are considered (as we 
assume that lowest-bidding agents are more preferred agents and will be chosen first).
However, this coincident behaviour is not maintained when we consider forward 
auctions. While our auctioneer would like the winning set to be large, to sell as many 
items as possible, this comes at the cost of decreasing prices (again, we assume that the 
highest-bidding agents are more preferred and will be chosen first).
As we have seen that truthful mechanisms are bid-independent, we can see that it 
may certainly be beneficial to sell only a smaller number of items in order to optimize 
the revenue obtained, as was shown in Example 6.1.
We can observe from condition (3) of the NTUmin definition (Definition 1.2) that 
the ‘bid’ value allocated to any agent will be determined by the bids of ‘losing’ agents. 
Therefore, when we consider a similar benchmark for forward auctions, we must in­
evitably conclude that always choosing the revenue-maximizing winning set will give an 
unreliable benchmark, as it may overly restrict the values of the losing agents. Therefore 
choosing an optimal winning set may give a value that is arbitrarily lower than some 
reasonable truthful (possibly randomized) mechanism may be expected to achieve, as 
can be demonstrated with Example 6.1.
As randomized mechanisms are well-used it seems reasonable to strengthen the 
benchmark. We may initially attempt this strengthening by giving a choice of winning 
set rather than only allowing the optimal.
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6.4.3 Considering F2NTUmax as a Benchmark
We may first attempt to strengthen the benchmark by considering every possible feasible 
set as a candidate, and choosing the largest of the resulting values for a benchmark, which 
we define as F2NTUmax as follows.
F2NTUmax(/) = max^^jr Bs when Bs is defined by the solution to the following 
problem.
maximize Bs — subject to
(l") be < ve for all e € 5 
(2") YeZS\Tbe > YeeT\SVe for all T £ F
(3") for every e £ S, there isTe £ F such that e £Te and X^e'es\Te be' ~ Ye'eTeXS11^
However, it quickly becomes obvious that such an approach may lead to set-systems 
for which this value cannot be defined. For example, let S = {1,2}, let F — {{1}, {2}}, 
let v\ — 1 and let V2 — 0. If we allowed arbitrary choices of S, we could have S = {2} 
and in order to satisfy condition (2//) (for set T2 — {1}) we would have 62 > vi giving 
62 > 1. However condition (l") requires 62 < 0, hence the benchmark could not be 
defined for this set-system as we cannot satisfy the constraints.
In order to avoid this problem, we consider a third approach - by enumerating the 
proposed benchmark (FNTUmax) over all possible sizes of the winning set, and choosing 
the largest value. For each possible size, we consider the optimal winning set of that size, 
and then choose the size, and hence winning set, to be the one that gives the largest 
value. We can see that, by choosing an optimal winning set for its size, then we do 
not have the same problem with an undefined benchmark, yet we also get a stronger 
approach than FINTUmax.
6.4.4 Considering FNTUmax as a Benchmark
We now define the benchmark FNTUmax as follows;
FNTUmax(/) = maxi<fc<n B^ when Bk is defined by the solution to the following 
problem.
Let Sk & argmax5j.gj7.i5j. |=fcU5fc and maximize Bk ~ YeeSk be subject to 
(1+) be < ve for all e € 5 
(2+) Ye£S\T be — YeeT\S ve ^or ah J1 € J7
(3+) for every e £ S, there is Te e J” such that e £Te and Ye'eS\Te be' ~ Ye'€Te\s
Observe that, in Example 6.1 we have FNTUmax= Q — 1 (asfc = Q — 2is optimal) and 
recall that the randomized /c-item Vickrey auction suggested gives an expected revenue 
of approximately Q/2, which shows that FNTUmax is at least strong enough to be a 
reasonable benchmark for this example.
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6.4.5 Benchmarks for Unit Demand Auctions
We now consider the special-case of unit-demand combinatorial auctions. These are 
analogous to the single-commodity auction discussed in Chapter 3, in the forward setting, 
but further restricted so that each agent only wishes to purchase one item.
In this setting, we have some quantity Q of homogeneous items for sale. There are 
n agents, each of whom would like to purchase one of these items, and each agent e has 
some private valuation ve that he places on receiving the item. Each agent submits one 
sealed bid be and the auctioneer will allocate the Q items (or less), one to each bidder, 
to give a winning set S C {1,..., n}. We assume that each agent e e S then pays some 
price pe G [0, be] for purchasing the item and agents that are not allocated an item do not 
pay, We ^ S,pe — 0 (i.e., we assume ‘no positive transfers’ and ‘voluntary participation’).
This unit-demand auction has been studied previously, notably by Goldberg et al. [16] 
which examines competitive mechanisms for these goods auction, also with unlimited 
supply, such as digital goods. In order to establish what they call a competitive frame­
work (this is the same notion of bounding payments that we have referred to as ‘frugal­
ity’) they also require some sort of benchmark figure for their auctions and we reproduce 
the definition here.
) is defined as follows: Let b be a bid vector and let ue be the e-th largest bid in 
the vector b. Auction on input b determines the value k such that k>2 and kvk 
is maximized. All bidders with be > vk win at price vk] all remaining bidders lose. The 
profit of J7^ on input b is thus
F^ib) = max kvk
2<k<n
We will now see how this benchmark value is closely related to our FNTUmax, 
in the special case of unit demand auctions.
Lemma 6.2. For a unit-demand auction having valuations v\> ...>vn, the inequality 
FNTUmax > maxi^/^ kvk+i holds .
Proof. Let Sk be the highest-valuation feasible set that contains k agents. For each agent 
e £ Sk, let j be the agent in £\with the highest valuation. Let Te — Sk\ {e} U {j} be 
a feasible set (where j replaces e). Condition (2+) tells us that bSk\Te > vTe\Sk, which 
is simplified to be > vj .
Let Sk = (1,..., fc) (recall the agents are sorted into decreasing order of valuation, 
ui > ... > vn), then let j = fc + 1 and we have Ve <k7be> vk+i.
Therefore, when computing over size fc, we have b3k > kvk+1. As FNTUmax maxi­
mizes over all 1 < fc < n, then it follows that FNTUmax > maxi<k<nkvk+i}
□
We can now compare this lower bound for FNTUmax with and see that the 
ratio between them is bounded by a factor of 2.
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Lemma 6.3. For unit-demand forward auctions, p^TUmax — 2- 
Proof. We have seen the definition that JF^(b') = max2<fc<n kv/c
and Lemma 6.2 which shows FNTUmax > maxi<fc<n kv^+i . Fixing the k which max­
imizes let A:' = fe — 1. We saw in the proof of Lemma 6.2 that bskr > k'n^+i and 
hence FNTUmax > We can rewrite this (substituting A: — 1 = fc') as
FNTUmax > (k - l)vk>
and, as we have fixed k to be the maximum, from its definition we have
F(2) - kvk.
Hence doing the division gives
F& ^ k 
FNTUmax ~ A; - 1 ’
and as A; > 2, from the definition of this can be simplified to
JF<2) ^ 2
FNTUmax " I
□
Now Lemma 6.3 allows us to leverage the results from [16], to show that no de­
terministic mechanism can be competitive with respect to FNTUmax. Their theorem 
statement is reproduced here.
Theorem 4-1 Let Af be any symmetric deterministic auction defined by bid-independent 
function f. Then Af is not competitive: For any 1 < m < n there exists a bid vector 
b of length n such that the profit of Af onh is at most
Using Lemma 6.3 we can fix m = 2 to give a similar result for FNTUmax.
Corollary 6.4, Let Af be any symmetric deterministic auction defined by bid-independent 
function f. Then there exists a bid vector b of length n such that the profit of Af on b 
is at most FNTUmax(b)^ .
6.4.6 Considering Alternatives to FNTUmax
As we have noted that NTUmax can be used as an alternative benchmark to NTUmin, 
and is in some ways more desirable, we could consider using FNTUmin rather than 
FNTUmax. If we minimize over the choice of the size parameter, k, then the auction 
given in Example 6.1 (with valuations (1,1, e,..., e, 0)) will result in a benchmark value 
of 0, which is unrealistically low (by choosing k = Q). Hence we must still maximize
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over the size parameter k, yet we will minimize the value given by a fixed winning set, 
as follows.
Define FNTUmin(I) = maxi<^<n when is defined by the solution to the 
following problem.
Let Sk G argmax^^.j^i^ and minimize Bk = Ee€Sfc subject to (l+),(2+) 
and (3+).
It is worth observing that in the case of the unit-demand auctions discussed earlier, 
that we will always have FNTUmin = FNTUmax; the bid of each agent e e S is defined 
by the feasible set Te — S \ {e} U {j} (i.e., be = Vj) when j is the item in £ \ 5 with 
the largest valuation. This means that each bid is defined by the valuation of a single 
agent and there is no variation in the bids, hence the minimum and maximum values 
are equal.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Discussion
7.1 Conclusion
To conclude, for each of the chapters, we will examine the main results, give a discussion 
on the impact of these results and consider the main questions that have been left open 
by this work.
7.1.1 Discussion and Summary of Main Results
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 gives a result for the frugality of VCG that seems to be reasonably obvious, 
but not specifically documented elsewhere. The result for the frugality of monotonic 
approximation mechanisms, in general, is an extension of this. Again, this result does 
not appear to be documented elsewhere and is a more generalized version of Theorem 
18 in [11]. Showing that only minimal winning sets need be considered with regard to 
tie-breaking (for VCG) is, likewise, fairly obvious but has been documented for com­
pleteness.
Chapter 3
We introduced a very natural single-commodity auction. We show that even in a very 
limited special case where only {1,2} quantities are permitted, VCG has poor frugality 
(with respect to NTUmin). We gave a mechanism that greatly improves the frugality in 
this special case. This result is within a constant factor of optimal for similar types of 
mechanism, but we have not shown that it is close to optimal for all truthful mechanisms 
(although it does seem likely). We have also shown a lower bound for the general case 
which shows that a blind-scaling mechanism of the same type will only be able to achieve 
relatively small gains in frugality. We conjecture that there is some scaling mechanism 
that may gain an improvement in frugality, by preferring agents with larger quantities 
over smaller ones, but have been unable to provide any proof, and confirming this remains 
an open question.
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One obvious open question for both these cases is whether the scaling mechanism 
could do better. There may be other types of (non-linear) scaling mechanism that have 
better frugality, which has not been addressed here. Perhaps allowing a mechanism more 
information about the instance, before it decides on scaling (or other) factors, would 
help. If more information helps lower frugality, then the question arises of exactly which 
information about the instance a mechanism would need in order to improve frugality, 
yet could still do so truthfully. Rather than the lower bound we have, restricted to a 
class of ‘blind-scaling’ mechanisms, one goal would be to find a lower bound on frugality 
for all truthful mechanisms.
We could extend the scope of this chapter to relax the requirement that quantities are 
integer, and examine the frugality of the mechanisms in that setting. It seems unlikely 
that a simple blind-scaling mechanism will achieve better frugality than VCG, as the 
range of quantities in the instances can vary arbitrarily.
Chapter 4
The generalization of path-auctions given in Chapter 4, which assumes that agents may 
sell bundles of edges, appears to have some reasonable motivation, although we show 
that finding an exact solution is NP-hard. The polynomial-time mechanism shown for it 
has an unsatisfactorily large frugality ratio (due to only a naive approximation algorithm 
being used). The best approximation ratio we have is k (the number of edges owned 
by each agent), but we do not have an inapproximability result showing that it would 
be hard to do better, so this remains an obvious open question. Scaling approaches for 
path-auctions have been shown to work well (e.g. [24, 39], and we have seen mechanisms 
proposed recently ([5] and [25]) that give a better frugality ratio than VCG for some 
problems, mostly related to vertex covers.
It is a natural question to ask if similar approaches could improve frugality for 
this auction (even for the NP-hard exact solution). An interesting direction for future 
research would be to look for a truthful mechanism that can implement a better ap­
proximation algorithm (if it can be shown that one exists) and that can also improve 
frugality by scaling. By doing this, it may be possible to create a genuinely practical 
auction — that is both tractable and has good frugality.
Chapter 5
Chapter 5 examines a number of methods of obtaining prices through first-price auc­
tions which could be considered as possible alternatives to NTUmin as benchmarks for 
measuring frugality. We initially described a way to look at finding feasible first-price 
bids on set-system auctions as a hypergraph of constraint sets.
Recently the focus has been more on using NTUmax as a benchmark rather than 
NTUmin (e.g. [5, 25]). As we show that NTUmin may be hard to approximate, this is a 
reason for intuitively believing that it may be unrealistically low for use as a benchmark.
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The uniformly rising first-price auction that was proposed seems to be a good way 
of producing a reasonable single solution but it may prove to be difficult to analyse.
We considered the process of taking maximal bids from agents in some order and 
saw that this ordering always produces a range of values between NTUmin(c) and 
NTUmax(c) and that certain instances allow both extremes to be reached with the 
appropriate ordering. This is another good way to produce some feasible solution (e.g. 
with a random ordering), but this still possibly leaves a large range of values to choose 
from and finding the ordering that gives a minimum is hard to approximate. We also 
showed that NTUmin may be hard to approximate even where calculating NTUmax is 
tractable (such as for edge cover auctions).
In the general case, even with just ternary constraint sets, we have seen examples that 
the minimum ordering value, OMBmin(c), may be significantly higher than NTUmin(c) 
(i.e., OMBmin(c) > 2n(NTUmin(c)/9), as well as an example where OMBmax(c) may 
be lower than NTUmax(c). Where the size of the winning set S is restricted to |5j < 4, 
we saw that OMBmin(c) = NTUmin(c), but that this does not hold where |5| > 5.
In the restricted case of binary-single value constraints, we saw a proof that that 
OMBmin(c) < NTUmin(c)/2 and a class of examples for which OMBmin(c) / NTUmin(c) 
appicaches 2, matching the lower bound. Even in this restricted setting, we saw that 
approximating either NTUmin(c) or OMBmin(c) to within a factor of n1-e for any e > 0 
is NP-hard.
In the case of single-commodity auctions we saw that OMBmin(c) may be greater 
than NTUmin(c) by up to a factor of 2, but we do not currently know of any upper 
bound for this ratio (other than the trivial \S\). It remains an open question whether it 
would always be possible to find an ordering cr such that bg < 2NTUmin(c). However, 
we have seen that a number of reasonable heuristics for creating an ordering cr give 
bg >2 NTUmin(c) for some examples.
Chapter 6
Chapter 6 considered possible benchmark values for forward auctions. We saw that 
the definitions used in the reverse auctions can not immediately be adapted, but that 
by expanding the scope we can give a possible candidate, which at least seems to be 
adequate for unit-demand auctions.
We saw that the problems of defining a benchmark for forward and reverse auctions 
are fundamentally quite different and that in the forward setting we cannot reasonably 
hope to use a benchmark that is simply based upon choosing a single, optimal, feasible 
set, as was the case for reverse auctions.
We have proposed an auction framework for forward auctions based on the set-system 
idea used in procurement auctions. While we did not give many details of the expressivity 
of this auction, it seems likely that it lies strictly between single-minded combinatorial 
auctions and general combinatorial auctions, so finding an exact characterization may 
be an interesting problem left open.
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We have proposed a benchmark, FNTUmax, based on the definitions used for NTU- 
min in procurement auctions, that can be applied to all forward set-system auctions. 
As this involves computing over all possible sizes of feasible sets and not just minimal 
feasible sets as in procurement auctions, it is likely to be harder to analyse. However, we 
have seen that in the special case of unit-demand auctions, it is close to a previously-used 
benchmark, , which suggests that it may have some potential.
It remains to be seen if this FNTUmax value could be used as a benchmark figure 
for more expressive auctions, such as general combinatorial auctions. Due to the nature 
of counting over all sizes of feasible sets, it is possible that this will prove too strong 
a benchmark such that not even randomized mechanisms will be able to give some 
performance guarantee with respect to FNTUmax, this is an area that has not yet been 
addressed.
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